dissenting.
Without any clear statement as to how the trial court abused its discretion in this matter, the majority substitutes its judgment for *243that of the trial court and concludes that the question of how Franks received the injury is not a “routine booking question.” Because I agree with the trial court that the question as to how Franks received the injury falls within the booking question exception to Miranda and there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding, I respectfully dissent.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), the United States Supreme Court recognized that proper protection of the privilege against self-incrimination requires the adoption of procedural safeguards to be applied to custodial interrogation. The court specifically held that an individual in police custody must be warned of his rights prior to any custodial interrogation. Miranda, supra, 384 U. S. at 479. Since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miranda, however, a number of exceptions to its requirements have been recognized, including the routine booking question exception referenced by the court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582, 601 (110 SC 2638, 110 LE2d 528) (1990). This exception “exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.’ [Cits.]”6 Id. These routine booking questions fall outside of Miranda’s reach because they are not likely to elicit incriminating information from the person in custody but are merely used for administrative and identification purposes. See Muniz, supra, 496 U. S. at 601.
After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found that the question asked by FBI Agent Magill was a routine question and was not one which police should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The trial court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous as to either of these findings. As to the question in this case, the trial court heard testimony from Agent Magill that “when [the FBI] apprehend[s] fugitives [they] like to get a thorough description of them,” including their physical description, height, weight, eye color, scars, tattoos, fingerprints, and injuries like marks, swelling, bruises, and bandages and that it is procedure to ask about injuries when the person in custody has a bandage or other type of visible injury. The agent further testified that he knew before meeting Franks that the arrest had been difficult, requiring authorities to use tear gas before Franks was dragged from under a bed where he was hiding with a gun to his head, and he thought Franks had been *244injured during the arrest. His belief was supported by the fact that the bandage on Franks’ arm appeared very recent whereas the injury he was believed to have received at the time of the crime would have been nine days old at the time of his booking; further, Agent Magill testified that he understood Franks’ earlier injury to have been an “upper arm” injury, not an injury on the elbow as indicated by the bandage at the time of booking.7
Thus, while obviously not all questions asked during the booking procedure are routine booking questions, Agent Magill’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that a question regarding visible injuries was a question normally attendant to arrest and custody, especially where such extreme measures as tear gas and physical force are required to apprehend the suspect. The question constituted a legitimate police concern for Franks’ then-existing medical condition and did not seek to prove an element of the crime Franks was suspected of committing. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 300-301 (100 SC 1682, 64 LE2d 297) (1980); United States v. Gotchis, 803 F2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1986) (question concerning arrestee’s employment was booking question); United States v. LaVallee, 521 F2d 1109, 1113 (2nd Cir. 1975) (questions concerning marital status are basic information for booking purposes); United States v. LaMonica, 472 F2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) (question about meaning of document during inventory of personal possessions was not asked for the purpose of eliciting an incriminating statement); Hibbert v. State, 195 Ga. App. 235, 236-237 (393 SE2d 96) (1990) (request for names and addresses of family members within the booking exception); State v. Geasley, 619 NE2d 1086, 1093 (Ohio App. 1993) (questions about physical and medical condition posed to DUI arrestee proper).
The majority likewise fails to explain what is clearly erroneous in the trial court’s finding that Agent Magill’s question was not one which he should have known was likely to elicit an incriminating response from Franks. Whether an officer knew or should have known that a particular question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. Syfrett v. State, 210 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (435 SE2d 470) (1993); Davis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 566, 568 (382 SE2d 396) (1989). Here, there is more than sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court’s finding that Agent Magül’s question was not one which police knew or should have known was reasonably likely to elicit Franks’ incriminating response, in that the question did not necessarily require Franks to “speak his guilt,” Muniz, supra, *245496 Ü. S. at 594, and did not limit his answering the question to “self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Id., 496 U. S. at 595, n. 8. Agent Magill’s question was just as likely to elicit a response such as “I hurt my arm,” which would have been truthful, responsive to the question, and would in no way have implicated Franks’ guilt. Thus, the “cruel trilemma” against which the right to remain silent was intended to protect is not implicated by Magill’s question. See id., 496 U. S. at 594.
Decided July 14, 1997 Reconsideration denied July 24, 1997. Robbins & McLeod, Stanley IF Robbins, Thompson, Fox, Chandler, Homans & Hicks, Joseph A. Homans, for appellant. Lydia J. Sartain, District Attorney, Leonard C. Parks; Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.The police must be permitted some leeway into inquiring into the present medical condition of the arrestee. The purpose of such inquiry is not to elicit incriminating responses, but rather to ensure the safety and well-being of the suspect while in the custody of the police. Accordingly, asking an arrestee whether he has recently seen a physician, is taking medication, or has any medical condition requiring special treatment is a legitimate police concern when booking a suspect.
Geasley, supra, 619 NE2d at 1093. Because I cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in concluding that Agent Magill’s question fell within the routine booking question exception to Miranda, I would affirm the trial court’s order denying Franks’ motion to exclude his response to the question.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
Four Justices joined in the division of the Muniz opinion expressly recognizing the routine booking question exception to Miranda. One Justice dissented to the plurality’s recognition of the exception, 496 U. S. at 610-611 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and four Justices found it unnecessary to examine the exception because they determined that Muniz’s responses were not testimonial and did not warrant application of the Fifth Amendment. Muniz, 496 U. S. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Agent Magill testified that he had reviewed a teletype reporting that the suspect had a stab wound on the upper arm, and that he did not know which arm was injured.