dissenting:
Believing as I do that the decision of this Court reversing the judgment of the circuit court in this case is not supported by the evidence, is contrary to its prior decisions, is logically inconsistent and is legally unsound, I respectfully but emphatically express my dissent.
The evidence shows beyond question that there is no general assessment of property in Kanawha County for 1957 at forty per cent of its true and actual value. On the contrary it clearly appears from the undisputed evidence that the assessor is merely engaged in an effort to *392assess some properties at that percentage of their value in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1, Acts of the Legislature, First Extraordinary Session, 1955, to obtain state aid for schools, and that various types of property are assessed at widely different percentages of their true and actual value. For instance bank stock is uniformly assessed at one hundred per cent of its value; cash on hand and money in bank are assessed at the same percentage of their value; accounts receivable and notes receivable at sixty per cent of their value; inventories at fifty per cent of their value; and machinery and equipment at twenty per cent of their original cost. The assessment of real estate is not uniform or general and ranges from nine per cent to one hundred and thirty per cent of its true and actual value. That the evidence utterly fails to establish any general or systematic assessment of forty per cent of the true and actual value of property in Kanawha County for the year 1957 is conclusively shown by the uncontroverted testimony of John M. Slack, then the Assessor of Kanawha County, upon which the plaintiff, The Kanawha Valley Bank, bases its claim to a reduction of the value of its stock to forty per cent of its true and actual value on the ground that the assessment of the stock at one hundred per cent constitutes an unlawful discrimination to that extent against the plaintiff in violation of the provisions of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution of this State that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law, and that no one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value.
Called as a witness by the plaintiff the assessor was asked these questions and gave these answers: “Q. Having arrived at a value by the book value method, what percentage of that true and actual value have you assessed the stock ? A. One hundred per cent. Q. What percentage of true and actual value have you assessed other property in Kanawha County for the year 1957? A. We *393have made an attempt to assess it at 40 per cent, according to Senate Bill 3. Q. Have you made any effort to assess other property in Kanawha County at 100 per cent of its true and actual value? A. None other than Class I property, and that, of course, we inherited from procedure carried on in the past. Now I might say, if I may, that in my conversation with Mr. Brown on July 22 he stated that he was using book value throughout the entire State, with the exception, I think, of a bank in Logan County, and that he had not looked upon the factors such as we considered last year as being proper. Then of course, insofar as I know the other banks within our area, the capital stock is valued and assessed at book value, which is 100 per cent. * * *. Under the requirements of Senate Bill 3, actually I am no longer an Assessor if I expect to obtain State aid for schools. I have to follow the mandates and the findings of the evaluation arrived at by the office of the State Tax Commissioner. * * *. Cash on hand and money in the bank at 100 per cent, accounts receivable at 60 per cent, notes receivable at about 60 per cent, and the way you determine that is how they are supported, by deed of trust, security and so forth.” Question by a County Commissioner: “Mr. Slack, are all banks in Kanawha County assessed according to this same rule you are using on The Kanawha Valley Bank? A. On book value? Q. Yes. A. So far as I know they are. I have Mr. Gaten’s word that they have been. I have not looked at it myself personally but he advises me they are assessed at book value. Q. Do you know what percentage of true and actual value livestock is assessed at? A. Frankly, I don’t. Q. Is it very low? A. It is very low. Q. Then as I understand, you have used less than 100 per cent of true and actual value in other classes of property. A. Yes, in the case of inventories we assess inventories at 50 per cent. We assess machinery and equipment at 20 per cent of the original cost. We find that by using this method we come up with nearer the same figure that the Tax Commissioner uses in arriving at his values for State aid purposes. Q. And real estate, what percentage of the true *394and actual value? A. Of course, we have a gross inequality there, according to the State Tax Commissioner our real estate runs from something like 9 to 130 per cent. As far as I know we are placing all real estate on the books at not less than 40 per cent of the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal, in order to qualify for State aid. Q. Would you consider that not less than 40 per cent of true and actual value? A. No. it is 40 per cent of the State Tax Commissioner’s appraisal, and he is basing his appraisal upon 1950 costs, which he states is about 25 per cent less than costs would be on today’s market. Q. Do you consider that you are assessing real estate on the average in Kanawha County at 100 per cent of true and actual value ? A. I do not. Q. At about what percentage of true and actual value would you estimate you are assessing it? A. There again we go back to the survey of the State Tax Commissioner, and he claims it is about 35 per cent of his appraisal, which would be 25 per cent less than the value as of 1957. Senate Bill 3 refers to true and actual value. However, for purposes of this survey the Tax Commissioner’s Property Evaluation Department is using replacement costs less depreciation, and they are based upon 1950 replacement costs, and