(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson, but write separately to point out the irony that, applying Batson, a new trial has been ordered because an African American juror, subjected to peremptory challenge, was permitted to sit on the jury.
In my view, the majority has elevated the right to peremptory challenge over the right established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to prevent the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude persons from the jury solely based on race. I have the same concerns as those I expressed in State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 841-45 (Minn. 2003) (Anderson, Russell A., J., dissenting).
The state objected to the peremptory challenge on the ground that the challenge was racially motivated. The district court asked Angus for a response, which Angus provided without questioning the state’s prima facie showing. Angus stated that the prospective juror’s credibility was the basis for the strike. After extensively questioning the prospective juror personally, the district court sustained the objection, determining that the credibility of the prospective juror was not a race-neutral explanation in the context of this voir dire. The court concluded that Angus’ race-neutral explanation was not “sufficient,” but a successful Batson challenge should not depend on the court’s use of particular magic words. The court’s detailed questioning of the juror to determine whether Angus’ explanation was a pretext for discrimination supports the court’s ruling even though the court failed to explicitly say that the state had carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
While the district court did not precisely follow Batson’s three-step analysis, it is implicit from this record that the challenge to this juror established a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under step one of Batson. By answering the court’s request for a race-neutral explanation, Angus as much conceded the inference of racial bias. By sustaining the objection to the challenge, which was based on the state’s assertion of pretextual racial dis*129crimination, the court implicitly determined that the strike was pretextual racial discrimination. In determining whether Angus’ strike was racially based, the court must consider “all the relevant facts bearing on the issue.” State v. Gaitan, 586 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn.1995). Where credibility is such a critical consideration in determining pretext, I would give deference to the district court decision, as we have said we must. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn.2000).