concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion not to review defendant’s plain error assignment. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in doubling the length of defendant’s imprisonment by changing defendant’s sentences from concurrent to consecutive terms. I vote to vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. I respectfully dissent.
I. Background
On 7 March 2005, defendant was indicted on one count of second degree rape and two counts of second degree sexual offense. The charges were tried before a jury between the 6th and 8th of March 2006.
On 8 March 2006, the jury found defendant to be guilty of one count of second degree rape and one count of second degree sexual offense (digital penetration into the victim’s genital opening). The *313jury returned a verdict of not guilty of a second count of second degree sexual offense by digital penetration. The trial court proceeded to the sentencing hearing.
In order to understand the full circumstances of defendant’s sentencing not set out in the majority’s opinion, the transcript shows the following exchange:
The Court: .... I am going to impose the sentence as follows:
Madam Clerk there will be two sentences. The first will be in the file of 04-CRS-50891. This is in the charge of Second Degree Rape.
The Defendant is to serve a minimum term of 100 months and maximum term of 129 months in custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. He is to be given credit for his time spent in confinement.
The second judgment, Madam Clerk, will be in the second case in which the Jury has returned a verdict of guilty. This is 05-CRS-324, the charge of Second Degree Sex Offense, digital penetration into the victim’s genital opening.
The Defendant is to serve a minimum term of 100 months and a maximum term of 129 months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. No credit is given for time spent in confinement all of the prior credit having been awarded in the first case.
The Defendant will be in custody and that will complete the matter unless there are questions.
[The District Attorney]: No, Your Honor.
(Defendant left the courtroom).
The Court: Madam Clerk, [defense counsel] that was (sic) consecutive sentence. I want to make sure that was on the record with the defendant present. The clerk advised me that I did not say that was consecutive, and that was my intention. I need him in the courtroom when I say that to clarify that when you can *314get him. Will it take a few minutes for the Defendant to be brought back?
(Court proceeded with other matters)
[The District Attorney]: Your Honor, [defendant] I understand is out in the hallway.
(Defendant brought back into the courtroom)
The Court: That is fine. [Defense counsel], if you will go over to this side of the courtroom, it is not necessary that he be brought back around into the area where he was standing as long as he is present in the courtroom. I did want to make sure there was no misunderstanding.
The record will reflect that the defendant has been brought back into the courtroom. He is in the courtroom with his defense counsel. The Court just wanted the record to reflect that the Court did impose two 100 to 129 month sentences to the defendant for the two charges from which the verdicts were returned as guilty.
It was the Court’s intention that the sentences were to be served as consecutive sentences and not concurrent sentences. I did not state that and I was advised by the clerk. I have brought the defendant back in so that could be stated publicly in the Defendant’s presence.
Two sentences 100 months minimum, 129 months maximum, those are to be served consecutively. That will complete the sentence. The defendant is to be returned to custody. Thank you.
(Emphasis supplied).
The trial court entered judgments accordingly and sentenced defendant to two consecutive sentences between 100 minimum to 129 maximum months with credit given for time served on the first judgment.
II. Sentencing
Defendant argues the trial court erred by increasing his sentence from concurrent to consecutive terms after the clerk of court’s prompting and advice. Defendant alleges the trial court permitted the clerk of court to comment on his sentence when the clerk had not been called as a witness and this procedure violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 16A-1334(b). I agree.
*315The trial court “has considerable leeway and discretion in governing the conduct of a sentencing proceeding[.]” State v. Smith, 352 N.C. 531, 557, 532 S.E.2d 773, 790 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 949, 149 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2001). “A judgment will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless there is a showing of abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.” State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962).
Defendant argues the trial court’s ruling and sentence violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334(b). This statute states in part, “No person other than the defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and one making a presentence report may comment to the court on sentencing unless called as a witness by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334(b). Defendant contends the statute was violated when the clerk commented to the trial court on his sentence and the trial court’s alteration of his sentence was prejudicial to him because it “cost the Defendant 100 to 129 months of liberty.”
Here, the trial court did not specify, during sentencing, whether defendant’s sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently. After the sentence was pronounced and defendant was taken into custody, that “complete[d] the matter,” and “defendant left the courtroom.”
“Unless otherwise specified by the court, all sentences of imprisonment run concurrently with any other sentences of imprisonment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.15(a) (2005); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1354(a) (2005) (“If not specified or not required by statute to run consecutively, sentences shall run concurrently.”). The sentencing proceeding ended at this point. Defendant’s sentences were concurrent by operation of law. Defendant was taken into custody, removed from the courtroom, and the trial court proceeded to other business.
The trial court then stated, “Madam Clerk, [defense counsel] that was (sic) consecutive sentence. I want to make sure that was on the record with the defendant present. The clerk advised me that I did not say that was consecutive, and that was my intention.” (Emphasis supplied). The trial court ordered defendant to be returned to the courtroom.
After defendant was returned to the courtroom, the trial court stated, “It was the Court’s intention that the sentences were to be *316served as consecutive sentences and not concurrent sentences. I did not state that and I was advised by the clerk." (Emphasis supplied). This revelation by the trial court was a recognition of judicial error, not a clerical error. State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202, 535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000) (reiterating that a clerical error is an error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertance). While our courts have held that a trial court may amend the record to correct clerical mistakes, it cannot amend the record to correct a judicial error. State v. Taylor, 156 N.C. App. 172, 176, 576 S.E.2d 114, 117 (2003).
The transcript plainly shows in multiple places the clerk of court “advised” the trial court on sentencing without being called “as a witness by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334(b). As a result, defendant was re-sentenced from concurrent to consecutive terms, in effect doubling his sentence. The clerk of court clearly “comment[ed] to the court on sentencing” in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334(b). By later imposing a consecutive sentence after comment from a non-witness, rather than the concurrent sentence originally imposed, defendant’s incarceration was increased by 100 minimum to 129 maximum months. This was “procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant” and requires his sentence to be vacated. Pope, 257 N.C. at 335, 126 S.E.2d at 133.
The trial court initially failed to specify that the sentence entered in this case was consecutive, by law, the sentence was concurrent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.15(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1354(a). Having announced the decision in open court and placing defendant into custody, the trial court “complete[d] the matter,” and it could not reopen the matter and double defendant’s sentence. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 82 L. Ed. 204, 204 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”).
III. Conclusion
After defendant’s sentencing was completed, he was remanded into custody, and removed from the courtroom. Contrary to the majority’s holding, the trial court committed prejudicial error by changing defendant’s sentence from concurrent to consecutive terms after the trial court stated on numerous occasions it was “advised” by the clerk of court who was not called “as a witness by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 15A-1334(b) (“No person other than the defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and one making a presentence report may comment to the court on *317sentencing unless called as a witness by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.”).
I vote to vacate defendant’s sentence and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment ordering his sentences to run concurrently with credit for time served prior to sentencing, as originally ordered. I respectfully dissent.