concurring in the result.
I concur with the result of the Court’s decision, but I disagree with the Court’s discussion of the effect of the prenuptial agreement and the Court’s application of community property principles to the support agreement.
In reaching its decision that there had been no substantial material change in Carolyn’s financial circumstances, the district court found the result to be the same with or without regard to the effect of the prenuptial agreement. The Court’s opinion does not address which of these analyses was correct. I write to express the opinion that the proper analysis was to consider the support agreement without regard to the prenuptial agreement. The support agreement and the prenuptial agreement were two independent contracts and must be considered on their own. Carolyn cannot change her obligations under the support agreement by entering into a subsequent contract to which Joe was not a party.
I also disagree with the Court’s application of community property principles to decide which of Frank’s assets should have been used in determining if her marriage to Frank had resulted in a material change in Carolyn’s financial situation. Although the general rule is that courts should apply the principles of community property in analyzing property settlements, this rule does not apply when the parties themselves have reached an agreement that differs from the normal rules of community property. See, Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983). This Court applies the usual rules of contract construction to property settlements. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342 (1992). “If a contract’s terms are clear and unambiguous, ... the meaning of the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract’s own words.” Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 489, 927 P.2d 873, 879 (1996)(quotes and citations omitted). Sub-paragraph 10E of the support agreement states that in determining if there has been a change in Carolyn’s financial circumstances, the court is to consider “the income and resources of her new husband____” Without the use of a limiting adjective, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “resources” would include both separate and community resources. The district court and the majority, however, have modified the support agreement by reading the word “resources” to mean community resources. Courts should not interpret contracts to mean something that is not in the contract itself. Miller v. Remior, 86 Idaho 121, 383 P.2d 596 (1963). Had Joe and Carolyn intended that the court’s consideration be limited only to community income and resources, they could have easily added that limitation to the support agreement. Having failed to add such a limitation, the court “cannot make for the parties better agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make----” J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960).
Although I disagree with the method the majority used to reach its decision, I concur with the result. The record shows that the bulk of Frank’s assets was contained in an irrevocable trust. Under the terms of the trust, Frank received the income from the trust assets. In addition, Frank could invade the trust principal, but only for “health, support, comfort, enjoyment and welfare.” Although, under this language Frank’s power to invade the trust principal is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Frank could not use the trust principal to the same extent as a true owner, the district court was correct in excluding the trust assets from its determination of Frank’s resources. When only the trust income is considered, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that Carolyn’s marriage to Frank did not result in a substantial material change in Carolyn’s financial circumstances.