dissenting in part:
I join Part II of Justice Mullarkey’s dissent. Although I believe that the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act apply to a civil action arising out of the so-called Whistleblower Act, Justice Mullarkey’s dissent convinces me that Doctor Lloyd substantially complied with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act under the rather peculiar circumstances of this case. I would remand the case to the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the district court for trial.
MULLARKEY, Justice,dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because I find no evidence that the legislature intended to subject a civil action brought pursuant to the Whistleblowers Act, section 24-50.5-101, 10 C.R.S. (1982), to the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, sections 24-10-109 and -118, 10 C.R.S. (1982). Alternatively, I would find that the plaintiff substantially complied with the notice requirements. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding this case for further proceedings.
*566I.
In Antonopoulis v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975), we rejected Telluride’s claim that an action brought pursuant to the Liability of Peace Officers statute, now codified as section 29-5-111, 12A C.R.S. (1986), was subject to the notice requirement of section 24-10-109. The plaintiff in Antonopoulis sought damages for personal injuries and property damage. He claimed that the Telluride police officers were negligent because they arrested him for public intoxication but released him and instructed him to leave town. Shortly after he drove out of town, he was involved in a car accident.
In Antonopoulis, we were not persuaded that notice must be given under the Governmental Immunity Act. Rather, we held that “[t]he requirements of the Immunity Act are extraneous to the Town’s liability under the Liability of Peace Officers Act.” We rejected the defendants’ suggestion “that the history of the two acts, together with the language of the Immunity Act, makes it clear that the two are to be read in conjunction with each other” because we were “unable to discern such a legislative intent.” We emphasized that “[cjompliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent only to actions brought under the provisions of the Immunity Act.” 187 Colo. at 397, 532 P.2d at 349. The Liability of Peace Officers Act and the Governmental Immunity Act both were adopted by the legislature in 1971. Both were approved on May 22, 1971, and took effect on July 1, 1972. See Ch. 255, sec. 2, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1048, 1049, and ch. 323, sec. 20, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1204, 1218. Neither act made reference to the other.
We have the same situation in this case. The Whistleblowers Act was passed and the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act were amended in the same session of the General Assembly. Neither act referenced the other. The Whistleblow-ers Act was effective upon its approval on June 15, 1979. Ch. 250, sec. 4, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 965, 968. The amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act were approved on June 15, 1979 and took effect on July 1, 1979. Ch. 219, sec. 8, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 862, 865.
The latter act made two changes in the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. First, it amended section 24-10-109 to increase the notice period from 90 to 180 days after the date of the discovery of the injury. As amended, section 24-10-109(1) read:
(1) Any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity or by an employee thereof while in the course of such employment shall file a written notice as provided in this section within one hundred eighty days after the date of the discovery of the injury. Substantial compliance with the notice provisions of this section shall be a condition precedent to any action brought under the provisions of this article, and failure of substantial compliance shall be a complete defense to any such action.
Second, it added a new section 24-10-118 entitled “Actions Against Public Employees — Requirements and Limitations” which provided in relevant part as follows:
(1) Any action against a public employee, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S. 1973, the common law, or otherwise, which lies in tort, and which arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, shall be subject to the following requirements and limitations, regardless of whether or not such action against a public employee is one for which the public entity might be liable for costs of defense or payment of judgment or settlement under section 24-10-110:
(a) Filing of the notice required by section 24-10-109 with the public entity, in the form and within the time provided by section 24-10-109, shall be a condition precedent to any such action against a public employee, and failure of substantial compliance shall be a complete defense to any such action against a public employee. Any such action against a *567public employee shall be commenced within the time period provided for that type of action in articles 80 and 81 of title 13, C.R.S. 1973, relating to limitations of actions, or it shall be forever barred.
Sections 24-10-109 and -118 as enacted in 1979 and set forth above were in effect at the time this case arose. Both sections are relevant here because the plaintiff has brought suit against both public employees and governmental entities.
As a rule of statutory construction, the legislature generally is presumed to be aware of relevant case precedent when it enacts subsequent legislation. E.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Colorado, 749 P.2d 400 (Colo.1988); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo.1987); Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973). In addition to the usual presumption, we also have clear evidence that the legislature considered the Antonopoulis decision and directly addressed it. As quoted above, section 24-10-118(1) expressly refers to section 29-5-111 (Liability of Peace Officers Act) and makes civil actions brought pursuant to section 29-5-111 subject to the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, when it amended the Governmental Immunity Act, the legislature was aware of our holding that a statutory cause of action was not subject to the notice requirements unless the legislature indicated its intent to apply the notice provision and it acted affirmatively to impose the notice requirements on the Liability of Peace Officers Act.