according to them the replacement costs have increased from 1950 to 1957 by some 25 per cent. Q. Then would that mean that if you were assessing at 40 per cent of the 1950 value that you would actually be assessing real estate at less than 40 per cent of the true and actual value today? A. I would say it would, yes. * * *. Q. Mr. Slack, in arriving at the value of taxable property in Kanawha County for purposes of determining percentage of assessed value for State aid to schools, do you know how the Tax Commissioner arrived at the value of Kanawha County property? A. By replacement cost less depreciation. Q. I mean, did they examine certain properties or all properties in Kanawha County? A. They state that they have spot checked 2200 pieces of property. However, in the past thirty days I have probably talked to as many as fifty people who have never *395seen an appraiser, on whose property it was reported they have spot checked.” (Emphasis supplied).
On cross-examination the assessor was asked these questions, among others, and gave these answers: “Q. You have also been advised by the Tax Commissioner that a spot check was simply their method of obtaining information, and that you were not completely bound by it in your assessment? A. Not bound by it except in my percentage for State aid purposes. * * *. Q. Yes, but their spot checks and the figures they give you with reference to particular pieces of property is simply their opinion, based on information they had of the value from sources which we don’t know, but which you are not completely bound by as to your assessment for tax purposes. Isn’t that right? A. I am only bound in order to qualify for State aid. * * (Emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing uncontroverted evidence it is obvious that there was no systematic or general assessment of property in Kanawha County in 1957 at forty per cent of its true and actual value but, on the contrary, the real estate assessments varied from “9 to 130 per cent” of such value; that the assessment of real estate “at not less than 40 per cent of the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal” shows that such assessment at least in some instances was more, without indicating how much more in any specific case, than forty per cent of its true and actual value; that bank stock was uniformly assessed at one hundred per cent of its value; and that numerous other classes of property were assessed at different percentages of their value. Under the evidence there has been no discrimination against the plaintiff in favor of other holders of bank stock, all having been assesed at one hundred per cent of its value, and there is no justification for reducing the stock of the plaintiff from one hundred per cent of its value to a nonexistent general or systematic valuation of forty per cent. In the absence of any showing of a general or systematic assessment of property at forty per cent of its true and actual value, which the plaintiff was required but has failed to es*396tablish, there has been no prejudicial or unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff to the extent of the difference between one hundred per cent and forty per cent of the true and actual value of its stock.
The evidence merely shows “a systematic plan,” to use the language of the majority, to assess property in Ka-nawha County at approximately forty per cent of its true and actual value. “A systematic plan” to assess property does not constitute a general or systematic assessment of property and furnishes no basis for the determination of discrimination against the plaintiff in the valuation and the assessment of its property. (Emphasis suplied). In the light of the undisputed evidence any general assessment of property in the county at forty per cent of its true and actual value, which results in any prejudicial discrimination against the plaintiff in the assessment of its stock at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value, is completely eliminated from this case. The evidence demonstrates an utter failure to establish any uniform standard of valuations of forty per cent with which to compare the valuation at which the stock of the plaintiff has been assessed and unless such standard is established there can be no unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff in the assessment of its stock at a higher valuation than that placed upon other property in the county. See In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed in Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857. In that case, though the intangible property of the taxpayer, a Federal savings and loan association, was valued at approximately thirty per cent more than other property of the same class which was valued at approximately seventy per cent of its true and actual value, notes and accounts were valued at sixty five to seventy per cent and bonds at seventy per cent of their face value, livestock and agricultural products were valued at about fifty per cent of their purchase value, and accounts receivable and notes were valued at about *397eighty five per cent of their face value, this Court found that these differences in valuations of various types of property did not constitute an unconstitutional discrimination to the prejudice of the complaining taxpayer. See also In Re: Tax Assessments Against The Southern Land Company, 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S. E. 2d 555. Having failed to establish any existing standard of a general or systematic assessment of property at forty per cent of its true and actual value by which to determine the degree or extent of any discrimination against the plaintiff in the assessment of its bank stock at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value, the plaintiff is not entitled to a reduction in the assessment of its stock from one hundred per cent, the percentage at which all other bank stock is admittedly assessed, to a mythical, fancied or imaginary standard of forty per cent of its true and actual value.
