We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider its decision in Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tippins Bank &c. Co., 213 Ga. App. 176 (444 SE2d 331) (1994). The Court of Appeals determined that an insurer was no longer required under OCGA § 33-24-46 to notify the insured or a lienholder of the lapse of a residential standard fire policy because of the named insured’s failure to pay premiums. The determination was based on an assessment of legislative intent.
The cardinal rule in construing a statute is to glean the intent of the legislature. State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 202 (312 SE2d 601) (1984); Bd. of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 554 (272 SE2d 288) (1980). The history of the legislation is telling. In 1977, the legislature passed an act, which provided:
No policy of insurance in which the interests of any lienholders named in the policy are protected by a loss payable clause may be cancelled or nonrenewed by an insurer so as to destroy the protection afforded by said policy for the interests possessed by the lienholders unless notice of such cancellation or nonrenewal or a copy thereof is sent to the lienholders in the manner provided for in [Ga. Code] sections 56-2430 and 56-2430.1.
Ga. L. 1977, p. 878. This was later codified as OCGA § 33-24-47.
The Code was amended, effective January 1, 1979, to add the predecessor to OCGA § 33-24-46, Ga. Code § 56-2430.3, which provided that the insurer send notice to the insured prior to cancellation or nonrenewal of certain standard fire insurance policies. Ga. L. 1978, p. 2017. Code § 56-2430.3 (b) (3) defined “nonrenewal” as “failure or refusal by an insurer to renew.” Id. at 2018. Subsection (d) of the statute expressly addressed nonrenewal for nonpayment of premium:
Nonrenewal shall not be effective unless written notice is *98provided . . . with respect to the nonpayment of premium for the expiring policy or the failure of the insured to pay the premium as required by the insurer for renewal, in either of which case such effective date shall not be less than ten days after the date of notice.
Id. at 2018-2019.
Chapter 24 of Title 33 underwent significant amendment in 1984. OCGA § 33-24-47 containing the notice provision to lienholders was repealed in its entirety and a new § 33-24-46 was adopted. OCGA § 33-24-46 (b) (1) then defined “nonrenewal” as solely “a refusal by an insurer ... to renew,” and omitted from the definition a “failure” to renew. Subsection (d) provided: “No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy to which this Code section applies unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or delivered in person to the named insured.”
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the repeal of OCGA § 33-24-47, coupled with the changes to OCGA § 33-24-46 evinced the legislative intent that an insurer now be required to give notice pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-46 (d) only when the insurer refuses, for whatever reason, to renew a policy. That is, § 33-24-46, including its notice provision, no longer included the situation in which a policy was not renewed because of nonpayment of premium by the insured.
The legislative intent to narrow the notice requirement of the statute is confirmed by an addition to the statute effective July 1, 1995. The amendment added to the definition of “nonrenewal” or “nonrenewed” contained in § 33-24-46 (b) (1):
Failure of an insured to pay the premium as required of the insured for renewal after the insurer has manifested a willingness to renew by delivering a renewal policy, renewal certificate, or other evidence of renewal to the named insured or his or her representative or has offered to issue a renewal policy, certificate, or other evidence of renewal or has manifested such intention by any other means shall not be construed to be a nonrenewal.
(Emphasis supplied.) “In construing statutes subsequent acts of the legislature on the same subject may be considered.” Wingfield v. Kutres, 136 Ga. 345, 349 (71 SE 474) (1911). Indeed, the courts are not only to be guided by the General Assembly’s last expression on a subject, but the latest declaration controls. Alford v. Public Svc. Comm., 262 Ga. 386, 388 (1) (b) (418 SE2d 13) (1992); Bd. of Trustees v. Christy, supra at 555 (1). See also Gunn v. Balkcom, 228 Ga. 802, 804 (188 SE2d 500) (1972).
*99Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, the insurer did not have a duty to send notice required under OCGA § 33-24-46.
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals rejected the assertion that the statutory provision governing whether the insurer must give notice to a lienholder when the insured fails to pay the insurance policy premium and the policy lapses at the end of the policy period is OCGA § 33-24-44 (d) rather than OCGA § 33-24-46 (d). It properly did so. “[T]he expiration or lapse of a policy does not constitute a cancellation.” Goodley v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 277, 278 (1) (326 SE2d 7) (1985). See also King v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 686 F2d 894 (11th Cir. 1982). This comports with the apparent statutory scheme to limit required notice to those instances in which coverage is ended because of the insurer’s unwillingness or refusal to renew rather then the insured’s own failure to act.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, Carley, and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.