dissenting:
¶ 24 I dissent. As noted in the majority opinion, “[w]hen we interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.” Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998) (citing Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)). Before turning to any other source, the statute’s plain language must be examined. See Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Indeed, the words of a statute are to be read literally unless unreasonably confused or inoperable. See Home v. Horne, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
¶25 The majority opinion, based upon a finding of textual ambiguity, interprets the applicable limitations period under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(a) such that it applies only to claims brought after the four-year repose period and does not negate or supplant the operation of the two-year general statute of limitations prior to expiration of the repose period. In reaching this result, the majority enters into a lengthy and oftentimes strained analysis in an effort to “harmonize” the multiple meanings of the statute in question. However, a close reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that section 78-14r-4(1)(a) is neither unreasonably confusing nor inoperable, and harmonization is not necessary. Rather, the clear language of the medical malpractice statute of limitations operates to bar the claim in this case.
¶26 Specifically, the relevant parts of section 78-14-4(1)(a) read as follows:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered!,] the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient’s body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient’s body, whichever first occurs[J
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 27 As recognized by the majority opinion, the first paragraph sets forth two time limitations on bringing suit for medical malpractice: a general two-year statute of limitations (running from the time of discovery), and a four-year repose period (running from the time of the alleged negligence). Subsection (a) is merely one of two exceptions to the foregoing. Although the majority found the words “except that” unclear and turned to *1209the “last antecedent” rule of construction for assistance in determining a plausible formulation, such was not necessary under the circumstances.
¶ 28 Relying on the literal wording of the statute, it is clear that paragraph (1) governs, except in situations where subsection (a) is applicable. In other words, a plaintiff who presents a case of malpractice has two years from discovery of the injury or four years after the date of the act to bring the cause of action, whichever comes first — “except that” where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left in a patient’s body, the plaintiff has one year after discovery to assert a claim.
¶ 29 The majority concludes that such a rule rewards physicians who are negligent or conceal their wrongful acts by decreasing the amount of time in which a litigant may file an action. However, this is not necessarily true. Indeed, the plaintiff who suffers an injury under subsection (a) may have less than a two-year time frame to bring his or her claim; however, the same plaintiff who does not and could not through reasonable diligence discover the existence of the foreign object could conceivably have an unlimited time in which to assert his or her cause of action under the literal wording of the statute.
¶ 30 Although subsection (b) is not át issue in this case, since it was considered' in the majority opinion, it will be addressed only to note that the same analysis would apply to it as well. Specifically, in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of the health care provider due to fraudulent concealment, the patient would have one year, possibly extending indefinitely, depending upon the particular circumstances of the case, to file his or her action.
¶ 31 While the majority finds that a literal reading of the statute leads to harsh and unreasonable results, the contrary is in fact true. Granted, there will be those litigants who quickly discover their alleged injury and are required, under the statute, to respond within one year of the discovery. However, for many other plaintiffs, the statute’s exceptions will result in a preservation of their claims well beyond the strict two- and four-year limitations.
¶ 32 Regardless of what result would be achieved, Utah law requires that the statute’s plain language be the first source of inquiry in all eases of statutory interpretation. As noted in the dissent by Justice Stewart in In re Young, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 976 P.2d 581, 1999 WL 23427 (Jan. 22, 1999), this rule “ ‘prevents judges from “finding” an ambiguity in even the most plain language of a constitutional or statutory provision as an excuse to search the legislative history in an attempt to justify an interpretation they prefer.’ ” Id. at 37, 976 P.2d at 598, 1999 WL 23427 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 n. 14 (Utah 1994)). There being no textual ambiguity in this case, this is where the analysis must end. Accordingly, I would affirm.
Having disqualified himself, Chief Justice HOWE does not participate herein; District Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK sat.