concurring in result only.
In my view Laws of 1975, L. B. 567, is constitutional and may be applied retroactively without the *159necessity of any approval by the Board of Pardons. The contention of the State that a statute which directs the discharge of a prisoner for good conduct before the maximum term of his sentence has been served interferes with the power of the judiciary and with the pardoning and commutation powers of the executive branch, if applied retroactively is, in my opinion, unfounded and disregards the history of constitutional and statutory changes in “good time’’ laws in this state.
Since 1871, this state has had a “good time’’ law giving prisoners credit for good behavior. See Laws of Nebraska, Eight Session, 1871, p. 79. From 1871 to 1969, that credit was applied to reduce the maximum term of a sentence and required discharge rather than release on parole when time limits had been met. During the same period of time a single Board of Pardons had the constitutional power to grant paroles, pardons, or commutations. As early as 1960 a study prepared for the Legislative Council committee pursuant to a legislative resolution recommended the creation of a permanent board separate from the Board of Pardons to handle paroles. In 1967, the Legislature submitted a constitutional amendment to be placed on the ballot in 1968 which did just that. At least one of the purposes of the amendment was to separate the power to parole for good conduct from acts of mercy or clemency involved in pardons, reprieves, and commutations traditionally vested in the executive branch. See, Hearings on L. B. 561 before the Government and Military Affairs Committee, Seventy-seventh Session, Nebraska Legislature, 1967.
The constitutional amendment was adopted by the electorate in 1968. It provided: “The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of a Board of Parole and the qualification of its members. Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power to grant paroles after conviction and judg*160ment, under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state except treason and cases of impeachment.” Article IV, section 13, Constitution of Nebraska. (Emphasis ours.)
Under the revised provisions of that section of the Constitution the Board of Pardons retained the “power to remit fines and forfeitures, and to grant respites, reprieves, pardons, or commutations in all cases * * *.” it seems clear that the constitutional amendment of 1968 authorized the Legislature to prescribe conditions under which the Board of Parole could not only parole prisoners but could also discharge them from custody.
In 1969, the Legislature implemented the constitutional amendment and gave to the Board of Parole, among other things, the power to dispense with and terminate parole guidance or supervision and also to discharge a parolee from parole at any time. Those 1969 statutes maintained the same good time allowances for prisoners in confinement as had been provided under the old law since 1921 and are now provided in L. B. 567, but the 1969 statutes provided for mandatory release on parole rather than the mandatory discharge from custody required by the prior and subsequent statutes. The 1969 statutes also provided for different amounts of good time allowances while a prisoner was on parole than were applicable during the period of confinement; provided for special meritorious allowances; and directed discharge when the time spent in custody and on parole equaled the maximum term, reduced only by parole good time reductions. In 1975, L. B. 567 essentially returned to the pre-1969 system, except that it is now under the administration of the Board of Parole rather than the Board of Pardons. L. B. 567 now requires discharge by the Board of Parole when the time served in custody and on parole equals the maximum term, less all good time reduc*161tions granted, and removes the differences for good time credits on parole and in custody. Basically a prisoner would be entitled to discharge at a somewhat earlier time under L. B. 567 and under pre-1969 law than he would have been under the statutes in effect between 1969 and 1975.
Under statutes effective since 1972, indeterminate sentences have been the rule in virtually all cases in Nebraska. It should be clear that where indeterminate sentences are involved in which there is a maximum and minimum sentence, a discharge after the minimum term has been served cannot be said to constitute a reduction or commutation of any such indeterminate sentence. Under L. B. 567 a prisoner is not even eligible for parole, much less entitled to a discharge, until his minimum sentence has been served.
The State’s position here rests on the assumptions that the constitutional amendment of 1968 did not grant any power to the Board of Parole or the Legislature to discharge a prisoner from custody before the maximum term of his sentence, and that any earlier discharge from custody required by statute constitutes a commutation of sentence. Neither assumption is justifiable. Good time.laws such as L. B. 567 and its predecessors provide for credit against sentences to be earned by a convict by his own conduct. Those good time credits are forfeitable. The granting of good time credits is not an act of clemency nor mercy, nor does it constitute an interference with the judicial or executive power under the Constitution. The Legislature should, and does, have the power to set and to change the allowance of good time credits and to grant the benefits uniformly to all prisoners who have earned them.
Subject to ex post facto restrictions, the Legislature may, if it wishes, direct that such good time statutes be applied retroactively as well as prospectively. That was done here. There is no valid reason to conjure up a spectre of unconstitutionality to *162deny to any prisoners the benefits earned by their own good conduct simply because they were sentenced at the time before the “good time” statute was changed. L. B. 567 is constitutional, both prospectively and retroactively, without being interpreted as requiring the approval of the Board of Pardons.