(dissenting).
I
We dissent from the majority holding that the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the merc of public employees’ fair representation claims. The Court reaches that conclusion by noting that the pera was patterned on the nlra, under which courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the nlrb of fair representation cases. Having found no "adequate reason for departing from the federal model,” the majority finds that concurrent jurisdiction is similarly appropriate in Michigan public sector cases._
*72Public employee labor relations in Michigan are governed by the pera. MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. The purpose of the pera is set forth in the act’s title:
An act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide review from disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances and the holding of elections; to declare and protect the rights and privileges of public employees; and to prescribe means of enforcement and penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the Legislature has, through the pera, enumerated both the "rights and privileges” of public employees and the "means of enforc[ing]” those rights.1 One of the rights guaranteed by the pera to public employees is the right to be fairly represented by their labor organizations. Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651; 358 NW2d 856 (1984). To enforce that right, the Legislature has, also through the pera, conferred upon an administrative agency (the merc) exclusive jurisdiction of claims alleging its violation.
Bearing in mind this Court’s consistent construction of the pera as the dominant law in public employee labor relations,2 we are persuaded that the act’s jurisdictional provision for resolution of disputes like the one involved in the instant case *73is controlling. Further, despite the basic similarity of the legislation governing Michigan public employee labor relations to that regulating private sector employees subject to the nlra, we are persuaded that there are significant differences in the two schemes which mandate deference to the legislative choice.
A
Section 16 of the pera, MCL 423.216; MSA 17.455(16), provides that "[violations of the provisions of section 10 shall be deemed to be unfair labor practices remediable by the commission [merc] . . . .” We have repeatedly interpreted this section as vesting the merc with exclusive jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices. See Detroit Bd of Ed v Parks, 417 Mich 268, 283; 335 NW2d 641 (1983); Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich 104, 117; 252 NW2d 818 (1977); Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 616, 630; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975), app dis sub nom Crestwood Ed Ass'n v Bd of Ed of School Dist of Crestwood, 427 US 901 (1976). See also Labor Mediation Bd v Jackson Co Road Comm’rs, 365 Mich 645; 114 NW2d 183 (1962); Detroit Bd of Ed v Detroit Federation of Teachers, 55 Mich App 499, 503; 223 NW2d 23 (1974), lv den 394 Mich 807 (1975).
One of the practices proscribed in § 10, MCL 423.210(3); MSA 17.455(10X3), is set forth in § 10(3)(a):
(3) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization or its agents (a) to restrain or coerce: (i) public employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 9: Provided, That this subdivision shall not impair the right of a labor organization to *74prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
The rights guaranteed in § 9, MCL 423.209; MSA 17.455(9), are:
It shall be lawful for public employees to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organizations, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their public employers through representatives of their own free choice.
Defendant in the instant case argues, and we agree, that a union’s breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under § 10(3).3 Since violations of § 10 are within the merc’s exclusive jurisdiction according to § 16, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs suit.
The majority suggests that the following statement in Goolsby, supra, 665, n 6, indicates that *75our Court has already resolved this issue, and has held that jurisdiction over public employees’ fair representation claims is not exclusively in the merc, but rather is concurrent in the circuit courts and the merc:
In this state, a person claiming that a labor organization has breached its duty of fair representation can institute an administrative or a judicial proceeding, the former by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the nlrb or the merc, the latter by filing a complaint with a federal district or state circuit court.”
Since the issue of jurisdiction over fair representation claims was not before us in Goolsby, the statement was dictum and was not intended as an absolute ruling on the jurisdictional issue.
B
As the majority correctly notes, the nlrb has exclusive jurisdiction over most unfair labor practices. In Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 188; 87 S Ct 903; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967), a closely divided United States Supreme Court held, however, that courts have concurrent jurisdiction of fair representation actions even though the conduct complained of is arguably subject to the nlra.4 Having reviewed the Vaca Court’s reasons advanced in support of its decision to create an exception to exclusive agency jurisdiction for fair representation suits in the private sector, we are not persuaded that an analogous exception is warranted for fair representation suits in the public sector under the pera.
*76The first reason set forth by the Vaca Court for rejecting exclusive agency jurisdiction was that the substantive fair representation doctrine was developed by the courts, not by the nlrb. Preemptive agency jurisdiction, which is often warranted to avoid conflicting rules of law, was not deemed necessary in fair representation cases because the nlrb would simply apply the judicial doctrine.
