(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
I would hold that the probate court failed to properly exercise its discretion when, in ruling on petitioner’s request for a rehearing, it limited its inquiry to whether petitioner could establish "fraud and/or material facts not discoverable at the time of the original hearing”. I would reverse.
The record presents a petitioner who, at the age of 18, released any rights that he may have had to his putative daughter, Lynda Mae Koroly, born May 4, 1984. He did so pursuant to the Michigan Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq.; MSA 27.3178(555.21) et seq., by filing with the probate court a disclaimer of paternity as provided under MCL 710.37(l)(b); MSA 27.3178(555.37)(l)(b). Petitioner’s patental rights were terminated by order entered June 12,1984.
Seventeen days after the order of termination had been entered, petitioner contacted the probate court and asked that the case be reopened. The court proceeded as though petitioner’s letter was a request for a rehearing under MCL 710.64(1); MSA 27.3178(555.64X1), which provides:
"Upon the filing of a petition in probate court within 20 days after entry of any order under this chapter, and after due notice to all interested parties, the judge of probate may grant a rehearing and may modify or set aside the order.”
The majority correctly concludes, as did the pro*90bate court, that the decision to grant petitioner’s request for a rehearing is within the sound discretion of the probate court and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In the Matter of Myers, 131 Mich App 160, 164; 345 NW2d 663 (1983); In the Matter of Michael Brent Hole, 102 Mich App 286, 290, fn 1; 301 NW2d 507 (1980).
The probate court went on to point out, however, what it perceived to be a lack of statutory or appellate authority regarding the factors to be considered in deciding motions for rehearing under MCL 710.64; MSA 27.3178(555.64). At a loss as to what to consider in deciding petitioner’s request, the court turned to the Juvenile Code, MCL 712A.1 et seq.; MSA 27.3178(598.1) et seq., and applicable court rules. The majority concludes that the probate court’s reliance on the standard employed in proceedings under the Juvenile Code constituted a proper exercise of its discretion. I must disagree.
The Juvenile Code governs the involuntary termination of parental rights where there is a showing, usually after a full evidentiary hearing, of parental abandonment, desertion or neglect. MCL 712A. 19a; MSA 27.3178(598.19a). See also In the Matter of Buckingham, 141 Mich App 828; 368 NW2d 888 (1985). A parent who defends against a petition for involuntary termination has the right to request a jury, MCL 712A.17(2); MSA 27.3178(598.17)(2) and may request appointment of counsel, MCL 712A.17(3); MSA 27.3178(598.17)(3). Thus, a parent seeking the rehearing of a termination order granted under the Juvenile Code does so with the disadvantage of having already been adjudicated unfit. A narrow and limited standard of evaluating such rehearing requests is, therefore, appropriate.
*91The Michigan Adoption Code, on the other hand, governs the completely different situation in which a parent voluntarily releases his or her minor child for adoption. Orders of termination under the Adoption Code are not preceded by an adjudication of child neglect, abuse or desertion. Rather, the primary focus at every stage of proceedings under the Adoption Code is on the voluntariness of the release. See, for example, MCL 710.29(5); MSA 27.3178(555.29)(5) and MCL 710.51(1); MSA 27.3178(555.51X1). Given the significant difference between proceedings under each code, I believe that it is an improper exercise of discretion to apply to voluntary termination cases the limited and narrow standard presently reserved for involuntary termination cases.
Moreover, I beleive that the probate court in this case indicated the need for some appellate guidance in deciding these rehearing requests under § 64 of the Michigan Adoption Code. I further believe that this Court should respond to that invitation.
I would hold that, in deciding a § 64 request for rehearing under the Michigan Adoption Code, the probate court should, at a minimum, consider on the record the best interests of the child or adoptee. The Michigan Legislature expressly announced in § 21a of the Adoption Code that one of its primary purposes was to "promote the best interests of each adoptee”. MCL 710.21a; MSA 27.3178(555.21a). Section 22 of the Adoption Code sets forth all of those factors which should be considered in determining the best interests of the adoptee or child. MCL 710.22; MSA 27.3178(555.22). It has been established that, where a putative father seeks at the outset to obtain custody of a child with whom he has no custodial or support relationship, the probate court must *92consider the best interests of the child in deciding the putative father’s claim. In the Matter of Baby Boy Barlow, 404 Mich 216, 235-236; 273 NW2d 35 (1978); In the Matter of Bell, 138 Mich App 184, 188; 360 NW2d 868 (1984). I would hold the probate court to a similar exercise of discretion where, as here, the putative father initially waives his parental rights and thus never obtains a hearing on the best interests of the child but timely requests rehearing under § 64 of the Adoption Code.
The probate court in this case agreed to accept evidence in response to petitioner’s request for a rehearing but limited its scope to that which established fraud or that which was newly discovered. We are thus presented with a probate court record in which there is little, if any, information .concerning the petitioner’s capacity and disposition to provide Lynda Mae Koroly with love, affection, education, food, clothing or medical care. We have insufficient information regarding the petitioner’s moral fitness or mental and physical health. The absence of this information undermines so important a process as terminating parental rights.
I have previously written to uphold the constitutionality of the 20-day rehearing provision under § 64 of the Michigan Adoption Code. In the Matter of Myers, supra. In so doing, I recognized that:
"A primary and permissible legislative purpose of the code is to preserve the finality of decisions to release children for adoption. A 20-day limitation on the right of a parent acting without support of the child placing agency to attempt to revoke a previously executed release bears a reasonable relation to this purpose.” 131 Mich App 166. (Citations omitted.)
Consistent with that opinion, I believe that the *93remedy provided under § 64 should be a meaningful one. The majority concludes and I agree that a change of heart does not guarantee petitioner a right to revoke his release. DeBoer v Child & Family Services of Michigan, Inc, 76 Mich App 641; 257 NW2d 200 (1977). Petitioner does not really contend otherwise on appeal. At the same time, however, a change of heart should not preclude petitioner from revoking his release if he can establish that a custody award in his favor would be in the best interests of the child.
I would reverse the probate court’s order denying petitioner’s request for relief and I would remand for an evidentiary hearing at which petitioner’s ability to provide for the best interests of Lynda Mae Koroly would be the paramount issue.