Inasmuch as all bank stock is assessed at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value and as its assessment at that percentage of its value is not discriminatory but equal and uniform among the members of that class of property owners, this Court should have adhered to and followed its former decisions and held valid the assessment as fixed by the circuit court on the basis of one hundred per cent of the true and actual value of the stock of $6,000,000.00.
In invalidating the assessment of the stock of the plaintiff for failure to conform to an imaginary standard of valuation of property at forty per cent of its value, this Court ignored and, I think erroneously, refused to follow its prior decisions which recognize the validity of assessments which are equal and uniform within the same type or class of property even though other and different types or classes of property are not taxed at the same valuation provided taxation within the particular class is equal and uniform. Until the decision in this case this Court, under Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution of this State, has upheld the validity of taxation of property in a particular class which is equal *398and uniform within that class and has consistently held that a tax upon all business of the same class which is uniform as to that class is not unconstitutional.
That the present decision is in direct conflict with numerous prior decisions of this Court involving the validity of assessments of taxes based upon the value of the property against which the challenged tax was assessed and constitutes a surprising and, in my judgment, an entirely unwarranted disregard of the salutary principle of stare decisis, clearly appears from even a cursory examination of the cases in which those decisions were rendered.
In Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, error dismissed, 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, cited with approval in numerous later cases and never criticized or departed from until the present decision, the assessment of a toll bridge of the plaintiff in the manner required by a statute providing a particular method of assessing toll bridges and ferries was challenged as viola-tive of the provisions of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution. It was contended that the bridge should be assessed as other real estate and not as personal property. This Court rejected that contention and recognized the validity of the valuation of any class of property where the value of the same class of property is ascertained throughout the State in the same manner. Points, 2, 3 and 4 of the syllabus in that case are expressed in this language: “2. The legislature has power to prescribe the method by which the valuation of any class of property may be ascertained, and, where the value of the same class of property is ascertained throughout the state in the same manner, such valuation can not be regarded as unconstitutional for lack of uniformity or equality. 3. The Constitution prescribes what property is to be taxed, and the legislature prescribes the manner in which it shall be taxed, which mode of taxation shall be equal and uniform as to all classes of property. 4. A tax upon all business of the same class, which is uniform *399as to that kind of business, is not unconstitutional.” There could be no clearer indication that this Court recognized as valid and constitutional the division of property into different classes with different values among the classes if the valuation within the particular class is equal and uniform, under both the “equal and uniform” and the “no one species” provisions of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution, not under one without regard to the other, than the statements in the syllabus in the Charleston and Southside Bridge Company case that ‘ ‘where/the value of the same class, of property is ascertained throughout the state in the same manner, such valuation can not be regarded as unconstitutional for lack of uniformity or equality,” and that “A tax upon all business of the same class, which is uniform as to that kind of business, is not unconstitutional.” The last quoted statement, if it has any meaning, means not unconstitutional under both the “equal and uniform” clause and the “no one species” clause of the Constitution.
In Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, involving the question of the right of the taxpayer to deduct certain items of expenses of business from taxable income under a statute then in force but since repealed, this Court, discussing the meaning of the requirement of equal and uniform taxation under Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution said: “That provision means merely that as to classes of property, businesses or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation. ‘A tax upon all business of the same class, which is uniform as to that kind of business, is not unconstitutional.’ Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002.” That quotation again gives recognition to the validity of the asssessment of taxes upon property in different classes if the assessment is equal and uniform within the same class.
