dissenting. 1. The following facts appear to be undisputed: (1) The applications contained a false answer; (2) The false answer related to a fact material to the risk; (3) The applications or a copy thereof are attached to and made a part of the policies; (4) The applications contained a limitation on the authority of the agent to waive answers or modify the application; (5) The applications were signed by the applicant, plaintiff-appellee here.
Under this factual situation, the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion for new trial on the general grounds, even though the plaintiff testified that she did not know what the applications said because she could not read and could write only a little, and that the questions which she remembered being asked, or heard asked, related only to her birth date, height and weight.
An insurer, by express provision in the application, may limit the power of a soliciting agent and the applicant is bound by such notice of limitation of authority. Beale v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 113 Ga. App. 506 (148 SE2d 474). In such event, knowledge of the agent (of a material misrepresentation) would not be imputable to the company. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Patten, 151 Ga. 185 (106 SE 183); and Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Perry, 121 Ga. App. post. See Lucas v. Continental Cas. Co., 120 Ga. App. 457 (170 SE2d 856), especially the concurring opinion of Judge Eberhardt and the opinion of Judge Deen in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 121 Ga. App. 582, for a discussion of cases dealing with the situation existing here.
*597There is no contention here, or evidence, that any fraud was practiced upon the applicant in order to keep her from knowing the contents of the documents which she signed, such as existed in Stillson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 79, cited and relied upon in the majority opinion. As to applicant’s limited capacity to read and write, see Grimsley v. Singletary, 133 Ga. 56 (65 SE 92, 134 ASR 196); Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596, 598 (6 SE2d 788); Robertson v. Panlos, 208 Ga. 116, 119 (65 SE2d 400); West v. Carolina Housing &c. Corp. 211 Ga. 789 (89 SE2d 188); Martin v. Alford, 214 Ga. 4, 7 (102 SE2d 598); DeLong v. Cobb, 215 Ga. 500, 504 (111 SE2d 89); Pirkle v. Gurr, 218 Ga. 424 (128 SE2d 490); and Smith v. Agan, 111 Ga. App. 536 (142 SE2d 291).
Nothing in this record would justify a conclusion that the agent knew that the applicant was illiterate, or that there was anything to put the agent on notice of it. See Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 759 (57 SE 69, 27 LRA (NS) 1). When the answers had been inserted the applicant signed without in any way indicating that she could not read.
However, it is noted from appellee’s brief that the plaintiff was not relying on her illiteracy. Her brief states, “The question of literacy or illiteracy is not involved in this case.”
The cases cited and relied upon by the majority are inapposite here. In Clubb v. American Acc. Co., 97 Ga. 502 (25 SE 333) the insured pleaded and testified that the alleged false answer in the application (that he was a contractor by trade, when in truth he was a farmer) was inserted after he signed it, and that he had no means of knowing what had been inserted until after the accident which was the basis of his claim under the policy. In Stillson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 79, supra, a somewhat similar fraud was practiced upon the applicant. Although the false answers were inserted before the applicant signed the application, he was prevented from knowing about them when the agent covered them with his hand and made it impossible for the applicant to read them. In Barber v. All American Assur. Co., 89 Ga. App. 270, 276 (79 SE2d 48) it is asserted in the opinion that “there was no limitation on the authority of the agent in .the applications in this case, which fact makes this *598case much stronger for the beneficiary than was the Stülson case.” (Emphasis supplied). Further, the case of National Life &c. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Sneed, 40 Ga. App. 131 (149 SE 68) is cited as authority for the holding in Barber, and in that case the court asserted: “In the instant case the application for insurance (no copy of which was attached to the policy, of insurance. . .) contained no such express limitations upon the power of the company’s agent who solicited and delivered the policy, and the decision in the Patten case [151 Ga. 185, 106 SE 183] is expressly based upon the fact of such limitations in that case.” Hn. 4. In National Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Goolsby, 91 Ga. App. 361, 365 (85 SE2d 611) it was asserted: “However, the present case is stronger for the plaintiff than either the Stülson or Barber cases, in that here the application was not attached to the policy and so did not become a matter of contract between the parties, and also because it affirmatively appears that the applicant did not read the application after it was written, but, when it was offered to her, merely handed it back with the comment that she did not understand it.” (Emphasis supplied). It was thus an invitation for an explanation, which was not forthcoming.
Each of the cases is distinguishable on the facts.
“[T]he application on which an insurance policy is based is not to be considered as a part of the insurance contract, unless a copy of the application is attached to or accompanies the policy; and this is true though it be sought by the express terms of the policy itself to make such unattached application a part of the agreement. Bankers Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Murray, 22 Ga. App. 495 (96 SE 347); Wilkins v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 191 (97 SE 879); Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App. 723 (134 SE 804), and cit.; Couch v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 34 Ga. App. 543 (130 SE 596); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 43 Ga. App. 658, 662 (159 SE 882); Johnson v. American &c. Ins. Co., 134 Ga. 800 (68 SE 731).” Mutual Benefit Health &c. Assn. v. Bell, 49 Ga. App. 640, 643 (176 SE 124).
■ But when the application contains a limitation of .authority on the powers of .the agent and, ashere, is attached to 'the policy, *599it becomes a part of the contract and a showing of materiality and falsity is all that is required for avoiding it. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 37 Ga. App. 704, 706 (141 SE 498); Preston v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 217 (26 SE2d 439, 148 ALR 897); National Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 183 Ga. 577 (188 SE 894).
There can be no question of the falsity or of the materiality of the false answers in this application.
If, as appellee’s brief contends, the question of literacy is not involved in this case, there should be a reversal and judgment for the defendant on the basis • of what is said in Division 1. If in fact there is a question as to whether or not the plaintiff was an illiterate person, then the court erred in failing to charge upon request that an illiterate person must exercise proper diligence to ascertain the contents of an instrument prior to signing it. If the plaintiff was relying on the fact of illiteracy, the defendant insurance company was entitled to this charge, request having been timely made, and exception noted upon the failure of the trial court to so charge (Robertson v. Panlos, 208 Ga. 116, supra; Smith v. Agan, 111 Ga. App. 536, supra), and this would be reversible error.
I would reverse with direction that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant Reserve Life Insurance Company.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Hall and Judges Eberhardt and Quillian concur in this dissent.