concurring specially.
I concur in affirmance of the judgment, but write separately to address the issue of Marks’ constitutional challenge to OCGA § 30-5-8 (a) (1) on vagueness grounds. In Division 4, the majority states that the trial court “expressly declined to address the merits” of the attack on the constitutionality of the statute because Marks lacked standing, and it then holds that Marks has waived his right to make the vagueness argument by failing to “complain about the standing ruling on appeal; he addresses only the merits of the vagueness challenge.” Majority opinion, p. 74.1 do not agree that waiver applies, because, contrary to the majority’s analysis, the trial court did not actually “decline” to address the merits of Marks’ contention based upon his lack of standing. Instead, I believe that the trial court’s conclusion that Marks lacked standing was a ruling on the merits of his vagueness challenge to the statute. Since the trial court ruled on the merits, so must we.
The rule is that “ ‘(o)ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 44 (14) (427 SE2d 770) (1993). However, success and standing are not synonymous. “A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the statute has an adverse impact on that party’s own rights. [Cit.]” State of Ga. v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 (1) (496 SE2d 912) (1998). Having been charged with a violation of OCGA§ 30-5-8 (a) (1), Marks certainly had standing to urge that that statute is unconstitutionally vague. The success of his attack is an entirely different consideration.
OCGA § 30-5-8 (a) (1) provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . exploit any disabled adult or elder *77person.” According to OCGA § 30-5-3 (9), “exploitation” means “the illegal or improper use of a disabled adult or elder person or that person’s resources for another’s profit or advantage.”
A statute ... is unconstitutionally vague only if it fails to convey “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices,” [cits.] so that “persons of common intelligence (need not) necessarily guess at its meaning (nor) differ as to its application.” [Cit.]
Franklin v. State, 279 Ga. 150, 151 (1) (611 SE2d 21) (2005). Because Marks’ vagueness challenge did not involve any First Amendment right, its success or failure is dependent upon
the application of the [statute] in light of the conduct to which it is applied in this case. [Cits.] “(A) person ‘who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’ (Cits.)” [Cit.]
Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81 (526 SE2d 60) (2000). Here, the trial court apparently determined that Marks lacked standing because, as worded, OCGA§§ 30-5-3 (9) and 30-5-8 (a) (1) are sufficient to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that the specific acts which the indictment alleged that he committed were instances of proscribed conduct. “In general, any word or phrase used in [a statute] that has a commonly understood meaning is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements, and thus is not considered vague. [Cit.]” Franklin v. State, supra. Therefore, the trial court essentially held that Marks’ constitutional attack was without merit as applied to him, and that he lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the hypothetical conduct of another accused. “[0]ne whose own conduct may be constitutionally proscribed will not be heard to challenge a law because it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. [Cits.]” Hubbard v. State, 256 Ga. 637, 638 (352 SE2d 383) (1987).
The majority mistakenly assumes that the holding in any decision which addresses the issue of standing can be applied indiscriminately in every case, even one which involves the right to assert a completely different constitutional attack. Standing vel non is not a general concept, but depends upon the relationship between the party attacking the constitutionality of the statute and the nature of the challenge he advances. Thus, reliance on Vandiver v. Williams, 218 Ga. 60 (1) (126 SE2d 210) (1962) as support for the waiver theory *78is clearly misplaced here, since that case does not involve a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute on vagueness grounds. Compare also Haynes v. Wells, 273 Ga. 106, 108 (3) (538 SE2d 430) (2000); Martin v. State, 195 Ga. App. 548 (1) (394 SE2d 551) (1990); Lockaby v. City of Cedartown, 151 Ga. App. 281 (259 SE2d 683) (1979). The majority concedes that the trial “court determined that Marks had no standing to assert such a challenge because he failed to show that the statute as applied to his conduct, adversely impacted him.” Majority opinion, p. 74. What the trial court obviously meant by this is that OCGA § 30-5-8 (a) (1) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Where, as here, the freedom of speech is not involved, we have always considered such a ruling to be a determination that a vagueness challenge lacks merit, because an accused can only attack the statute on that ground based upon its application to his own conduct and not upon the hypothetical conduct of others. Thelen v. State, supra; Hubbard v. State, supra; Dowis v. State, 243 Ga. App. 354, 355 (533 SE2d 43) (2000). Thus, notwithstanding any additional comments made by the trial court, the substance of its ruling was not a complete refusal to address the merits of Marks’ vagueness challenge. Instead, by predicating its ruling on the lack of standing and citing Dowis v. State, supra, the trial court distinctly held that the vagueness challenge was without merit to the extent that Marks had standing to raise the issue. Compare Haynes v. Wells, supra; Vandiver v. Williams, supra; Martin v. State, supra; Lockaby v. City of Cedartown, supra.
Decided December 1, 2005. Teddy R. Price, for appellant.As the majority notes, Marks does not complain about the standing ruling on appeal, but he does address the merits of his vagueness challenge. Of course, a vagueness challenge, as applied to Marks, is precisely the issue that he raised below and that the trial court ruled on. Therefore, he has not waived his vagueness argument on appeal. However, we should address the merits of that argument, and affirm the trial court’s holding that, insofar as Marks’ conduct is concerned, OCGA § 30-5-8 (a) (1) is not unconstitutionally vague simply because the “application of the statute’s standards sometimes requires an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if [it] is violated.... [Cits.]” State v. Boyer, 270 Ga. 701, 703 (1) (512 SE2d 605) (1999).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears joins in this special concurrence. *79Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.