dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, this case does not require consideration of the “filed rate doctrine” because this is not a “rate case.” Therefore, I would reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims that the South Carolina Reinsurance Facility (the Facility) charged Plaintiffs an illegal “facility base rate,” and that State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) collected this illegal rate. In addition, I would affirm the circuit court’s refusal to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that State Farm issued unauthorized sur*523charge points on Plaintiffs’ insurance policies, in violation of the parties’ insurance contracts and South Carolina law.
In my opinion, the majority mischaracterizes this case as a “rate case,” and as a result, improperly considers the applicability of the “filed rate doctrine.” Outlined first by Justice Brandéis in Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. RY. CO., 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922), the “filed rate doctrine” hypothesizes that regulatory rates which are duly adopted via administrative channels and/or administrative proceedings are not subject to collateral attack in court. See also Com. ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Companies, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Ky.Ct.App.1999) (holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes an agency’s liability for damages).
In the traditional “rate case,” a plaintiff would argue that he was charged an excessive premium because an administrative body, through the exercise of its discretion, should have adopted a lower premium. This case stands in stark contrast to such a claim. Plaintiffs in the instant case allege that they were improperly charged the wrong rate, though the rate was otherwise valid.8
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that State Farm assessed unauthorized surcharge points to Plaintiffs’ insurance policies in violation of the parties’ insurance contracts. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that these unauthorized surcharge points were assessed in violation of South Carolina law. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Facility violated S.C.Code §§ 38-73-1400 and 38-73-1420 when calculating the “facility base rate,” and that State Farm collected this illegal rate.
In my opinion, these causes of action, essentially claims for declaratory relief and damages in the form of overcharges, can be easily resolved by simply implementing the clear and unambiguous terms of the rates outlined in the South Carolina *524Code.9 Accordingly, I would allow the Plaintiffs’ above-discussed claims and also decline to address the broader issue of the applicability of the “filed rate doctrine” in South Carolina; the doctrine is simply not implicated in this case.
As a final matter, the trial judge also held that Plaintiffs’ claim that only certain policy holders could be charged premiums other than the “base” or “objective” rates was predicated on an erroneous reading of the law. Accordingly, the trial judge dismissed this claim against the Facility. Plaintiffs did not argue that this was error on appeal. Since Plaintiffs’ assert an identical claim against State Farm, I would dismiss this claim on the same grounds.
Accordingly, I would reverse in part and affirm in part the ruling of the circuit court. I would allow the case to proceed forward and Plaintiffs to assert (1) that the Facility charged Plaintiffs an illegal “facility base rate,” (2) that State Farm collected this illegal rate, and (3) that State Farm issued unauthorized surcharge points on Plaintiffs’ insurance policies, in violation of the parties’ insurance contracts and South Carolina law.
. To distinguish this case from a "rate case,” it is perhaps helpful to use the following illustration: If Plaintiff claims, “in the exercise of discretion, the agency should have adopted some lower rate instead of a rate of X,” then Plaintiff is effectively asking the court to substitute its discretion for the administrative agency’s. If instead, a rate scheme authorizes a base rate of X, and further provides that, if certain additional conditions exist, then a rate of Y, Plaintiff is free to argue that he does not meet the requirements for issuance of the higher rate; Plaintiff is merely disputing the rate’s validity "as applied” to him.
. I simply fail to see how performing the mathematical computations of (1) subtracting unauthorized surcharge points from Plaintiffs' insurance policies (Plaintiffs' seventh and eighth causes of action) and (2) correctly applying non-discretionary portions of the statutory rate (Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action) constitutes supplanting the Department of Insurance’s discretion.