(dissenting).
The majority states the contract provided no bonus payments were to be made if the employment agreement was terminated for any reason prior to the expiration of the four-week period. Baldwin terminated her employment after inquiring and being told that “she would not be entitled to the commission under the contract.” She terminated anyway. There was no reliance because there was no misrepresentation on which to rely. The majority then states:
We agree with college that the language of the bonus provision unequivocally reads that no bonus payments will be made after termination. The language is unambiguous.
In other words, Baldwin terminated knowing she had no right to the bonus. Despite that, the majority unduly strains to find that “waiver” creates something out of nothing *20and now she is entitled to the $1,600.00 bonus. It is also ironic that this is the same court * who only four months ago, in Owens v. Moyes, 530 N.W.2d 663 (S.D.1995) affirmed the trial court holding that a person who admittedly owed $5,000.00 was not hable because the deal was not in writing and was therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds (SDCL 53-8-2).
Justice Gilbertson was not a member of the court at the time Owens v. Moyes was submitted and he did not participate.