(dissenting). By virtue of the relevant statutory enactment,1 petitioner is exempt from the use tax if it is engaged in the business of constructing, altering, repairing, or improving real estate for others, among whom are municipal corporations such as the city of Detroit, and if the property sought to be taxed was actually used in performing one or more of the enumerated services for such others. See Knapp-Stiles, Inc., v. Department of Revenue (1963), 370 Mich 629, 639. It is the rule in this State that while ambiguity in the imposition provisions of a taxing statute is resolved in favor of the taxpayer, exemption provisions must be strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority. Evanston Y.M.C.A. Camp v. State Tax Commission (1962), 369 Mich 1, 7.
On the facts of this case of Ferguson, I am not persuaded that petitioner should be considered as having constructed the parking facility for others.
In Knapp-Siiles, supra, plaintiff building contractor secured a contract from the United States government through its department of the air force to build housing units on air force bases. Under terms of the agreement with the department, plaintiff then organized a Delaware corporation with nominal capitalization. The department leased the land upon which construction was to occur to the Delaware corporation, reserving use and possession of the land. The corporation secured financing for the construction, making progress payments to plaintiff as the construction proceeded. Title to all mate*394rial and work covered by the progress payments vested in the department.
Tbe question arose whether property purchased by plaintiff and made a part of, or consumed in construction upon, the leased lands, was exempt from the use tax of section 4, subd (m), cited supra, footnote 1. It was argued that plaintiff was not in any event entitled to an exemption, since the work was being done nominally for the Delaware corporation, instead of for one of the enumerated political entities. This Court held that plaintiff was entitled to an exemption, noting also that (p 637):
“The net total result is that after the dummy corporation has served its purpose as a ‘channel’ during the construction period, the department owns, operates and pays for the housing facilities.”
It was thus not necessary for the Court in Knapp-8tiles to decide whether plaintiff would still have been entitled to an exemption had the real party in interest, the government, not met all three of the criteria especially mentioned, namely, owning, operating, and paying for, the result of plaintiff’s construction activity.
I believe it is the clear implication of the Knapp-Stiles opinion that these criteria would be applied to decide disputed questions of exemption arising under section 4, subd (m). The Court there stated (p 639):
“As already noted, section 4, subd (m) of the use tax act exempts property purchased by contractors engaged in improving real estate for others when such property is made a part of the real estate or is consumed in fulfillment of a contract for such improving within exempt classifications other than the United States and its instrumentalities or the State of Michigan, its departments or institutions. Thus, the exemption applies to contractors’ pur*395chases of materials which are made a part of or are consumed in improving real estate for cities, villages, townships, counties, school districts, or other political subdivisions of this State but is not extended to materials purchased by contractors for like use under contract with the United States or its instrumentalities.”
It follows that the Court need not have reached the question of whether such discrimination was constitutionally invalid had it not concluded that the construction plaintiff was performing was for others, in this case the United States, instead of for itself. It is reasonable to assume that the Court reached this conclusion for the same reason that it reached the conclusion that plaintiff had contracted with the United States and not with a private corporation, namely, because (p 637):
“The net total result is that after the dummy corporation has served its purpose as a ‘channel’ during the construction period, the department owns, operates and pays for the housing facilities.”
Testing this case of Ferguson by the three criteria, we find:
1. Although nominal title to the leased premises and improvements thereon remains at all times in the city of Detroit, in actual fact the lease vested virtually all of the rights and duties of ownership in petitioner2 for a period of at least 25 years, which period might at petitioner’s option be extended to 40 years.
2. During the term of the lease the facilities are to be operated by petitioner, and not by the city.
3. Under the lease petitioner agreed to construct the facility “at its sole cost and expense” and in *396addition to pay the city an annual rental of $25,000, or more depending upon gross receipts.
On this state of facts I am not convinced that petitioner should be viewed as having been “engaged in the business of constructing, altering, repairing, or improving real estate for others” (emphasis added); viewed realistically, petitioner improved the real estate involved herein for its own use and benefit and should not, therefore, be entitled to exemption from the use tax.
I would reverse the summary judgment in petitioner’s favor entered by the court of claims and remand this cause for further proceedings.
CLS 1956, § 205.94 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 7.555[4]). See currently, CLS 1961, § 205.94, as amended by PA 1964, No 164 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 7.555 [4]).
The petitioner’s interest in the lease was assignable and, in fact, it was assigned upon completion of the parking facility.