dissenting.
While I concur fully with the affirmance of the judgment and sentence entered on Moore’s convictions for murder, armed robbery and theft by receiving, my review of the record establishes that Moore’s conviction for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the murder conviction. Thus, I would vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on that conviction and respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance thereof.
Moore was charged with murder in that he “did unlawfully and with malice aforethought cause the death of [the victim] by shooting him with a firearm,” and with aggravated assault in that he “did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of [the victim] with a firearm, a deadly weapon, by pointing said firearm at [the victim].” The evidence adduced at trial showed that the victim was shot to death behind the counter at an Exxon gas station/convenience store in Cobb County. As established by the testimony of the investigating officers and the crime scene investigator, there was very little indication of any sort of struggle behind the counter and no evidence of a struggle elsewhere in the convenience store. The victim was shot three times: in the abdomen, in the jaw and in the neck, with the latter bullet traveling into the body cavity to lodge in the victim’s *162spine, paralyzing him. According to the medical examiner, the three shots to the victim occurred within a “very short period of time.” The medical examiner testified that the victim was sitting in a chair behind the counter, having rocked backwards probably in a fear or flight response, when he received the first shot in the abdomen; the victim then put up his hand to defend himself and shifted to his left, exposing his neck for the final two wounds. Although the medical examiner could not determine in what order the final two wounds were received, he testified that “they were both basically in the same angle and probably were at the very — within seconds of each other.” Based on gun powder and stipling evidence, the shots were fired within the same approximate distance from the victim.
In a letter Moore wrote that was admitted at trial, he confessed that “I can’t prove he wasn’t shot sitting down. I remember shooting the man twice and one of them missed, then he fell back in the chair and supposedly I shot two more times.” Contrary to the majority’s position, my reading of Moore’s statements to police officers reflects that he claimed that he and the victim “tussled”; the victim pulled a gun on him; and appellee pulled his gun once they were at the counter, at which time he shot the victim in the leg. As counsel for Moore conceded, his claim that the victim had a weapon was a “fantasy”; the medical testimony established that the victim was not shot in the leg; and, as noted above, all of the shots were fired within a very short period of time. Under my reading of Moore’s statement, nothing in his account indicates that any “deliberate interval existed between the assaults that indicated the completion of one criminal act before the start of a separate criminal act.” Ingram v. State, 279 Ga. 132, 133 (2) (610 SE2d 21) (2005).
However, even if the majority’s reading of Moore’s statement is accurate and that Moore admitted pointing a gun at the victim at the far end of the convenience store, the majority still errs by sustaining Moore’s aggravated assault conviction. A review of the record establishes a total absence of any evidence, physical or otherwise, that there was a struggle at the far end of the store. The majority can identify no evidence other than Moore’s statement to the police that he pointed a weapon at the victim to support his conviction for an aggravated assault committed prior to the shootings behind the counter. The law is well established that “[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.” OCGA § 24-3-53. Applying the majority’s own theory of the case, it would necessarily have to reverse the aggravated assault conviction for lack of corroborating evidence.
Based on my review of the transcript, I would recognize that the aggravated assault charged in the indictment was predicated on the shots Moore fired at the victim while the victim was seated behind *163the counter at the convenience store. As we recently held in Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 791-792 (1) (671 SE2d 815) (2009):
OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1) prohibits a defendant of being convicted of more than one crime when the same conduct of the accused establishes the commission of more than one crime and one crime is included in the other. The aggravated assault conviction is included in the malice murder conviction under OCGA § 16-1-6 (1) since the same conduct of the defendant . . . establishes the commission of both aggravated assault and malice murder, and aggravated assault is “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts that were required to establish proof of the [murder] offense.” Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 213 (636 SE2d 530) (2006).
See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377 (659 SE2d 372) (2008) (aggravated assault merged into malice murder where evidence showed defendant struck victim in head three times with flashlight, rummaged through victim’s pockets, struck the victim again with the flashlight when victim refused to hand over a ring, took ring and left); Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 693 (653 SE2d 477) (2007) (aggravated assault merged into malice murder where defendant shot victim, victim ran then fell over, defendant followed, kicked victim and “fired the remaining bullets” in her gun into victim).
The fact that “multiple shots” were fired by Moore does not justify the failure to merge the aggravated assault under facts that establish the shots were fired in quick succession with no interval in between. Compare Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410 (1) (b) (478 SE2d 762) (1996). See also Montes v. State, 262 Ga. 473 (1) (421 SE2d 710) (1992), in which we disapproved case law that each of a series of attacks in quick succession constituted a “renewed assault”; Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60 (539 SE2d 545) (2000) for a thorough discussion of cases addressing whether the firing of multiple gunshots may serve as the basis for separate charges. Although these cases pre-date Drinkard, supra, 281 Ga. at 213, the holdings in these cases are still factually sound as reflected by our analysis in Bell v. State, as well as Gibson v. State and Taylor v. State, supra.
Accordingly, because OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1) prohibits a defendant from being convicted of more than one crime where one crime is included in another, I would vacate the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed on Moore for aggravated assault.
*164Decided March 9, 2009. Mary Erickson, for appellant. Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Amelia G. Pray, Dana J. Norman, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Sara K. Sahni, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.