dissenting. The 1938 Act, the 1946 amendment thereto and the city ordinance thereunder. 1. The Act of 1938 (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103; Code Ann. Ch. 58-10), known as the “Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors” unquestionably specifically sets forth the public policy of Georgia’s prohibiting the sale of any spirituous liquors on Sunday. Code Ann. § 58-1060 provides: “Any person who shall sell or offer for sale any spirituous liquors as herein defined on Sundays or election days shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished as for a misdemeanor as provided in section 27-2506.”
Code Ann. § 58-1079 provides: “It shall be unlawful to sell any liquor in any of the counties specified by this Chapter between the hours of 12:00 o’clock, midnight, on Saturday night, until the hour of 12:00 o’clock, midnight, on Sunday night, at any time and at any time on election days. It is the purpose and intent of this section to prevent the sale of liquor on Sunday and election days, and any violation of same shall be a misdemeanor, by the buyer and/or the seller.”
In addition, Code § 26-6105 provides: “Any person who shall keep open a tippling house on the Sabbath day or Sabbath night shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Public policy of Georgia is further enunciated in Code § 26-6905 providing: “Any person who shall pursue his business or the work of his ordinary calling on the Lord’s day, works of necessity or charity only excepted, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” This is an unequivocal prohibition against selling any liquor in any of the counties between the hours of twelve o’clock midnight on Saturday night and the hour of twelve o’clock midnight on Sunday night, and that no spirituous liquors shall be sold on Sunday or election days or on the Sabbath or on the Lord’s day.
In 1964 the General Assembly of Georgia passed an Act which was an amendment to the original “Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors” (Ga. L. 1964, p. 771). This amendment did not directly or by implication repeal any other section of that Act or any other law which prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages on Sunday. The amend*260atory Act must be construed in relation with the original law and there will be no repeal by implication unless there is a positive repugnancy between the old law and the new. Mayor &c. of Athens v. Wansley, 210 Ga. 174 (78 SE2d 478). The 1964 amendment for the first time authorized certain counties and cities, after a favorable referendum, to issue licenses for alcoholic beverages to be sold by the drink for consumption only on the premises (Ga. L. 1964, p. 771). Counties or municipalities succeeding in holding such elections were given power and authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the “regulation of hours of business.” (Emphasis supplied.) The only logical construction of “regulation of hours” would be that counties and municipalities could regulate the hours of sale within the limits set by State laws; that is, the sale of spirituous liquors could be authorized at such time as the general law and public policy did not prohibit the sales. The general law and public policy of Georgia regulates the days that sales of spirituous liquors by the drink and the sale of alcoholic beverages by the bottle may be made.
Code Ann. § 58-1068 provides: “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as giving any person a right to sell spirituous liquors as herein defined, but the manufacture, sale, and distribution of spirituous liquors is declared to be a privilege in this State and not a right. (Acts 1937-38, Ex. Sess., pp. 103, 121.)”
It can not be argued that the General Assembly of Georgia delegated authority to counties and municipalities authorizing them to repeal State law by “rule or regulation” or to adopt ordinances inconsistent with or in conflict with State laws. Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840 (196 SE 897).
The State laws dealing specifically with intoxicating liquors are State-wide laws of general application and as such they take precedence over other applicable, though less specific, State laws of general application such as the Sunday closing laws. Parrish v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 185 Ga. 828, 832 (196 SE 721).
Appellants vigorously argue that the General Assembly of Georgia has set up prohibitions against Sunday sales of spirituous liquors in the bottle but that there are no prohibitions against *261Sunday sales of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. This would result in rank discrimination. This type construction could well render the 1964 amendment unconstitutional, as prohibiting equal protection and uniformity as provided by the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945, particularly Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (Code Ann. § 2-102), and Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-401) of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 as well as the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. If an Act of the legislature is susceptible of two meanings one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other would render it constitutional, we must give it the latter construction. CTC Finance Corp. v. Holden, 221 Ga. 809 (147 SE2d 427).
The city ordinance of Atlanta does not positively provide that authorized licensees may sell alcoholic beverages from twelve o’clock midnight until 2 a.m. on Sunday. The ordinance does provide that persons so licensed shall not engage in sales thereof between the hours of 2 a.m. Sunday and 9 a.m. Monday. The ordinance is silent as to sales from midnight on Saturday until 2 am. on Sunday. The only reasonable answer could be that the Atlanta city ordinance could not authorize the activity of subject matter that is prohibited by State law. There is no conflict between the 1938 law and the 1964 amendment or in the ordinance provided thereunder. The Act and its amendment construed together clearly provide a prohibition against liquor sales on Sunday giving cities the right only to regulate hours within the non-prohibited days.
Section 31 (a) of the 1964 amendment added to the original Act a section which contains five provisions numbered consecutively “a” through “e”. The provision number (a) contains a proviso, “Anything in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding . . .” wherein certain cities and counties are authorized to license the sale of mixed drinks. No such proviso was inserted by the General Assembly in the other provisions.