In the case of In Re: Tax Assessments Against Hancock County Federal Savings and Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543, involving the valuation of property of a Federal savings and loan association for *400the assessment of ad valorem taxes and the question whether certain items were exempt from taxation, this Court, after incorporating' in the majority opinion the identical provisions of Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution of 1863, and Article X, Section 1, of the present Constitution before it was amended in 1932, that “Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value; * * referring to other classes of property assessed at less than its true and actual value, used this language: “The contention that we should reduce the assessment of the association’s property because, as contended, certain property of other classes, particularly real estate, is assessed at something less than its true and actual value is without merit. In West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862, it was held, in effect, that a taxpayer was entitled to have his property assessment reduced to the level at which other property of the same class was assessed in the same governmental unit. It will be noted that this decision applies to property of the same class. It does not appear that intangible property in Hancock County is assessed at less than its true and actual value. There is, therefore, no basis for the application of the rule laid down in the West Penn case. This question was raised in Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, 816, and it was stated in the body of the opinion that the requirement of equal and uniform taxation set out in Article X, Section 1, of our Constitution ‘means merely that as to classes of property, businesses or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation.’ See also, Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N. E. 417; People v. Telephone Co., 277 Ill. 303, 36 N. E. 2d 362.” (Emphasis supplied).
In the case of In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 *401W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857, involving an assessment of ad valorem taxes upon the property of certain savings and loan associations and building and loan associations, in which reductions of values fixed by the assessor were reversed by the board of review and equalization, and the values fixed by the assessor were restored by the circuit court and affirmed by this Court, the unanimous opinion, prepared by Judge Fox, contains several statements which are pertinent to, and, in my judgment, should control the decision in this case and require a conclusion contrary to that reached by the majority. Repeating its previously expressed view of the meaning of the “equal and uniform” provision of the Constitution this Court said: “The ‘equal and uniform’ provision of our Constitution ‘means merely that as to classes of property, business or income there shall be uniformity of taxation.’ Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, 816. See also Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. County Court, supra; in re Hancock County Federal Savings & Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543.” In that case the assessor had placed a higher valuation upon the property of the complaining taxpayers than the valuations placed upon other species of property just as in the case at bar the stock of the plaintiff was assessed uniformly with the stock of other banks at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value which was higher than the assessment of accounts receivable and notes receivable at sixty per cent, and inventories at fifty per cent, of their true and actual value, machinery and equipment at twenty per cent of their original cost, and real estate, as to which there was “gross inequality” at nine to one hundred and thirty per cent of its true and actual value. This Court unanimously rejected the contention of the taxpayers that the assessment of their property at the higher valuation was unconstitutional discrimination against them and held the assessment as made by the assessor to be valid and constitutional.
*402Concerning the question of discrimination this Court said: “On the record before us, we do not believe a clear case of discrimination has been shown. No one contends that the property of the appellants has been assessed in excess of its true and actual value.” The plaintiff in the case at bar likewise does not seriously contend that the value fixed by the circuit court of $6,000,000.00 is in excess of the true and actual value of its stock. The opinion also contains these statements: “Appellants would not be permitted to do business if their respective assets were less in value than that reported to the assessor. State and Federal authorities would intervene, if such a situation existed. As has been stated above, the assets of each of the appellants were originally selected after the most rigid test as to its value, and care taken to guard against the fluctuation in values of properties securing such assets. Clearly, as relates to safety and security it is a different type of property from the ordinary note or account. Why, therefore, should we be asked to reduce an assessment below its true value, merely because as to other property, the value of which is uncertain, and by reason of its character cannot be accurately determined, assessing officers have, in good faith, adopted a plan for arriving at an estimated value?” And finally as to discrimination, the opinion states: “Our holding goes no further than this: What has been shown with reference to the assessment of intangible property in Kanawha County, of types other than that owned by the appellants, is insufficient to establish a case of discrimination, which would justify us in applying the principles announced in West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization, supra.”
