dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Nebraska guest statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,237 (Reissue 1995), does not violate the equal protection clause of the Nebraska Constitution. The guest statute, as amended in 1981, is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, as required under equal protection principles, and is therefore unconstitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly notes that this court has previously addressed the constitutionality of the Nebraska guest statute, finding no violation of the equal protection clause. See, i.e., Cushing v. Bernhardt, 210 Neb. 272, 313 N.W.2d 688 (1981); Kreifels v. Wurtele, 206 Neb. 491, 293 N.W.2d 407 (1980); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975). However, the only occasion in which this court has had the opportunity to examine the guest statute since its amendment in 1981 was in Coburn v. Reiser, 254 Neb. 495, 577 N.W.2d 289 (1998). In Coburn, we disposed of the issue regarding the constitutionality of the guest statute by citing to preamendment cases, such as Botsch, supra, summarily finding the guest statute to be constitutional. This was error on our part; most specifically, I concede that I eijed in joining the judgment in Coburn based on this reasoning. We should have performed an analysis of the amended version of the guest statute within the equal protection *944framework, independent of analyses made by this court in evaluating the preamendment version of the statute. The majority has now engaged in such an analysis in this appeal; however, I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority after applying the appropriate analysis.
In an equal protection challenge, when a fundamental right or suspect classification is not involved, the act is a valid exercise of police power if the act is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Waste Connections of Neb. v. City of Lincoln, 269 Neb. 855, 697 N.W.2d 256 (2005). The party attacking a statute as violative of equal protection has the burden to prove that the classification violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The Les have met their burden in this case.
Among the arguments made on appeal, the Les argue that this court should follow the reasoning of Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985), in which the Texas Supreme Court determined that its guest statute — also limited in application to persons related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity — violated the state equal protection clause because the classifications drawn by the statute were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In Whitworth, the court acknowledged that the legislative purpose behind the guest statute was to prevent collusion between an insured party and a guest. Id. Thus, the court stated, the guest statute “creates a presumption that all automobile passengers suing a driver who is within the second degree of affinity or consanguinity do so collusively.” Id. at 197. The court stated:
We refuse to indulge in the assumption that close relatives will prevaricate so as to promote a spurious lawsuit. . . . Dishonest individuals will always attempt to circumvent the intent of the statute by lying, while honest citizens are penalized when the truth brings them within the statutory scope denying them a negligence cause of action.
Id. The court concluded that the classifications drawn by the guest statute were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and that, thus, the state guest statute was unconstitutional. Id.
I agree not only with the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court, but with the rationale of a host of other states that have found their state guest statutes unconstitutional because of a lack *945of a rational relationship between such statutes and collusion prevention. The “collusion prevention” rationale is simply inadequate to justify, in equal protection terms, the elimination of all automobile guests’ (related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity) rights to recover for negligence. Although the guest statute may prevent those rare collusive suits connived by automobile drivers and their “related” passengers to defraud insurers, Nebraska’s classification scheme is far too gross and overinclusive to be justified by this end, since the statute bars the great majority of valid suits along with the rare fraudulent claim.
In Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973), the California Supreme Court concluded that the state guest statute violated equal protection principles, finding in part that the distinction drawn by the statute was not rationally related to its purpose of eliminating collusive lawsuits. The statute at issue in Merlo was similar to the pre-1981 Nebraska guest statute, limiting actions for damages brought by nonpaying passengers to those alleging intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver. In Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 873, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 401, 506 P.2d at 225, the court explained:
The theory behind this “compensation” classification appears to be that the driver who gives a free ride to a passenger does so because of a close relationship with his guest; because of the presumed closeness of this relationship, the driver may falsely admit liability so that his guest may collect from the driver’s insurance company. To combat this risk of potential fraud, the guest statute eliminates all causes of action in negligence for automobile guests.
