(dissenting). I express no opinion as to whether General Motors discharged Boldt because of handicap, in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA). Nor do I express an opinion as to whether there was probable cause to believe that Boldt was discriminated against because of handicap. I conclude, however, that the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) erroneously imposed on Boldt the requirement that he "prove" that he was discriminated against. In its memorandum decision, LIRC stated: "Considering the entire record, the Commission was left with the definite conviction that Boldt failed to prove that the misconduct in which he engaged was the result of a mental illness or that GM perceived it to have been the result of a mental illness." (Emphasis added.)
LIRC cites Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, Case No. 120-078, 1 EPD ¶ 9772 (Dane County Circuit Court, February 23, 1967), where the circuit court, prior to the adoption by the department of Wis. Adm. Code sec. Ind 88.01(8), defined "probable cause" to mean "proof within reasonable probabilities that a full hearing *480will establish the fact [of discrimination] to a reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the evidence." (Emphasis added.) In its brief, LIRC correctly observes that: "Probable cause, however, does not mean proof to a reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the evidence." The department now defines "probable cause" as follows:
"Probable cause" means a reasonable ground for belief, supported by facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a prudent person in the belief, that discrimination or unfair honesty testing probably has been or is being committed.
Wisconsin Adm. Code sec. Ind 88.01(8).
If there is an initial determination of no probable cause, as in this case, the complainant may file with the Equal Rights Division a written request for a hearing on the issue of probable cause. Wisconsin Adm. Code sec. Ind 88.08. After the hearing, the administrative law judge shall issue a decision and an order which dismisses the allegations of the complaint or which orders the matter remanded for conciliation pursuant to Wis. Adm. Code sec. Ind 88.09. Wisconsin Adm. Code sec. Ind 88.18(2). In this case, LIRC stated that it had no disagreement with the material findings of fact of the administrative law judge, but had prepared its own decision "merely in order to set forth more fully the basis upon which it arrived at the same result as the Administrative Law Judge."
Neither the WFEA, nor the administrative regulations impose on a complainant the obligation imposed by LIRC's conclusions of law and its memorandum decision. As noted, LIRC concedes that "probable cause" does not mean proof to a reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the evidence. Yet, the effect of LIRC's *481decision is to impose on Boldt the obligation of proving he was discriminated against. Perhaps Boldt has that obligation, if ever, when LIRC reaches a hearing on the merits. However, at the probable cause stage, there is no requirement that a complainant "prove" the allegations of his or her complaint.