concurring specially. In my opinion the Act of March 31, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 476; Code Ann. §§ 105-403 through 105-409) is controlling as to the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff and the extent of his liability. This Act, the stated purpose of which is to encourage landowners to make premises available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting owner liability (§ 1; Code Ann. § 105-403) expressly includes swimming as a recreational purpose (§ 2 (c); Code Ann. § 105-404 (c)) and provides (§ 4; Code Ann. § 105-406) that an owner who directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use his property does not (a) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose, (b) confer *626on that person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for injury to property or person caused by an “act of [sic] omission” of the users. The Act also provides (§ 6 (a); Code Ann. § 105-408 (a)) that nothing therein shall limit any liability which otherwise exists for the wilful and malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. It provides further (§ 7 (b); Code Ann. § 105-409 (b)) that it shall not be construed as relieving the user from any duty of care in using the land and in his activities thereon, or the legal consequences of failure to use care.
Viewing the Act as a whole there appears to be no basis for restricting its application merely because the actual or implied invitation may appear to be limited to specific individuals or a class of individuals, e.g., neighborhood children or playmates of the owner’s children, as distinguished from the public in general, for the Act is couched in terms of limited liability to the person or persons who are actually permitted on the premises, and there is not the stated condition that the property must be available to all members of the public.
Applying this Act to this case, the plaintiff’s status could be no better than that of a licensee, for the 1965 Act supra, expressly limits the owner’s liability to the wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, such being substantially the duty owed to a licensee under Code § 105-402.