With respect to Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution, the opinion contains these statements: “Recent radical changes in our tax system, brought about by the adoption of the tax limitation amendment, Section 1 of Article X of our Constitution, where property is classified, gives rise to the suggestion that once property has been classified, there can be no further distinction as to property within a given classification. Whether there *403can be such distinction is perhaps dependent on the character of the property involved. Each of the four classifications of property for tax purposes includes property of different types, for the ascertainment of the value of which different methods are employed. In the very nature of things this must be true. The Constitution plainly says that the value of all property for tax purposes shall be ascertained ‘as directed by law’. Who gives the direction? Obviously, the sole law-making authority, the legislature. In respect to building and loan and federal savings and loan associations, as well as other types of property, the legislature has given specific direction, and as to other types of property the directions are more general. We do not doubt the inherent and constitutional power of the legislature to give these directions, so long as they are designed to provide a method in keeping with the aim to tax property equally and uniformly, as required by our Constitution. So far as concerns our State Constitution, we think the question is set at rest by the decision of this Court in Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, supra. That case was decided in 1896, when there was no classification of property for tax purposes, and uniform tax rates, in each •taxing district, applied to all property. However, Section 1 of Article X of the Constitution, as it then was, contained the same provisions with respect to equality and uniformity as those contained in the present Constitution. In that case the plaintiff was the owner of a toll bridge and the legislature had provided a particular method for the assessment of toll bridges and ferries.” After quoting points 2, 3 and 4 of the syllabus in the Bridge Company case, the opinion continues: “We know of no subsequent case which in any way departs from that decision. It was cited with approval in Christopher v. James, supra. The later classification of property does not, in our opinion, call for any departure from the principles therein pronounced. We think they are applicable to our present tax system.” (Emphasis supplied).
In Bankers Pocahontas Coal Company v. County Court *404of McDowell County, 135 W. Va. 174, 62 S. E. 2d 801, this Court, in a unanimous decision, refused to disturb valuations fixed by the assessor which were affirmed by the county court and the circuit court and which the taxpayer challenged on the ground that such valuations on its three tracts of land were excessive and higher than those placed upon contiguous lands of other taxpayers. In the opinion this Court said: “With certain exceptions the organic law of this state requires that ‘taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law * * Article X, Section 1, Constitution of West Virginia. Since the adoption of the classification amendment to the Constitution of this State on August 10, 1932, this Court has considered the question of uniform and equal taxation. In Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, in which a deficiency assessment of State income tax was considered, the Court in relation to the Constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity in taxation made the following pertinent statement: ‘That provision means merely that as to classes of property, businesses or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation.’ The foregoing statement in the Christopher case was approved in In Re: Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 434, 25 S. E. 2d 543. The same principle was likewise upheld in In Re: Tax Assessments, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513. The judgment of this Court in In Re: Tax Assessments, supra, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Charleston Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Alderson, 65 S. Ct. 863, 324 U. S. 182, 89 L. ed. 857. It is well established law in this jurisdiction that the equality and uniformity of taxes are confined to a species of property rather than all taxable property in a taxing unit." This statement shows clearly that despite the “no one species” clause of Section 1, this Court, in the cited cases, upheld the validity of uniformity of taxation within a particular class or species of property even though there should be a different value upon property within another or different class or species of property if the *405taxation was uniform within the same class or species, which is in direct conflict with the holding of the majority in the instant case. (Emphasis supplied).
In In Re: Tax Assessments Against The National Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling and The Morris Plan Savings and Loan Company, 137 W. Va. 673, 73 S. E. 2d 655, the complaining taxpayers challenged the assessment of ad valorem taxes against the property of a national bank and an industrial loan company. The assessor made the original assessment on the basis of the book value of the shares of stock in each corporation. The county court upon review arrived at a different value by considering other relative methods and factors. The taxpayers contended that the valuation of the shares should be based on a sales price method. This Court reversed the assessment based on the book value method and in the opinion which was concurred in by two of the three judges who constitute the majority in the case at bar used this language: “Our State Constitution, Article X, Section 1, provides: ‘Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal shall be taxed in equal proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law * * The exceptions made in the section have no application to the questions involved in the instant proceeding. Thus, the ultimate goal is ‘equal and uniform taxation’.
