dissenting.
Leroy Dowdy Smith correctly argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit Torrence Bradby’s pre-trial statement to the police which contradicted Bradby’s trial testimony. Conceding that Bradby’s statement was inconsistent with Bradby’s testimony, the Commonwealth cites Code § 19.2-268.1 in support of the contention that the trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit the statement in evidence. The Commonwealth further contends that since Bradby did not dispute the fact that his previous statement contradicted his trial testimony, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit the prior written statement. I would hold that the record proved the trial judge abused his discretion, and I would reverse the conviction.
By statute in Virginia, parties in a criminal case may cross-examine a witness as to previous statements.
A witness in a criminal case may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, relative to the subject matter of the proceeding, without such writing being shown to him; but if it is intended to contradict such witness by the writing, his attention must, before such contradictory proof can be given, be called to the particular occasion on which the writing is supposed to have been made, and he may be asked if he did not make a writing of the purport of the one to *515be offered to contradict him, and if he denies making it, or does not admit its execution, it shall then be shown to him, and if he admits its genuineness, he shall be allowed to make his own explanation of it; but it shall be competent for the court at any time during the trial to require the production of the writing for its inspection, and the court may thereupon make such use of it for the purpose of the trial as it may think best.
Code § 19.2-268.1.
The Commonwealth reads Code § 19.2-268.1 too broadly. The statute does not by its terms limit a party’s right to offer as evidence the writing used to examine the witness. The last phrase in the statute reads: “[I]t shall be competent for the court at any time during the trial to require the production of the writing for its inspection, and the court may thereupon make such use of it for the purpose of the trial as it may think best.” Id. (emphasis added). This language empowers the trial judge to require the production of the document, on the court’s own initiative, even if the party in possession of the writing does not make it available to the witness. When the trial judge secures the document pursuant to Code § 19.2-268.1, the judge is authorized to ‘ ‘make such use of it for the purpose of the trial as [the trial judge] may think best.” Id. Thus, nothing in the statute changes the rules concerning the admissibility of relevant documentary proof offered by any one of the litigants.
Code § 19.2-268.1 cannot be read to empower the trial judge to limit introduction of the writing when that limitation intrudes upon the defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation to “substantially and fairly” cross-examine his opponent’s witness. Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 77-78, 354 S.E.2d 79, 93 (1987). Consistent with the statute, the Supreme Court has stated:
It is fundamental to the right of cross-examination that a witness who is not a party to the case on trial may be impeached by prior statements made by the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony, provided a foundation is first laid by calling his attention to the statement and then questioning him about it before it is introduced in evidence.
Hall v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 369, 374, 355 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
*516When Smith’s counsel cross-examined Bradby, Bradby admitted that he gave a statement concerning the robbery to the police on the day he was arrested. That statement was inconsistent with his trial testimony. However, Bradby also said he could not recall certain portions of the statement.
[SMITH’S COUNSEL]: You’ve also told the detective that day that Leroy got in and drove the cab and drove you all off, right?
A. I don’t recall that.
[SMITH’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, might I approach the witness?
THE COURT: Yes.
Q. It’s page 3. All right. Mr. Bradby, take a look at that paragraph. Specifically what I have got underlined there, would you read that, please?
A. Leroy got out of the cab and drove the cab.
Q. Do you recall saying that, now?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. You don’t recall saying that?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. This tape is wrong?
MR. TRONO: Objection, Judge.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
The Commonwealth asserts that the “statement would have added nothing that the witness did not admit.” However, as the quoted excerpt from the trial transcript demonstrates, Bradby did not unequivocally admit either the accuracy of the prior inconsistent statement or the inconsistencies of the prior statement. It is well established that whenever a witness testifies that he or she is unable to recall a prior inconsistency, the prior inconsistent statement is admissible as evidence. McGehee v. Perkins, 188 Va. 116, 125, 49 S.E.2d 304, 309 (1948); Forde v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 547, 553-59 (1864). See also State v. Van Gorder, 56 Or. App. 83, 89, 641 P.2d *517584, 587 (1982); People v. Baca, 633 P.2d 528, 529 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). All inconsistent portions of a prior written statement are admissible for impeachment purposes. Epps v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 93, 102, 56 S.E.2d 237, 240-41 (1949).
Bradby admitted that he never incriminated himself in the statement he gave the police. His failure, however, to recall statements that directly conflicted with his trial testimony describing Smith’s participation in the events was tantamount to denial of those statements. The scope and weight of the impeachment material directly related to Smith’s participation and could not be adequately assessed by the jury when limited to one or two inconsistencies brought out on cross-examination or Bradby’s simple admission that he had been lying when he gave that statement. When Bradby failed to recall items in the statement, the entire statement became relevant. The statement’s impeachment value was derived from its factual completeness and detailed account of Bradby’s false claim of innocent presence at the robbery as well as Bradby’s inconsistent description of Smith’s involvement. In depriving the jury of the entire statement, the trial judge deprived the jury of the opportunity to consider the thoroughness of Bradby’s self-admitted prevarication, to weigh the degree of his evasiveness when questioned, and to compare his statement with his similarly detailed testimony at trial.
“While it is true that the trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, limit cross-examination of a witness within reasonable bounds, that does not mean that in the exercise of such judicial discretion it should exclude relevant evidence which tends to attack the credibility of a witness who is not a defendant.” Hummel v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 548, 550, 231 S.E.2d 216, 217 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979). Since the trial judge’s discretion to limit cross-examination may not be employed until the defendant has had an opportunity to “substantially and fairly” cross-examine the witness, Williams, 4 Va. App. at 77-78, 354 S.E.2d at 93, his actions impermissibly compromised Smith’s constitutional right to confront the witness. The error was not harmless; therefore, the conviction should be reversed.