The court concluded that “it is unreasonable to eliminate causes of action of an entire class of persons simply because some undefined portion of the designated class may file fraudulent lawsuits.” Id. at 875, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 506 P.2d at 226. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed, adding that the guest statute does little to prevent collusion, since the parties can lie about whether compensation was paid and thereby avoid the bar of the statute, just as they could perjure themselves about the negligence issue if the guest statute did not exist. McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975). Further, the North Dakota Supreme Court added that
*946[i]n all other cases, we rely upon the standard remedies of perjury, the efficacy of cross-examination, the availability of pretrial discovery, and the good sense of juries to detect false testimony if it should occur. We do not withdraw the remedy from all injured persons in order to avoid a rare recovery based upon false testimony.
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 778 (N.D. 1974).
The Merlo court explained that the guest statute imposed an overinclusive classification scheme:
Instead of confining its disability to those who actually institute collusive suits, the provision reaches out beyond such persons and burdens the great number of honest automobile guests. . . . We believe that in barring suits by all automobile guests simply to protect insurance companies from some collusive lawsuits, the guest statute exceeds the bounds of rationality and constitutes a denial of equal protection.
8 Cal. 3d at 877, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04, 506 P.2d at 227-28. See, also, Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978); Laakonen v. District Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).
Although the cases cited above address statutes more akin to the earlier version of Nebraska’s guest statute, the same logic extends to the current language of the statute. Section 25-21,237 bars nonpaying passengers related to the driver within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity from filing lawsuits for damages against the driver unless the damages are alleged to have been caused by the intoxication or gross negligence of the driver. The classification presumes that all drivers and passengers related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity will collude in negligence actions for damages caused by the drivers. However, such a broad presumption penalizes the vast majority of passengers who do not engage in such fraudulent behavior and disregards the procedural safeguards in our justice system designed to determine the truth of damage claims.
Furthermore, persons who are of a mindset to engage in collusion will not be deterred by the statute but are likely to instead offer that the passenger provided compensation for the ride; that *947the driver was intoxicated while operating the vehicle; or that the driver was grossly negligent in operating the vehicle, any of which would place them outside the scope of the statute. In other words, the statute has the perverse effect of punishing those who are honest, while doing nothing to stop those who are willing to lie. Thus, “collusion prevention” is hardly a rational basis for applying a blanket provision barring passengers from bringing general negligence claims against drivers to whom they are related.
The Legislature itself did not present a rational basis for adopting the classification at issue in Nebraska’s current guest statute. In that regard, I disagree with the majority’s reading of the legislative history of the 1981 amendment. In discussing 1981 Neb. Laws, L.B. 54, the bill that ultimately amended Nebraska’s guest statute, limiting its application to family members, the senator responsible for introducing the bill explained essentially that the bill was a compromise, narrowing the statute’s application but also accommodating the interests of insurance companies. The senator promised not to propose a complete repeal of the guest statute, if the insurance industry would accept a limited repeal, narrowing the class of limited claims to those brought by guest passengers that were “relatives” of the owner and operator of the vehicle. If the insurance industry refused to accept the compromise, the senator vowed to seek a complete repeal of the guest statute and stated that it would be “a no holds barred contest, this year, next year and however long it takes.” Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 54, 87th Sess. 2 (Jan. 28, 1981). There was no discussion of a history of collusive claims amongst “relatives” in Nebraska or the effect, if any, of these types of claims on automobile insurance rates in the State of Nebraska. There was no pretense when the Legislature considered the 1981 amendment to Nebraska’s guest statute— the amendment process was pure politics at its finest.
During the floor debate on L.B. 54, the sponsoring senator stated:
[T]o remove even the vestige of a possibility of say, alleged collusion, between a father and a daughter or whatever, I accepted that as the compromise necessary to sell the insurance companies or one of the many elements I utilized in *948dealing with the insurance companies because that was the necessary final piece, very simply.
Judiciary Committee, 87th Sess. 1144 (Feb. 24,1981).