“Moreover, the uniformity required relates to property of a particular class. It is not required that property, businesses or income of different classes be taxed equally and uniformly. Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Court, 135 W. Va. 174, 62 S. E. 2d 801; In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Association, et al., 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. ed. 857; Arslain v. Alderson, 126 W. Va. 880, 30 S. E. 2d 533; In Re: Tax Assessments Against Hancock County Federal Savings and Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543; Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002.”
*406In the recent case of In Re: Tax Assessments Against The Southern Land Company, decided in 1957, 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S. E. 2d 555, in which the taxpayers challenged assessments of ad valorem taxes on lands owned by them in Boone County based on true and actual valuations fixed by the assessor which, except as to four tracts, were affirmed by the county court and by the circuit court upon appeal. The grounds on which the taxpayers assailed as unconstitutional the valuations of their property, as determined by the assessor and the county court, were that the valuations were in excess of the true and actual value of their property; and that they were discriminatory because lower valuations were placed upon similar adjacent property, because Class III property was assessed at 61.75 per cent of its value, Class II property at 28.45 per cent of its value, and Class IV property at 25.85 per cent of its value in Boone County, because Class III property in that county was assessed at a greater percentage of its value than the same class of property in other counties, and because the property of the taxpayers in that county was taxed higher than other species of property in this State of equal value. In a unanimous decision concurred in by two of the judges who joined in the decision of the majority in the case at bar, this Court rejected the foregoing contentions of the taxpayers and affirmed the circuit court in upholding the validity of the challenged assessments. The opinion in that case contains these pertinent pronouncements concerning the meaning and effect of both the “equal and uniform” and the “no one species” provisions of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution of this State:
“Subject to the limitations governing the jurisdiction of this Court, the question before us is raised by Article X, Section 1, of the West Virginia Constitution, which reads: ‘Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as *407directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value * * V This requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation, as set forth in Article X, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, means that as to all classes of 'property, business or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation. West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization of Brooke County, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862; Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813; Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, supra.” (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing quotation “that as to all classes of property, business or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation” shows conclusively that this Court, in considering both the “equal and uniform” provision and the “no one species” provision of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution, which were quoted in the opinion in the Southern Land Company case and also in the opinion in the Hancock County Federal Savings and Loan Association case, recognized the validity, under both provisions, of classifications for the valuation of taxable property of different types or classes provided the valuation within each particular class was equal and uniform. If it did not do so it would not have expressly used the terms “all classes” which necessarily imply the existence of more than a single class or species of property the valuation of all of which must be the same to be equal and uniform. The application now made by the majority in the instant case of the “no one species” clause necessarily abolishes “all classes” of property and permits only the existence of one universal all inclusive single class of property within which the valuation for the assessment of ad valorem taxes must be the same for every kind of property, and this requirement of a universal all inclusive single class is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with its utterances in the foregoing series of cases beginning with Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, *408error dismissed 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, decided in 1896, and including In Re: Tax Assessments Against The Southern Land Company, 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S. E. 2d 555, decided in 1957, which covers a period of sixty one years of the ninety six years of the existence of this State. Though none of those cases makes specific application of the “no one species” provision, this Court, being cognizant of that provision in upholding the constitutional validity of the assessed valuation in a particular class of property when such valuation was uniform, as it did in the cases of Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, error dismissed 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, and In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857, necessarily considered it to mean that no one species of property within a particular class should be valued higher than any other species of property in the same class and that it did not operate to prevent different valuations in different classes when the valuations in the same class were equal and uniform. If this Court had given that clause the meaning and effect now placed upon it by the majority decision in this case it would necessarily have reached a different conclusion as to the validity of the challenged valuations in each of the two above cited cases. By the prior decisions of this Court, during a period of almost two-thirds of the existence of this State, in which many of its distinguished former judges participated and in which it clarified the meaning of the “equal and uniform” provision of Article X, Section 1, it harmonized that provision with the “no one species” provision and avoided the apparently irreconcilable conflict between them which has resulted from the present decision and will inevitably give rise to perplexity and confusion in the administration of the long established system of taxation in this State.
