concurring specially.
Because of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582 (224 SE2d 416) (1976) and Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 162 (377 SE2d 853) (1989), cited by the majority, I agree that we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Cincinnati in this case. I fully agree with Judge Blackburn’s lament regarding the unfairness of this situation, and ' have expressed almost identical sentiments in Reid v. U. S. Fidelity &c. Co., 223 Ga. App. 204 (477 SE2d 369) (1996), also cited but distinguished by the majority. I fully concur in the majority opinion, which calls for a re-examination of the Bohannon rule. I write separately to *223repeat my plea in Reid. I implore the Supreme Court and/or the legislature to re-examine the Bohannon rule.
The statutory scheme for uninsured motorist coverage reflects a public policy designed to assure that the uninsured motorist carrier enjoys the same rights and defenses, as to the tort claims, as the uninsured motorist. One cannot seriously quarrel with the wisdom of such a public policy. In my view, however, the Bohannon decision actually places the uninsured motorist carrier in a superior position to the uninsured motorists/defendants in situations such as presented by the facts of this case, where a defendant was insured at the time the action was commenced but became uninsured during the pendency of the action but after the two-year statute of limitation had expired. The uninsured motorist/defendant is still in the case and exposed, while the carrier has been released from the very exposure it contracted to assume. In effect, therefore Bohannon has deprived the insured of the benefits of the contract of insurance and given the carrier a windfall.
As Justice Weltner stated in his dissent in Bohannon, “[t]he rule should be that a policyholder must perfect service upon the uninsured motorist carrier as soon as reasonably possible after becoming aware, by whatever means, that there is a substantive doubt as to the existence of adequate insurance coverage of an event that might become the subject of an uninsured motorist claim.” Id. at 163 (3). His explanation in subsequent paragraphs of the dissent eloquently demonstrates that such a rule is both workable and would satisfy the public policy concerns addressed by the statute and decisions seeking to assure that the carrier has the same standing in the action as the uninsured motorist.
The decision in Bohannon recognizes the problem, but states that “fashioning such a rule” allowing service upon the insurer within a reasonable time after it is determined that the defendant is uninsured is “a task that is better left to the legislature.” I must agree with Justice Weltner’s dissent, which disagrees with the proposition that the General Assembly is the only source of relief for a policyholder who learns only after the expiration of the appropriate period of limitation that a tortfeasor is, or may be, an uninsured motorist. After all, it was the courts, not the legislature, who created the problem we now confront by their interpretation of OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) (formerly Code Ann. § 56-407.1 (d)). Furthermore, a great period of time has elapsed since Bohannon suggested a legislative solution, and the General Assembly has not seen fit to address the issue. I believe it to be within the proper scope of judicial authority to correct this situation and place the risk of injury by an uninsured motorist exactly where the policyholder, by the payment of a premium, and the carrier, by the issuance of a policy of insurance, have *224contracted it to be — that is, on the carrier, as Justice Weltner long ago suggested.
Decided April 22, 1997 Before Judge Mulherin. Jolles & Slaby, Isaac S. Jolles, Richard A. Slaby, for appellant. Fulcher, Hagler, Reed, Hanks & Harper, Scott W. Kelly, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Blackburn join in this special concurrence.