dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
With the exception of three customers, all of the operations of Southern Union Gas Company were inside the City of Durango. Therefore, in 1949 any contract with respect to franchise and rates and any regulation of rates was a local and municipal matter within the jurisdiction of Durango as a home rule city. Spears v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 Colo. 369, 67 P.2d 1029; and City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 P. 604.
The franchise provided that the jurisdiction which the city might thereafter exercise would be vested exclusively in the city council. Therefore, the contract term “unless and until changed in accordance with law” must mean *559that the city council should act in accordance with law. To me, this is a contract which gave ■ the city council exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates throughout the franchise period.
The city has argued that application of Amendment XXV to this contract would violate Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution which prohibits states from impairing the obligation of any contract. The company has responded that the city cannot raise such a defense against action taken by the state. It may be that the city is in no position to raise this defense. However, if abrogation of existing contracts was the intended result of this constitutional provision, I believe that such an intent would have been clearly expressed therein. In the absence of such expression, I must conclude that abrogation was not intended.