concurring.
I agree with the result reached in this case. I believe we should adopt a rule that provides that neither side may obtain a right to specific performance of a plea *407agreement until such time as that agreement is disclosed to the trial court and approved, in conformity with Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Such a rule finds support in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); United States v. Blackner, 721 F.2d 703 (10th Cir.1983); and, I believe, is foreshadowed in Stobaugh v. State, 614 P.2d 767, 771-72 (Alaska 1980).
Applying that rule to this case, the agreement between Smith, his counsel, and the State of Alaska, was never disclosed to the trial court or approved by the trial court in conformity with Criminal Rule 11. In my view, neither party obtained specifically enforceable rights under the agreement. The prosecutor must abide by the terms of a plea agreement where the defendant pleads guilty in reliance upon those terms. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). But, where the agreement is not disclosed to the court in accordance with Rule 11, the defendant’s only remedy is the withdrawal of his plea, not specific enforcement of the agreement. Blackner, 721 F.2d at 709. A fortiori, the state should not be able to specifically enforce a plea agreement not approved by the trial court. Since Smith apparently believed the agreement was specifically enforceable and entered a plea based in part on this mistaken belief, I agree he should be permitted to withdraw his plea.