While all parts of a statute, including provisos, are to be construed together (Cherokee Brick &c. Co. v. Redwine, 209 Ga. 691, 693 (75 SE2d 550)), a proviso refers only to the provision to which it is attached. United States v. McClure, 305 U. S. 472, 478 (59 SC 335, 83 LE 296).
*262The general rule is stated in 82 CJS 884, Statutes, § 381 (b) as follows: “(1) In General. “A proviso should be construed together with the enacting clause or body of the act, with a view to giving effect to each and to carrying out the intention of the legislature as manifested in the entire act and acts in pari materia. A strict but reasonable construction is to be given to the proviso so as to take out of the enacting clause only those cases which are fairly within the terms of the proviso.”
This general rule as applied limits the effect of a proviso to the provision to which it is attached. See Melvin v. Reading, 346 Mich. 348 (ftn. 3) (78 NW2d 181), Farrey v. Bettendorf, (Fla.) 96 S2d 889.
Reason alone would require that a proviso be strictly construed when it is used either in an amendment to a general Act or when it is used to exempt activities from regulatory statutes. It is unreasonable to believe that the General Assembly of Georgia intended to strike down the public policy of Georgia and allow cities and counties to authorize the sale of alcohol to minors, on Sundays, on election days, or within 100 yards of a church or school. The restriction of the proviso used in provision (a) to that provision would of course permit the sale of ■mixed drinks but subject sales to the restrictions and controls found elsewhere in the Act governing the sale of all alcoholic beverages and spirituous liquors. With or without the proviso, “anything to the contrary notwithstanding,” it is clear that the 1964 amendment does not create an exception or exemption to the controls and restrictions imposed against Sunday, election day, etc., type prohibitive sales.
Sabbath and Sunday. — Judge Townsend said in Bolden v. State, 88 Ga. App. 871, 874 (78 SE2d 368), that the old statute in Code § 26-6105, “while archaic in language, is still in force in this State, and forbids the keeping open of tippling houses on the Sabbath.”
This case shows that the raid on the premises occurred at about 2 a.m. on Sunday morning and that the defendant was present on the Sunday morning in question, that some liquor was sold shortly thereafter and that he left before the officers arrived. The defendant was convicted in this case and this *263case holds 2 a.m. Sunday morning as being sufficient to convict under Code § 26-6105.
It must logically follow “as night follows the day” or as day follows night that 2 a.m. Sunday morning is part of the Sabbath day or Sabbath night. We are bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Gunn v. State, 89 Ga. 341 (3) (15 SE 458) which says, “ ‘Sunday’ and 'the Sabbath day’ are synonymous in the legislation of Georgia.” Where a statute prohibits certain activities on Sunday, Sunday is properly construed to include the entire period between 12 midnight at the end of Saturday and 12 midnight at the beginning of Monday. Gillooley v. Vaughn, 92 Fla. 943 (110 S 653). The Georgia courts have followed this rule of law. Rose v. State, 107 Ga. 697 (1) (33 SE 439). The case of Kroer v. People, 78 Ill. 294, supra, specifically held that the phrase “Sabbath day” and “Sabbath night” includes the time between twelve midnight on Saturday and daybreak on Sunday, as well as the time between daybreak Sunday and 12 midnight Sunday.
If, as argued by appellants, 2 a.m. Sunday is not part of the Sabbath or Sunday and Sunday and the Sabbath or Lord’s day does not really begin until sunrise, then this court would be saying that a municipality under the previously mentioned applicable laws could permit sales of alcoholic beverages until 3 a.m., 4 a.m. or possibly 5 a.m. or 6 a.m. on Sunday morning. Carrying this reasoning even further, alcoholic beverages could be sold during the period of an Easter sunrise service or during the eclipse of the sun all day Sunday or on a cloudy Sunday dawn or dusk might be simulated at various periods of the day. This is not the law in Georgia, Florida or Illinois. Certainly this court would not consider following the law in South Carolina and Connecticut which permits the sitting of a court and the rendering of a valid judgment on Sunday. It is the writer’s opinion that the public policy in Georgia is based on the premise outlined in Berta v. State, 223 Ga. 267, 268 (154 SE2d 594): “It is contended that the statute is discriminatory because it selects the Christian Sunday as the Sabbath day and discrimi-' nates against those religious groups that use Saturday as the Sabbath day. Historically the requirements of our law forbid*264ding labor on Sunday, and similar laws of other states, were based on religious beliefs in regard to the sanctity of the Sabbath day as observed by people of the Christian faith, and this background is reflected in our statute, which refers to Sunday as ‘the Lord’s day.’ It is now generally held that the authority to enact and enforce such laws rests within the police power of the State.”
Much of this historical background is based on the same bedrock principles outlined by Justice Brainard in the dissenting opinion in the case of Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 541, 553, who said “The questions are, what is the Christian Sabbath? And, What, in Connecticut, is the Sabbath? Whether the Christian Sabbath comprehends one seventh part of time, one seventh part of a week; and if it does, whether the Sabbath of Connecticut, is, by law the same?
“That the Christian Sabbath consists of one seventh part of time, the religious observance of which is of moral and perpetual obligation on the consciences of all professing Christians, I think, there can be no doubt.