The majority suggests that because Michigan courts had similarly recognized the right of fair representation in cases arising under the nlra before the concept of unfair labor practices was brought under the merc’s jurisdiction, we should follow the federal procedural scheme.
We do not dispute that the substantive doctrine was judicially developed. It must be remembered, however, that the doctrine has always been grounded upon a union’s statutorily imposed duty conferring its right to act as the exclusive bargaining agent.5 Until the enactment of the pera in 1965, public employees did not enjoy the substantive collective bargaining rights possessed by employees in the private sector. See Wayne Co Civil Service Comm v Bd of Supervisors, 384 Mich 363, 374; 184 NW2d 201 (1971). Moreover, we are persuaded that blind adherence to the federal procedural scheme is not necessarily mandated. In this regard, we believe that the majority overlooks some details of the pera’s legislative history which are, although perhaps not dispositive, relevant to any analysis of this jurisdictional question.
First, even prior to the enactment of § 10(3) of the pera, the merc had suggested that its jurisdiction extended to claims based on alleged breaches of the duty of fair representation. Reeths-Puifer *77School Dist v Wilder, 1970 MERC Lab Op 674, 678, aff'd on other grounds sub nom MERC v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, 391 Mich 253; 215 NW2d 672 (1974). Also, Vaca, which held that fair representation claims in the private sector would be treated differently than other unfair labor practices, was released well before § 10(3) of the pera was enacted in 1973. Yet § 10(3) does not distinguish fair representation claims from other unfair labor practices.
The Legislature is presumed to act with some knowledge of existing laws and decisions. Scholten v Rhoades, 67 Mich App 736; 242 NW2d 509 (1976). We suggest that these points indicate that the Legislature chose to depart from the federal scheme as to procedure and not carve out an exception to the pera’s exclusive jurisdiction.6
Another reason cited by the Vaca Court and by the majority here for allowing concurrent jurisdiction was an alleged lack of agency expertise in fair representation cases. The Court thus distinguished fair representation actions from other unfair labor practice actions, in which agency expertise is a main justification for affording the agency exclusive jurisdiction. We disagree for two reasons.
First, it does not necessarily follow that courts *78have jurisdiction merely because it cannot be said that the agency has more expertise than the courts concerning the matter involved.
More importantly, we believe that fair representation actions are precisely that type of matter within the scope of the merc’s expertise. This Court has acknowledged the merc’s "special expertise in statutory unfair labor practice matters.” Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 408 Mich 663, 684; 293 NW2d 278 (1980), see also Rockwell, supra, 630. And, while the Vaca Court opined that the relationship between the union and the individual employee was "merely peripheral,” we conclude, rather, that this relationship is essential to the effective administration of the pera. The relationship between an employee and a union harbors complicated problems regarding status (such as in the instant matter) which, we believe, are best left to the administrative agency responsible for the implementation of the act.
Another reason for concurrent jurisdiction advanced in Vaca dealt with the concern that some fair representation claims might go unredressed if the nlrb was given exclusive jurisdiction. This could happen, the Court noted, because the nlrb’s general counsel has unreviewable discretion in choosing to institute an unfair labor practice complaint.
The procedure under the pera eliminates that concern:
[The pera directs] that "[a]ny proceeding” relating to statutory unfair labor practice charges "shall be conducted pursuant to chapter 4 of [the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act]”, MCL 423.216(a); MSA 17.455(16)(a); and . . . [requires] that merc make findings of fact in resolving unfair practices complaints, and that merc’s decisions be reviewable as a matter of right in the Court of *79Appeals under the competent, material, and substantial evidence standard.8 MCL 423.216(d), 423.216(e); MSA 17.455(16)(d), 17.455(16)(e).
[Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n., supra, 678-679.]
Despite this safeguard under the pera, the majority believes that the trial courts are nevertheless more concerned with and better able to protect individual rights. The majority infers that the merc is more concerned with protecting the collective interests of workers than with an individual worker’s rights, yet offers no hard support for this bald allegation.
Thus, we conclude that there is no reason to believe that the merc will not give an employee’s fair representation claim its due consideration. Further, we believe that the procedures of the pera are adequate to fully resolve fair representation claims. MCL 423.216(b); MSA 17.455(16)(b) indicates, in pertinent part, that the merc can "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this act.” See Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 60 Mich App 606; 231 NW2d 479 (1975), aff'd 399 Mich 449; 249 NW2d 121 (1976). And, the Supreme Court has held that punitive damages "may not be assessed against a union that breaches its duty of fair representation by failing properly to pursue a grievance.” Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v Foust, 442 US 42, 52; 99 S Ct 2121; 60 L Ed 2d 698 (1979). Thus, we believe that such claims can and will be resolved by the merc.
