On Motion For Rehearing.
Eberhardt, Judge.Able counsel for defendant in error, in a motion evidencing exhaustive study of the authorities, particularly those from our Georgia courts, urge that the many cases cited in their motion require a different result. We have read with care all of them, but we do not agree. The cases relied upon fall generally into distinguishable categories of instances where the deceased declarant’s statement was offered as a part of the res gestae but was held, under the circumstances of the case, not to be (W. & A. R. Co. v. Beason, 112 Ga. 553, 37 SE 863; Hunter v. State, 147 Ga. 823, 95 SE 668; Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 179, 172 SE 467; East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237, 2 SE 941; White v. Southern Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 353, 51 SE 411; Fulton v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 19 Ga. App. 127, 91 SE 228; Higgins v. Trentham, 186 Ga. 264, 197 SE 862), or as a dying declaration which was held not admissible in a civil case under the rule concerning such (Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 179, supra; Wooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223, 99 AD 456), to show an intent or a state of mind (Miller v. Everett, 192 Ga. 26, 14 SE2d 449; Paris v. Paris, 207 Ga. 341, 61 SE2d 491; Gullatt v. Thompson, 61 Ga. App. 253, 6 SE2d 447; Wooten v. Wilkins, supra), to show *85delivery of a deed or lack thereof (thus affecting title to land) (Blalock v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573, 13 SE 551; Smith v. Smith, 206 Ga. 461, 57 SE2d 611; Miller v. Everett, 192 Ga. 26, supra; Dollar v. Thompson, 212 Ga. 831, 96 SE2d 493; Fuller v. Fuller, 213 Ga. 103, 97 SE2d 306), declarations against interest (or in his owtu interest), as affecting title (Whitaker v. Smith, 33 Ga. 237; Massee-Felton Lbr. Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 50 SE 92; Miller v. Everett, 192 Ga. 26, supra; Blalock v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573, supra; Freeman v. Brewster, 93 Ga. 648, 21 SE 165; Hollis v. Sales, 103 Ga. 75, 29 SE 482; Groover v. Wilkes, 145 Ga. 714, 89 SE 761; Hill v. McLendon, 147 Ga. 733, 95 SE 232; State Banking Co. v. Miller, 185 Ga. 653, 196 SE 47; Higgins v. Trentham, 186 Ga. 264, supra; Smith v. Smith, 206 Ga. 461, supra), cases in which there was other evidence or there were other witnesses (whether favorable or unfavorable) available (Drawdy v. Hesters, 130 Ga. 161, 60 SE 451, 15 LRA (NS) 190; Hunter v. State, 147 Ga. 823, supra; East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237, supra; White v. Southern Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 353, supra; Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 179, supra; Lanier v. Huguley, 91 Ga. 791, 18 SE 39; Freeman v. Brewster, 93 Ga. 648, supra; Hollis v. Sales, 103 Ga. 75, supra; Groover v. Wilkes, 145 Ga. 714, supra; Hill v. McLendon, 147 Ga. 733, supra; State Banking Co. v. Miller, 185 Ga. 653, supra; Higgins v. Trentham, 186 Ga. 264, supra; Hobbs v. Houston, 190 Ga. 505, 9 SE2d 749; Smith v. Smith, 206 Ga. 461, supra; Paris v. Paris, 207 Ga. 341, supra; Rabun v. Wynn, 209 Ga. 80, 70 SE2d 745; Fuller v. Fuller, 213 Ga. 103, supra; Gullatt v. Thompson, 61 Ga. App. 253, supra).
Two cases are cited which, on their facts, closely parallel the case here. Bolton v. Columbia Cas. Co., 34 Ga. App. 658 (130 SE 535), and Poole v. East Tenn. &c. Ry. Co., 92 Ga. 337 (17 SE 267). These, however, are distinguishable. In each of them the ruling was altogether on the basis of the rule of res gestae, and in neither was the rule of necessity dealt with. Moreover, in Poole the case turned upon the physical condition of a railroad crossing, a matter about which there should have been ample other evidence available.
Counsel urge that since the statement here was in the interest *86of the deceased declarant it is necessarily excluded by the terms of Code § 38-309. We do not agree. The provisions of the Code sections dealing with hearsay are not exhaustive of those in which hearsay is admissible and do not pre-empt the area. Rea v. Pursley, 170 Ga. 788, 793 (154 SE 325); Ellis v. O’Neal, 175 Ga. 652, 657 (165 SE 751). And see, on the matter of such declarations when they are “self-serving,” McCormick, Evidence, § 275 (1954).
The doctrine of stare decisis has been invoked. “This is an action for negligence; and while even as applicable to such cases an erroneous decision, if thoroughly established, might be followed as a matter of judicial policy, yet the rule of stare decisis is usually considered as one more appropriately applied to vested property rights.” Rogers v. Carmichael, 184 Ga. 496, 511 (192 SE 39). Dean Roscoe Pound has stated that stare decisis is “ . . . primarily useful as a principle where rules of property and rules of commercial transactions [are] involved.” Pound, Law Finding Through Experience and Reason, 39-40 (1960). Other jurisdictions have followed this rule and the rule of Rogers, 184 Ga. 496, supra, e. g., Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290 (32 A2d 227, 234); Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., 183 Va. 704 (33 SE2d 201, 205). And, if the cases upon which there is reliance in the invoking of the doctrine were in all respects applicable and on no basis distinguishable, we should feel obliged, under that rule, to follow the principle of the older cases of Feagin v. Beasley, 23 Ga. 17, and Tilman v. Stringer, 26 Ga. 171.
Further effort to make clear our view, as outlined in the opinion, would be a work of supererogation or a rechauffe of what we have already said.
Motion denied.
Carlisle, P. J., and Custer, J., concur.