Defendant, Richard H. Shirk, and one Gerald McKay were charged with- first-degree murder in the death of Carlo Vitale whose body was found in Oakland county on January 19, 1960. They were tried together before a jury in the Oakland county circuit court, which trial commenced on Tuesday, May 17, 1960. On May 20, 1960, the prosecuting attorney was allowed to -file an amendment to the information, thereby adding a second count charging Gerald McKay with murder ■ in the second degree. This was done after police officers testified as to confessions made by McKay which had implicated Richard H. Shirk. . Gerald McKay then offered, and the court accepted, a plea of guilty to the second count. The trial proceeded as to defendant Shirk only.
During the course of the trial and prior to McKay’s plea, when the confession of McKay was introduced into evidence, defendant Shirk’s counsel requested, and the court gave, instructions to the jury that such confession could be considered by the jury only against defendant McKay.
*124After defendant Shirk had testified denying all knowledge of the killing, McKay was called as a rebuttal witness by the prosecution. His testimony was, in part, as follows:
“Q. Do you know the respondent Eichard McKay or- — -Eichard Shirk, rather?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Are you acquainted with the facts surrounding the shooting of Carlo Vitale?
“A. I am not going to answer.
“0. Were you present when Carlo Vitale was killed?
“A. I am not going to answer any questions, Mr. Barry.
“Q. You are here under subpoena of this court?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Would you tell this court and the jury why you refuse to answer questions concerning this matter?
“A. Because I am afraid of Dick, that is why.
“Q. Of Dick Shirk?
“A. Yes.
“Q. In what way?
“A. Just afraid of him, that’s all. I don’t want to be wrong about anything. I am not going to answer any questions.
“Mr. Barry: Your witness.”
Then on cross-examination he testified:
“Q. Were you told to say that now, sir?
“A. Was I told to say that? No. What I was told — I was — that is what I told I was going to say.
“Q. You told the police that Carlo Vitale was killed on November 28th.
“A. I am not going to answer any questions.
“Q. Was Carlo Vitale killed on November 28th?
“A. I am not answering any questions, Mr. Bedrosian.”
*125The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder against defendant Shirk.
This appeal asserts two errors:
(1) The accused was denied his right to be confronted by the witnesses against him guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution of 1908, art 2, § 19, and the United States Constitution, Am 6.
(2) The evidence (properly admitted) against defendant Shirk was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
With regard to the second assertion of error we find little merit. One witness, David Henry Crow, testified that he, together with Shirk and Vitale (the deceased), held up the Designing Engineers Credit Union. Thereafter the witness and Shirk discussed the fact that Vitale was “hot” — wanted by the police — and Shirk said that the best thing to do would be to “plant” him someplace. Crow also testified that Shirk asked if Crow would help him dispose of the body, saying that he (Shirk) would “send him (Vitale) on his way.”
This testimony was corroborated in part by Jo Ann Huldquist.
Shirk admitted he left town with Vitale and McKay shortly prior to Vitale’s death.
One witness (Detective Schlacter) testified that Shirk admitted he was involved in disposing of the body. In our view this testimony, if believed, was adequate to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In analyzing the first assertion of error, however, we are confronted with a more difficult task. It is clear that when a confession of one joint defendant is admitted under circumstances such as in the instant case, the instruction the court is required to give to the jury must provide sufficient protection to the defendant. See Paoli v. United States (1957), 352 US 232 (77 S Ct 294, 1 L Ed 2d 278). The *126question of the sufficiency of the jury instructions is whether or not the limiting instructions “kept the jury from considering the contents [of the statements] with respect to the guilt of anyone but the declarant.” See Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 US 471, 490 (83 S Ct 407, 419, 9 L Ed 2d 441, 457). The instructions given by the trial court were accurate and clear.
A reading of the testimony of the rebuttal witness leads us to a different conclusion from that reached in the dissenting opinion. The prosecutor may have been forewarned that McKay was going to take the stand and decline to testify. We do not know whether the prosecutor hoped that once McKay was sworn in as a witness he would change his mind and testify, or whether the prosecutor put him on the stand for the purpose of eliciting the testimony that he was afraid of Shirk. Any comments on this point are but speculative. While we agree that it would have been better if the witness had not testified that he was afraid of Shirk, the statement as made was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. Defendant’s argument that he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation of the witness is not persuasive. The prosecutor turned the rebuttal witness over to the defense for cross-examination and the fact that the defense was dissatisfied with the cross-examination is not grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.
McGregor, J., concurred with J. IT. Gillis, J.