dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because the statutes governing the operation of public enterprises for municipal corporations clearly invalidate thé enabling ordinance at issue in this case, as well as the actions taken by the “utility” established thereunder.
It is undisputed that, for reasons of expediency, the City of Durham chose to establish a utility as the mechanism by which it would comply with the unfunded mandates of the 1987 Water Quality Act related to stormwater runoff. Municipalities are authorized to establish and to operate public enterprises like utilities only as provided by statute. Having chosen this method, therefore, the City must abide by the statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 160A-311 and N.C.G.S. § 160A-314, which govern such public enterprises. These statutes read in relevant part:
§ 160A-311. Public enterprise defined.
As used in this Article, the term “public enterprise” includes:
*640(10) Structural and natural stormwater and drainage systems of all types.
N.C.G.S. § 160A-311 (1994) (emphasis added).
§ 160A-314. Authority to fix and enforce rates.
(a) A city may establish and revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise. Schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may vary according to classes of service, and different schedules may be adopted for services provided outside the corporate limits of the city.
(al)....
The fees established under this subsection must be made applicable throughout the area of the city. Schedules of rates, fees, charges, and penalties for providing structural and natural stormwater and drainage system service may vary according to whether the property served is residential, commercial, or industrial property, the property’s use, the size of the property, the area of impervious surfaces on the property, the quantity and quality of the runoff from the property, the characteristics of the watershed into which stormwater from the property drains, and other factors that affect the stormwater drainage system. Rates, fees, and charges imposed under this subsection may not exceed the city’s cost of providing a stormwater and drainage system.
N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a), (al) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
In deciding whether the City’s public enterprise complies with the above statutes, we first must look to the plain language of the statutes themselves. State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 95, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1996). “Ordinary rules of grammar apply when ascertaining the meaning of a statute.” Dunn v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992). When the language of a statute is clear, there is no need for judicial interpretation, and the court should give the statute its plain meaning. Dellinger, 343 N.C. at 95, 468 S.E.2d at 220.
In the case sub judice, the language of the above statutes is clear. N.C.G.S. § 160A-311 defines “public enterprises” as “structural and natural stormwater and drainage systems.” The word “systems” is limited by the adjectival phrases “structural and natural” and “stormwater and drainage.” Thus, the plain meaning is that the public *641enterprises authorized by the statute applicable here are expressly limited to those which oversee systems of physical infrastructure, structural or natural, for servicing stormwater. N.C.G.S. § 160A-314 reinforces this understanding of the statutory construct. That statute provides that the City may establish fees “for the use of or the services furnished” and that fees may vary for “structural and natural stormwater and drainage system service” according to the type and size of “property served.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a), (al) (emphasis added). This plain language contemplates only the collection of fees for the “use of’ or “furnishing of’ stormwater services by the utility. The statute further modifies the setting of fees by tying their computation to the particular “property served.” Thus, the plain meaning of these statutes is that, in order to operate as an authorized public enterprise for the purposes of stormwater control, the utility in question is limited to the establishment and maintenance of physical systems directly related to stormwater removal and drainage of property.
Even though the plain language of the statute is sufficient to determine its meaning in this case, it is also clear the legislature intended for public enterprises of this type to operate actual drainage systems, not broad pollution protection programs. In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, the title of an act should be considered as a guide. State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1992). The act that added the statutory provisions regarding stormwater was titled:
An ACT TO AUTHORIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEMS AS PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND TO PROVIDE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITH FUNDING AND TAXING AUTHORITY TO FINANCE THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEMS.
Act of July 15, 1989, ch. 643, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1763. The title’s focus on “construction and operation” of storm drainage “systems” indicates the legislature did not intend for such public enterprises to be used as general programmatic bodies, but rather as organizations charged merely with the supervision of physical drainage systems.
When determining the intent of the legislature, it is also significant if the General Assembly adopts provisions which differ from those suggested by a study commission. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 634, 325 S.E.2d 469, 475-76 (1985). The study commission proposal did not contain language that tied stormwater charges to services provided to properties. Proposed Legislation: Study Commission *642Report to 1991 N.C. General Assembly 44-45. Conversely, the adopted statute linked the charges for stormwater services to the character of property served. This is indicative of the legislature’s intent that stormwater utilities limit their activities to physical systems for the removal of stormwater from property.
Examination of the City’s ordinance establishing the utility, as well as the actual operation of the utility, reveals the City to have exceeded the authority conferred upon it by the plain language of the statutes. The ordinance creates a stormwater utility “to develop and operate the stormwater management program.” The “program” is defined by the ordinance to include not just a stormwater system, but also “the development of ordinances, policies, technical materials, inspections, monitoring, outreach, and other activities related to the control of stormwater quantity and quality.” Durham, N.C., Code ch. 23, art. VIII, § 23-201 (1994). Similarly, the ordinance provides that “all developed land . . . shall be subject to a stormwater charge,” id., not just property served by the system. Thus, the ordinance on its face exceeds the express limitations in the plain meaning of the statute. Moreover, the operation of the utility exceeds statutory authority. All funds collected by the utility are placed in one fund, and this fund pays for the City’s entire stormwater quality program. The City concedes the utility’s activities substantially exceed the providing of stormwater infrastructure. Over half of the funds go to general programmatic elements involving water quality, such as general education programs for commercial and residential areas, programs related to discharge and disposal of hazardous materials, inspection and training for industrial sites, and construction-site runoff consultation. It is clear the ordinance and its application through the utility exceed the express limitations imposed by the plain language of N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311 and-314.
Moreover, N.C.G.S. § 160A-314 expressly mandates that “[r]ates, fees, and charges imposed under this subsection may not exceed the city’s cost of providing a stormwater and drainage system.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(al) (emphasis added). The uncontroverted evidence establishes the City spent only a fraction of the money collected by the utility on the cost of constructing the stormwater and drainage infrastructure. The vast majority of the fees were spent on general programmatic pollution reduction efforts. This exceeds the authority conferred by the plain meaning of the statutes. Even assuming arguendo that the majority’s expansive interpretation is correct, the evidence still shows the utility to have exceeded its authority. The *643City admits substantial sums of money collected for the purposes of operating the stormwater “utility” were transferred to other city uses, including the sewer and landfill funds, and even the general fund. The evidence establishes the City transferred over $1.8 million to the general fund alone. Leaving aside the question of whether this amounts to an illegal or unconstitutional taxation of these churches via the utility strawman, which is not raised on appeal, it clearly exceeds any reasonable interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 160A-314, which requires that fees not exceed costs.
Additionally, the defendant’s unreasoned, blanket exclusion of all undeveloped land (which is approximately 50% of the area producing the stormwater the ordinance purports to address), defendant’s like exemption of certain types of commercially developed properties, and its diversion of very substantial portions of the funds generated from the assessed “user fees” to programs unrelated either to cost of service in providing stormwater infrastructure or any benefit received or burden generated by the plaintiff churches, if not violative of equal protection, seem clearly to be “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a deprivation of the plaintiff[s’] liberty or property, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or the similar Law of the Land Clause of Art. I, § 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina.” Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N.C. 703, 713, 185 S.E.2d 193, 200 (1971). See also United States v. Sperry Corporation, 493 U.S. 52, 63, 107 L. Ed. 2d 290, 303 (1989).
In light of the fact that the ordinance at issue, as well as its application, exceeds the express limitations established by the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311 and -314 and is, I believe, violative of equal protection and due process, I vote to uphold the determination of the trial court.
Justice Orr joins in this dissenting opinion.