Finally, the majority adopts the Vaca Court’s *80conclusion that it would be incongruous to permit an employee to bring an action in a court for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but restrict him to an agency forum for his complaint against the union. The statement that the "factual predicate [of the two actions] is essentially the same” (ante, p 62) obscures the undeniable basic difference between the actions. See Vaca, supra, 200-202 (Fortas, J., concurring in the result). And, simply because it is "quite common” (ante, p 63) to combine a breach of contract action against the employer with a fair representation action against the union is not, to us, a compelling reason to allow concurrent jurisdiction when the Legislature has provided for exclusive agency jurisdiction of the action against the union.
C
It is true that under our approach only public employees would be restricted to the agency forum for resolution of the one class of unfair labor practice claims at issue in the instant case. We would emphasize, however, that the bulk of unfair labor practice actions in both the public and private sectors are subject to exclusive agency jurisdiction. Further, the pera provides that a public employee who is dissatisfied with the merc’s decision on his fair representation claim may obtain review in the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we do not believe that our approach is as unfair and unreasonable as the majority suggests.
We conclude that the merc has exclusive jurisdiction of plaintiffs claim against his union.
II
In our order granting leave to appeal, we directed the parties to address the issue whether the *81duty of fair representation is a common-law right not statutorily derived.7 We have considered the issue and conclude that the duty is imposed by statute.
Prior to recognition of the duty of fair representation, the principal control on unions was political, i.e., dissatisfied members could replace their union by vote.8
The duty of fair representation was first recognized in Steele v Louisville & N R Co, 323 US 192; 65 S Ct 226; 89 L Ed 173 (1944), and Tunstall v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 US 210; 65 S Ct 235; 89 L Ed 187 (1944), a pair of cases involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act (rla). The Court in Steele held that if the rla granted exclusive bargaining authority to a union "without any commensurate statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. For the representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations . . . .” Steele, supra, 198. The Court avoided these constitutional difficulties by finding that the rla implicitly "expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.” Steele, supra, 202-203.
Not long after, the Court held that the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, granting unions in the private sector the right to act as exclusive representatives, imposed upon those unions the duty of fair representation. Ford Motor Co *82v Huffman, 345 US 330; 73 S Ct 681; 97 L Ed 1048 (1953).
In Michigan, public employees are governed by the public employment relations act (pera). MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq.
This Court recently held that the "pera impliedly imposes on labor organizations representing public sector employees a duty of fair representation . . . .” Goolsby, supra, 681. We noted that "the rights and responsibilities imposed on labor organizations representing public sector employees by pera . . . are similar to those imposed on labor organizations representing private sector employees by the nlra,” which has been found to confer upon unions the duty of fair representation. Id., 660-661, n 5. Therefore, being guided by " 'the construction placed on the analogous provisions of the nlra [National Labor Relations Act] by the [National Labor Relations Board] and the Federal courts,’ ” we concluded that the pera confers on public sector employee unions a similar duty of fair representation. Id. (quoting Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 636.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals wrote:
In Michigan, a public employee’s union is granted the same power of exclusive representation by § 11 of pera, MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11), as is granted unions in the private sector by § 9 of the nlra. As in the private sector, the power of exclusive representation implies the duty to represent fairly. [Citation omitted.] . . . We think that, for public employees, the existence of the right to fair representation must be implied from the grant to unions of exclusive bargaining rights. [Demings v City of Ecorse, 127 Mich App 608, 616-617; 339 NW2d 498 (1983).]
We have no quarrel with this conclusion. *83Goolsby, supra. However, the Court of Appeals went on to state:
The rights enforced by a fair representation suit are not just rights granted by pera; they are rights arising from the law of contract. While pera allowed public employers and employees to enter into relationships which gave rise to the right of fair representation, it was the fiduciary or agency relationship and not the statute which gave rise to the duty. Independent of anything in pera, the right to fair representation exists whenever public employees are represented by an exclusive bargaining agent. We conclude that the rights enforced in a fair representation suit are common-law rights .... [Demings, supra, 621.]
It is with this conclusion that we disagree.
