¶ 57. (concurring). I agree with the majority that after the defendant's probation ends unpaid restitution is reduced to a civil judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r) (2003-04). I also do not dispute that the right to enforcement of this judgment may be released by the parties. However, in my view where restitution has *199been required in a criminal proceeding, any release in a settlement of a personal injury claim brought by the victim involved should contain express language that addresses the issue of future payments in restitution. Such express language certainly is preferable to the uncertainty that has been created by the actions and circumstances surrounding the issue of restitution in this case. Therefore, I respectfully concur.
¶ 58. I am not at all confident that the parties in this case contemplated, or future parties in a similar position will contemplate, unpaid criminal restitution as falling within the terms of a civil settlement agreement as a matter of course. Given the policies behind restitution, I conclude the better result for future victims entitled to restitution payments is an express release of their right to enforcement of a civil judgment resulting from unpaid criminal restitution.
¶ 59. The majority recognizes that the overarching purposes of 1987 Wisconsin Act 398 and 1989 Wisconsin Act 188 are: "to promote the dignity of crime victims, to maximize the respect afforded victims by the criminal justice system, and to increase the amount of restitution recovered." Majority op., ¶ 34.1 agree; however, a better approach to achieving these three policy objectives is to require an express agreement to ensure that a victim truly intends to release her right to restitution payments after the defendant is released from probation.
¶ 60. Furthermore, restitution "serves the purposes of punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, while seeking to make the victim of criminal acts whole in regard to the special damages sustained," State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999). Given these policy implications, I believe *200that unpaid restitution should not be swept up into a settlement agreement that is silent to any such consideration.
¶ 61. The public has an interest in having defeh-dants pay the full amount of restitution. The public wants victims to be made whole. It is one thing if the victim expressly settles the unpaid amount of restitution. It is another thing to have the defendant get off the hook because of a "global" settlement agreement that lacks any apparent contemplation of such a judgment.
¶ 62. The majority concludes that the "global" settlement agreement Huml signed approximately six years prior to Vlazny's termination "is a fully integrated contract intended to be the final expression of Huml and Vlazny's agreement." Majority op., ¶ 55. This settlement includes broad, boilerplate language, but it does not include any reference to judgments or restitution.
¶ 63. As I alluded to above, the actions of the parties seem to indicate that neither party intended for this agreement to include unpaid restitution after probation. Between December 1996, when the settlement agreement was signed and August 2002, Vlazny made 49 restitution payments, and at no time during his probation did Vlazny request any offset of his restitution payments based on the settlement agreement. Furthermore, at the time of Vlazny's release from probation, Vlazny's probation agent wrote that he had "spoken with the victim in the case and she has no objections to a Civil Judgment for restitution." If Huml had realized the settlement agreement encompassed an unpaid restitution judgment, she likely would have contested the release of Vlazny from probation.
*201¶ 64. Despite the apparent confusion surrounding the issue of restitution in this case, I ultimately agree with the majority that the broad language of the settlement agreement releases Vlazny from any requirement of making future restitution payments. However, given the legislative intent behind Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(lr) and the policies behind restitution, I would require victims to expressly release a civil judgment for unpaid restitution in settlement agreements.
¶ 65. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this opinion.