(concurring in result):
I concur with the majority in its decision to reverse the grant of a new trial, but write separately to explain why I would reverse on a different ground.
*457Dicapua raises the issue of the ability of the State to appeal the grant of a new trial. This is a threshold issue not addressed in the majority opinion. The State’s ability to appeal the grant of a new trial is closely circumscribed by precedent. If the grant of a new trial by the trial court is based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the State has no right to appeal. State v. Lynn, 120 S.C. 258, 261, 113 S.E. 74, 75 (1922). On the other hand, the State may appeal the grant of a new trial when it appears it is based wholly upon an error of law. State v. Des Champs, 126 S.C. 416, 418, 120 S.E. 491, 492 (1923).
Although the grant or refusal of a new trial motion lies within the discretion of the trial court, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law.” State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643, 656, 623 S.E.2d 122, 129 (Ct.App.2005).
In this instance, I agree the State may appeal because the ruling of the trial court that the videotape is not admissible is, in my view, an error of law. The flaws in the videotape go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. The trial court’s grant of a new trial was premised solely on the finding that the videotape was inadmissible. I believe that ruling to be an error of law that allows the appeal, and its prejudicial nature compels the reversal.