With this knowledge, the legislature took no action imposing a notice requirement on civil actions brought under the Whistle-blowers Act. Instead of notice, an elaborate administrative procedure, which must be followed by state employees like Lloyd, was built into the Whistleblowers Act. Neither in the Whistleblowers Act nor in the Governmental Immunity Act is there any language indicating that the legislature intended to subject such lawsuits to the notice requirements of the Govemmen-tal Immunity Act. The legislative histories of the two 1979 acts are similarly silent. Under these circumstances, I think it is not reasonable to infer that the legislature intended the notice requirements to apply to the Whistleblowers Act. Accordingly, I would hold that a civil action brought pursuant to section 24-50.5-105 is not subject to the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act.
II.
Assuming, however, that the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are applicable, I believe that the plaintiff has substantially complied with the notice requirements. Section 24-10-109(1), as then in effect, expressly provided that the notice requirements were satisfied by substantial compliance.
The majority states that this issue is not properly before the court because it is not an issue which we accepted for review and it was not briefed in this court. At 559. I do not find this reasoning persuasive.
I note first that the majority does reach the plaintiffs argument that compliance with the procedural requirements of the Whistleblowers Act fulfills the purposes of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. At 564-565. This argument can only be construed as one of substantial compliance. The majority’s analysis of this issue is inconsistent with its assertion that the question of substantial compliance is not properly before this court.
C.A.R. 53(a)(1) provides that the statement of an issue in a petition for certiorari “will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue clearly comprised therein” and that issues “fairly comprised therein will be considered.” See Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900 (Colo.1982). The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the almost identical language of Sup.CtR. 21.1(a),1 has held that it “is not limited by the precise terms of the question *568presented” and the “fairly comprised” standard is met if an issue is essential to analysis of the lower court decision, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559-60 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 855, 858-59 n. 6, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), or essential to the correct disposition of the stated issue, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-52 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875-76 n. 5, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 3051, 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980); see also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 528 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1974-75 n. 5, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (the issue of whether judicial immunity bars an award of attorneys’ fees against a judge includes the question of whether judicial immunity bars the injunctive relief awarded); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 382 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1905, 1911-12 n. 6, 76 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (question of statutory preemption is properly included within a challenge based upon the Commerce Clause).
This court granted certiorari to determine whether an action brought under the Whistleblowers Act is subject to the notice provisions of section 24-10-109. At 559. Section 24-10-109 explicitly provides that substantial compliance satisfies the notice provisions. To reach a correct disposition of this issue, in the context of this case, the court must determine whether there was substantial compliance with the notice provisions. Thus, I would find that the issue of substantial compliance is fairly comprised within the issues upon which we granted certiorari.
There is also a second, independent reason why the issue of substantial compliance is before us. As the Supreme Court has held repeatedly, the party prevailing in the court below is entitled to rely upon any grounds presented in the lower courts to support the judgment below despite a failure to cross-petition for certiorari on that basis. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n. 5, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 2775, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 364, 369 n. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 376; see also Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 740, 749-50 n. 20, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 reh’g denied, 440 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 1290, 59 L.Ed.2d 500 (1979) (“[a]s the prevailing party, the appel-lee was of course free to defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the [lower court]”); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 29-30, 104 S.Ct. 2916, 2918, 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984) (Court may affirm the judgment below “on any ground that the law and the record permit and that will not expand the relief granted below”); see generally 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 204.11[3] (2d ed. 1987). A leading treatise on Supreme Court practice correctly notes a practical reason for finding that a cross-petition is unnecessary in this type of case:
The practical justification for the rule is that a party satisfied with the action of a lower court should not have to appeal from it in order to defend a judgment in his favor on any ground no matter what his adversary does. Indeed, in other contexts, it has been said that a party has no right to appeal from a decision in his favor.
R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 382 (6th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted).
The substantial compliance argument was fully presented by the plaintiff in his response to motion for summary judgment in the district court and in his opening and reply briefs to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply, 710 P.2d at 1179-80, and therefore did not reach this issue in the context of the plaintiffs whistleblower claim. Nevertheless, the plaintiff explicitly stated at oral argument in front of this court that he did not concede the substantial compliance issue. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff was not required to cross-petition and this issue is properly presented for review.