The parties and the Court of Appeals agree that the duty of fair representation arises because of the aspect of the relationship between the union and its members which allows the union to be the exclusive representative of its members. They further agree that the union’s right to act as the exclusive representative is conferred by statute. Beyond this, their arguments diverge.
Plaintiff and the Court of Appeals essentially claim that the fact that the source of the union’s right to function as the exclusive representative is statutory is irrelevant to the determination of the source of the members’ corollary right to fair representation. In plaintiff’s words:
If a union’s position as exclusive representative arose merely by contract or practice rather than by statute, the rationale for imposing the duty of fair representation would be the same.
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the determination of the source of the duty is inextri*84cably related to the source of the union’s right to act as the exclusive representative. The source of the latter right being statutory, it follows that the source of the corresponding duty is also statutory.
The problem with plaintiffs argument is that the union’s right to act as the exclusive representative is not created by contract or by practice, but, rather, is made possible by § 11 of the pera. In fact, it was not until the enactment of the pera in 1965 that the right of public employees to be represented by exclusive bargaining agents was recognized. Wayne Co Civil Service Comm, supra, 374; MCL 423.209; MSA 17.455(9).
It might be argued that there is a significant difference between the union’s duty of fair representation in contract negotiation and matters of contract administration such as grievance processing. That is, the union’s right to act as the exclusive representative in bargaining is expressly granted by statute in both the public, MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11), and private, 29 USC 159(a), sectors. However, neither Congress in the nlra nor the Legislature in the pera granted unions exclusive authority in presenting and settling grievances. 29 USC 159(a); MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11).
These statutes provide:
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided [emphasis in original], That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev*85anees adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect [emphasis added]: Provided further, [emphasis in original], That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. [29 USC 159(a).]
Representatives designated or selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the public employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the public employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized by the public employer: Provided, That any individual employee at any time may present grievances to his employer and have the grievances adjusted, without intervention of the bargaining representative, if the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect, provided that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. [Emphasis added. MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11).]
Nevertheless, unions typically assert in collective bargaining agreements the exclusive power in the grievance realm.9 Thus, the argument continues, this power of the unions to control the grievance procedure derives not from any statute, but from the collective agreement. Proponents of this theory10 assert that the source of the duty of fair representation in this context is found in general contract law principles, e.g., agent-principal, fiduciary-beneficiary._
*86The United States Supreme Court held that in the private sector the statutory duty of fair representation applies in matters of contract administration. Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41; 78 S Ct 99; 2 L Ed 2d 80 (1957); Humphrey v Moore, 375 US 335; 84 S Ct 363; 11 L Ed 2d 370 (1964). And, in Vaca v Sipes, supra, 186, 191, the Court wrote that "Congress . . . conferred] upon employees and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures” and that "the individual employee has [no] . . . absolute right to have his grievance” processed.
This conclusion was based on the Court’s adoption of Professor Cox’s view that, in spite of the language of 29 USC 159(a), Congress did not intend that the individual should have a "right” to present grievances, but only that the employer should have a "privilege” to listen.11
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in Mellon v Fitzgerald Bd of Ed, 22 Mich App 218; 177 NW2d 187 (1970), interpreted MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11), the pera provision comparable to 29 USC 159(a), as permitting an employer to negotiate directly with an individual grievant, but not as obligating an employer to process such a grievance. Thus, it appears that there is statutory authority for exclusive union control over the grievance procedure.
Moreover, the relationship between unions and their members is not a true agency or fiduciary one. This Court addressed the nature of that relationship in the context of grievance processing in Lowe v Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 389 Mich 123, 145-146; 205 NW2d 167 (1973):
In many ways, the relationship between a union *87and its member is a fiduciary one. Certainly, it is a relationship of fidelity, of faith, of trust, and of confidence.
If the courts have stopped short of declaring the union and member relationship a fully fiduciary one, it is because the union, by its nature, has a divided loyalty.
It must be faithful to each member, to be sure, but it must be faithful to all of the members at one and the same time.
The union must be concerned for the common good of the entire membership. This is its first duty.
That duty of concern for the good of the total membership may sometimes conflict with the needs, the desires, even the rights of an individual member.
When the general good conflicts with the needs or desires of an individual member, the discretion of the union to choose the former is paramount.
When the general good conflicts with the legal or civil rights of an individual member, the courts will recognize those rights and enforce them as against the will of the majority of the union membership.
In the area of grievances, the courts have held that the union has considerable discretion to decide which grievances shall be pressed and which shall be settled. It has been said that the union has latitude to investigate claimed grievances by members against their employers, and has the power to abandon frivolous claims. Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171; 87 S Ct 903; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967).