“In six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, and rested the seventh. On the completion of this stupendous work of Omnipotence, in six days, God blessed the seventh, and sanctified it.
“In reference to time, God, to declare, by his divine command, what portion should be observed as holy, divided it into days, each consisting of an equal number of hours. [Emphasis supplied.] On the seventh day, God rested from his work, and blessed and sanctified it.
“Did this seventh day, which God blessed and sanctified, consist of the same portion of time, as each of the six preceding days, in which, according to language adapted to our comprehension, God is said to have made the heavens and the earth?
“Whoever reads and believes the concise and sublime account given by Moses of this astonishing work of creation, cannot doubt that one seventh part of time, one day in seven, containing twenty-four hours, was blessed and sanctified — a Sabbath, holy unto the Lord.
“This is expressly confirmed in the decalogue. ‘Six days shalt *265thou labour, but the seventh is the Sabbath of the Lord, thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work.’
“Can it be supposed, that the Almighty, declaring his commandment from Sinai and prescribing the same order and distribution of time, which he did in the creation, intended, that this seventh day should be wanting in measure, and destitute of proportion? [Emphasis supplied.] Indeed, on this point, Exodus xxiii. 10-12, I think, is conclusive. ‘Six years shalt thou sow thy land, &c. but the seventh thou shalt let it rest,’ &c. ‘Six days thou shalt do thy work; and on the seventh, thou shalt rest.’ Can there be a question, but that this seventh year was an entire year; and this seventh day, an entire day?
“If this be the Jewish, what is the Christian Sabbath?
“On the authority of the resurrection of our Saviour, the day of the Sabbath, in the view of Christians, generally, is altered; but the portion of time not varied: the Christian Sabbath, in point of duration, is the same as the Jewish. . .
“On the whole, I take the Sabbath, or Lord’s day, to be, in Connecticut, a natural day, consisting of twenty-four hours.”
While there should be an unbending separation of Church and State, we cannot ignore the fact that the representatives of the people (General Assembly) have enacted a multiplicity of Acts affecting activity on Sunday and the Sabbath. The notion is advanced that the term “Sabbath” is ambiguous and vague and as a legal term has no place in a statute. Throughout Georgia’s history statutes have been passed, even as current as April 10, 1968, using this vague term “Sabbath.” The many statutes are in the books. They are in existence. This court is powerless to strike down the Sunday or Sabbath laws. Only the General Assembly can repeal them. Only the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Supreme Court of the United States can rule them unconstitutional. Our court must uphold and recognize the Sunday-Sabbath statutes until such time as they are repealed or overruled. Hennington v. State, 90 Ga. 396, 398 (17 SE 1009), affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 163 U. S. 299 (16 SC 1086, 41 LE 166); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 444 (81 SC 1101, 6 LE2d 393); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (81 SC 1144, 6 LE2d 563); Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588 (2) *266(110 SE 726, 20 ALR 1105). Hughes v. Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727 (157 SE2d 746), is not applicable to this factual situation. The case sub judice is controlled by Berta v. State, supra, and this court is bound by the holding therein. “. . . [I]n seeking a sound construction we must look, not to what we would prefer, but solely to what sayeth the law.” Hood v. First National Bank, 219 Ga. 283, 286 (133 SE2d 19). The crux of the appellants’ argument is that in March of 1964 (Code Ann. § 58-1083) an amendment was passed superseding or repealing the Sunday-Sabbath (Election Day) prohibitions of liquor sales. On June 24, 1964, (approximately 90 days later) Code Ann. § 34-1937 (Ga. L. 1964), was passed: “34-1937. Sale of alcoholic beverages on primary or election days prohibited. — Any person who shall sell or buy or offer for sale any alcoholic beverages on primary or election days shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Acts 1964, Ex. Sess., pp. 26, 196.)”
And again this year, 1968, when the General Assembly adopted the new Criminal Code, most of the Sunday-Sabbath-Lord’s day prohibition against certain liquor sales provisions were left intact, in toto, in the same identical unambiguous wording clearly showing the intent of the legislature: “26-9906. Tippling Houses, Keeping Open on Sabbath. Any person who shall keep open a tippling house on the Sabbath day or Sabbath night shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” “26-9908. Violating the Sabbath Day. Any person who shall pursue his business or the work of his ordinary calling on the Lord’s day, works of necessity or charity only excepted, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding these statutes were not repealed in 1964, they have been and still are the law of Georgia and according to the new Criminal Code (advanced by the crime commission and State Bar) will continue to be the law in the future.
Sunday, the Sabbath, or Lord’s day is a complete day, a natural day, consisting of twenty-four hours as Tuesday, Wednesday or any other day of the week. We must not short-change the amount of time or hours of any day, including Sunday. Assuming arguendo that Sunday is stripped of all religious connotation, as in McGowan, supra, Sunday is still a complete day consisting of twenty-four hours.
*267The trial court correctly sustained general demurrers to the petition and dismissed the same and I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Jordan concurs in this dissent, and that Judge Pannell concurs in its result.