The defendants conceded in their motion for summary judgment that the 180 day *569notice period began to run on October 27, 1981, the date on which the administrative proceedings concluded.2 Thus, the 180 day notice period would have expired on April 25,1982. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on November 24, 1981. More than six months passed with no recorded action on the case. During that time, the defendants filed no motions or responsive pleading. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 1, 1982, with the parties stipulating that the defendants reserved all of their rights as if the amended complaint were an original complaint. The defendants filed their answer on May 20, 1983, and their motion for summary judgment on October 21, 1983. The notice issue was raised in those pleadings.
Section 24-10-109(2) required that the notice contain the name and address of the claimant, the name and address of the claimant’s attorney, a concise statement of the basis of the claim, the name and address of any public employee involved, if known, a concise statement of the nature and the extent of the injury claimed to have been suffered, and a statement of the amount of monetary damages that is being requested. The plaintiffs initial complaint satisfies all of these requirements. Section 24-10-109(3) provided that if the claim is against a public entity other than the state or an employee thereof, the notice shall be presented to the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity. The attorney general is representing all of the defendants in this action. On December 10, 1981, a copy of the complaint was served upon the attorney general, well within the 180 day period.
Where the purpose of a notice statute is met, the claimant has substantially complied with such statute. Powers v. Boulder, 54 Colo. 558, 131 P. 395 (1913) (where the purpose of a notice statute is to give the mayor and city council notice of the claim of damage, service upon mayor rather than city clerk complies with statute); Emcasco Ins. v. Dover, 678 P.2d 1051 (Colo.App.1983) (where the purpose of a notice provision is to make certain the insurer is informed of suits filed against an insured, notice given twenty months prior to the trial date, although six weeks after the filing of a counterclaim, substantially complies with the notice requirement despite a failure to strictly comply with a requirement to forward the suit papers); Strong Bros. v. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.App.1983) (although statute not strictly complied with, where goal of speedy and efficient distribution of decedent’s estate met, adequate notice given). Form should not be exalted over substance when construing the Governmental Immunity Act’s notice provision. Isbill Assocs. v. City and County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo.App.1983); see Strong Bros., 666 P.2d at 1111. Notice statutes should be interpreted to achieve a reasonable result and to avoid an unjust one. Strong Bros., 666 P.2d at 1112.
This court decided a similar question in Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 P. 1040 (1913). The statute at issue required notice of a personal injury claim against the defendant city to be given within ninety days of the occurrence of the accident causing the injury. Within sixty days of the injury, the plaintiff instituted a suit against the city without having given the required notice. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first action and commenced a second one. This court held that, because the original complaint contained all of the required elements of notice, the object of the law was accomplished and notice had been given.
Although not decided under the Governmental Immunity Act, the Canon City case is factually indistinguishable from the *570present case. In recent cases, we have held that strict compliance is not necessary under the Governmental Immunity Act. See Isbill Assocs., 666 P.2d 1117 (notice provision of the Immunity Act complied with despite that the notice was given by the injured party’s insurer rather than the injured party itself and that the notice was given to the mayor of Denver rather than its governing body or attorney); Uberoi v. University of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo.1986) (filing of a complaint may satisfy the notice requirement of the Immunity Act if it is presented to the proper party); Gray v. Regional Transp. Dist., 43 Colo.App. 107, 602 P.2d 879 (1979) (filing of RTD claim form may meet the notice requirement of the Immunity Act). The Canon City case is consistent with our decisions under the Governmental Immunity Act and it should be followed here.
The equities do not favor the defendants’ position. Although the record does not disclose what occurred during the six months after the first complaint was filed, it appears that the parties must have been in negotiations. Otherwise, the defendants could, and probably would, have been defaulted for failing to file a responsive pleading. Had the defendants raised the notice issue promptly in response to the first complaint, the plaintiff could have cured any technical defect by sending a notice. The defendants, of course, chose to wait and did not raise the notice question until after the 180 day period had run. By agreeing to permit the original complaint to be withdrawn and a new complaint to be filed in its stead, I believe the defendants accepted the first complaint as notice and I would so hold.
I am authorized to state that QUINN, C.J., joins in Part II of this dissent.
. Sup.Ct.R. 21.1(a) states in pertinent part: “The statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court.”
. Any other conclusion would result in the notice provision running prior to the completion of the administrative proceedings required by the Whistleblowers Act. A party in the position of the plaintiff may not file suit until these proceedings have been concluded, and he is permitted to bring suit only if he does not prevail in the administrative proceedings. § 24-50.5-105, 10 C.R.S. (1982). To require a litigant to give notice of his intent to file a lawsuit prior to the date on which, by statute, he can file the lawsuit would be an absurd result which could not have been intended by the General Assembly. See, e.g., Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985).