It has been held that an individual member does not have the right to demand that his grievance be pressed to arbitration, and the union "obviously” is not required to carry every grievance to the highest level, but must be permitted to assess each with a view to individual merit. Gunkel v Garvey, 45 Misc 2d 435; 256 NYS2d 953 (1964).
Having regard for the good of the general membership, the union is vested with discretion which *88permits it to weigh the burden upon contractual grievance machinery, the amount at stake, the likelihood of success, the cost, even the desirability of winning the award, against those considerations which affect the membership as a whole.
Therefore, we conclude that a union’s duty to fairly represent employees in grievance processing is implied from its statutorily granted power to act as the exclusive employee representative.
Ill
We agree with the majority that the exclusion of plaintiff from the arbitration hearing did not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation of his right to fair representation.
Conclusion
We would hold that: (1) the merc has exclusive jurisdiction of public employees’ fair representation claims; (2) the duty of fair representation is statutorily derived; and (3) the exclusion of plaintiff from the arbitration hearing did not, as a matter of law, violate plaintiff’s right to fair representation.
Inasmuch as we believe that the merc has exclusive jurisdiction of plaintiff’s claim against the defendant union, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we respectfully dissent.
Cavanagh and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.Const 1963, art 4, § 48 authorizes the Legislature to "enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees
Detroit Bd of Ed v Parks, 417 Mich 268, 280; 335 NW2d 641 (1983); Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 616, 629; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), reh den 394 Mich 944 (1975), app dis sub nom Crestwood Ed Ass’n v Bd of Ed of School Dist of Crestwood, 427 US 901 (1976); Local 1383, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v City of Warren, 411 Mich 642; 311 NW2d 702 (1981); Central Michigan University Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan University, 404 Mich 268; 273 NW2d 21 (1978).
See Proñtt v Wayne-Westland Community Schools, 140 Mich App 499; 364 NW2d 359 (1985), in which the Court of Appeals held that a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under § 10(3). See also Harris v Amalgamated Transit Union, 122 Mich App 706; 333 NW2d 1 (1982). The Proñtt panel cited the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v NLRB, 368 F2d 12. (CA 5, 1966), cert den 389 US 837 (1967). There, the court construed the provisions of the nlra analogous to the pera, §§ 9, 10 and 11, and reasoned "that the duty of fair representation implicit in the exclusive-representation requirement in § 9(a) of the act comprises an indispensable element of the right of employees 'to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing’ as guaranteed in section 7.” Id., 17. The court concluded that a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice because it restrains the employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. Similarly, the nlrb held that a union’s breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice in Miranda Fuel Co v Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enf den 326 F2d 172 (CA 2, 1963).
Justices Fortas and Harlan, and Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result, but concluded that a complaint that a union has breached its duty of fair representation is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the nlrb, noting the nlrb’s preemptive jurisdiction over most unfair labor practices. Justice Black dissented, expressing his total displeasure with the majority decision.
The Railway Labor Act was the statute under which the duty was first recognized. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held that the nlra imposes a similar duty. See discussion in Part II.
In support of its decision to create an exception to exclusive agency jurisdiction for fair representation suits, the Vaca Court noted that
"Congress itself has carved out exceptions to the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction: Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat 158, 29 USC § 187, expressly permits anyone injured by a violation of nlra § 8(b)(4) to recover damages in a federal court even though such unfair labor practices are also remediable by the Board; § 301 of that Act, 61 Stat 156, 29 USC § 185, permits suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement regardless of whether the particular breach is also an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the Board (see Smith v Evening News Ass’n, 371 US 195 [83 S Ct 267; 9 L Ed 2d 246 (1962)]). . . .” Vaca, supra, 179-180.
Unlike the federal scheme, the Legislature has not created similar exceptions in the pera. See Lamphere, supra, 123.
See Const 1963, art 6, § 28; see also MCL 24.306; MSA 3.560(206).
419 Mich 942 (1984).
Clark, The duty of fair representation: A theoretical structure, 51 Tex L R 1119, 1120 (1973).
See Feller, A general theory of the collective bargaining agreement, 61 Cal L R 663 (1973).
See Summers, The individual employee’s rights under the collective agreement: What constitutes fair representation?, 126 U Pa L R 251, 253-257 (1977).
Cox, Rights under a labor agreement, 69 Harv L R 601, 624 (1956).