Thus, prior to 1981, the Nebraska guest statute limited claims brought by any nonpaying passenger against an owner or operator of a motor vehicle. The legislative history reveals that this language was favorable to the automobile insurance industry because liability with respect to nonpaying guests was limited to those guests that could prove damages caused by gross negligence or intoxication. In an effort to avoid opposition by the insurance industry, the 1981 amendment to the guest statute proposed a limited repeal, narrowing the class of limited claims to those brought by guest passengers related to the owner or operator as spouse or within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. In other words, in exchange for the insurance industry’s acquiescence, the law was only partially repealed, eliminating some but not all of its irrational application.
In that regard, the majority quotes the Indiana Court of Appeals for the assertions that the Legislature “ ‘may have perceived’ ” a greater risk of collusion among family members, or a risk that juries would unfairly compensate injured family members at the expense of insurance companies. I find these assertions unpersuasive. First, the legislative record is inconsistent with the claim that the Legislature perceived a greater risk of collusion among family members. Further, it is hard to conclude such a perception was rational, in the absence of any evidence before the Legislature providing any facts upon which a perception could have been based, or upon which the Legislature could have concluded that the statute would actually be effective at preventing collusion or fraud. Finally, I see no basis for any unsupported claim that a jury’s inclination to attack the “deep pockets” of a “rich” insurance company may be more pronounced when the plaintiffs are related to one another. Nebraska law does not allow evidence of liability insurance or policy limits to be admitted into evidence. See Kvamme v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 267 Neb. 703, 677 N.W.2d 122 (2004). In short, the majority’s hypotheses about what the Legislature might have been thinking are not compelling.
*949Under the rational basis standard, equal protection is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. See State v. Garber, 249 Neb. 648, 545 N.W.2d 75 (1996). Based on a thorough review of the legislative history of L.B. 54, the classification accomplished through the amendment was the result of pure political compromise. The only reason certain family members remain subject to the limitations of the guest statute is because of a political compromise — not because of any recognized or asserted classification that is related to a legitimate state interest. Political compromise as a justification, in and of itself, simply does not establish that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
For that reason, I also disagree with the majority’s contention that because we approved the constitutionality of the pre-1981 guest statute in Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975), we are somehow required to approve of the classification created by the 1981 amendment. The majority contends that because the Botsch court found a rational relationship between all nonpaying guests and preventing fraud and collusion, “it logically follows that in the absence of compelling developments, a rational subset of that universe remains rationally related to that interest.” That is only true if the “subset” of nonpaying guests at issue is based upon a classification that bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. After all, “nonpaying guests whose last names begin with a vowel” would be a subset of the “universe” of nonpaying guests, yet we would hardly approve of such an arbitrary classification. Since the classification set forth in the 1981 amendment was based on little more than raw political compromise, I find it to be equally capricious.
While I recognize the necessary and appropriate deference that should be given to the Legislature when this court performs a rational basis analysis on an equal protection claim, at some point, the judiciary must draw the line and truly require that the legislative classification is somehow rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The current guest statute has crossed that line. Certainly, the prevention of wholesale fraud and collusion is a legitimate governmental objective; however, the legislative *950record does not reflect that this was the objective of the classification created in 1981. In any event, limiting recovery for all family members is not rationally related to that objective, as it rests on the unreasonable presumption that all family members will collude, and does not serve to prevent actual collusion.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the classifications drawn by § 25-21,237 are not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and are thus violative of the equal protection clause of the Nebraska Constitution. Consequently, I would reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing the Les’ theories of recovery based on simple negligence and remand the cause for a new trial as to those issues.
Hendry, C.J., and McCormack, L, join in this dissent. Hendry, C.J., dissenting.I was not a member of the court when Coburn v. Reiser, 254 Neb. 495, 577 N.W.2d 289 (1998), was decided; with that exception noted, I join in Justice Gerrard’s dissent.