Inasmuch as this Court in its decisions in the foregoing *409series of cited cases was required to consider the meaning- and effect of the “no one species” provision of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution, and quoted that provision in its opinion in two of those cases, that question in the instant case was manifestly not one of first impression in this State even though the majority considered it to be a question of that nature.
The provisions that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law” and that “No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value,” have been a part of the Constitution since the formation of this State and each appeared, in the identical language just quoted, in Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution of 1863, and in Article X, Section 1, of the present Constitution adopted in 1872, and the same language remains in the same Article and Section notwithstanding the amendment to that Article and Section in November 1932 which authorized the division of all taxable property into four classes for the establishment of rates of taxation and imposed a limitation on the rate or amount of the tax which may be levied upon each class of property. The absence of any discussion of the provision that “No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value;” did not eliminate it from the Constitution or remove or impair its operation or effect. It can not be contended, with any show of sound reason or any degree of convincing persuasion that the several judges of this Court who participated in the decisions in the cases of Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, error dismissed 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, West Penn Power Company v. Board of Review and Equalization of Brooke County, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862, Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, In Re: Tax Assessments Against Hancock County Federal Savings and *410Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543, and In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed in Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857, were unaware of the “no one species” clause, ignored its existence, or misunderstood its full and complete meaning and effect, or that all or any of those jurists were less capable of rendering a sound, just and correct decision of the question involved than the able and distinguished judges who constitute the majority in this case. On the contrary, the conclusion is inescapable that the judges who decided the above cited cases gave studied consideration to all the provisions of Article X, Section 1, and after mature deliberation adopted the view that the “no one species” clause did not render invalid or unconstitutional different valuations of property of different classes if the assessment of taxes within each of the different classes was equal and uniform.
It is pertinent to make particular mention of the seven prior decisions of this Court which the majority in the case at bar was required to disapprove in order to reach the conclusion that the assessment of the stock of the plaintiff at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value was violative of the “no one species”'clause of the Constitution. In the first of these cases, Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, error dismissed 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, decided in 1896, the opinion in which was written by Judge English, the decision was concurred in by the other three members of this Court who were Judges Holt, Brannon and Dent, although Judges Brannon and Dent filed separate concurring opinions. In the second case, Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S. E. 2d 813, decided in 1940, the opinion in which was written by Judge Maxwell, the decision was concurred in by the four other members of this Court who were Judges Riley, Hatcher, Kenna and Fox. In the third case, In re: Tax Assessments Against Hancock Federal Savings and Loan Association, 125 W. *411Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543, decided in 1943, the opinion in which was written by Judge Fox, the decision was concurred in by two of the four members of this Court who were Judges Kenna and Lovins with the two remaining members Judges Riley and Rose filing-separate dissenting opinions. In the fourth case, In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed in Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857, decided in 1944, the opinion in which was written by Judge Fox, the decision was concurred in by the other four members of this Court who were Judges Riley, Rose, Kenna and Lovins. In the fifth case, Bankers Pocahontas Coal Company v. County Court of McDowell County, 135 W. Va. 174, 62 S. E. 2d 601, decided in 1950, the opinion in which was written by Judge Lovins,- the decision was concurred in by the other four members of this Court who were Judges Fox, Riley, Haymond and Given. In the sixth case, In Re: Tax Assessments Against The National Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling and The Morris Plan Savings and Loan Company, 137 W. Va. 673, 73 S. E. 2d 655, decided in 1952, the opinion in which was written by Judge Given, the decision was concurred in by the other four members of this Court who were Judges Riley, Lovins, Haymond and Browning. And finally, in the seventh of these cases, In re: Tax Assessments Against The Southern Land Company, 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S. E. 2d 555, decided in 1957, the opinion in which was written by Judge Riley, the decision was concurred in by the other four members of this Court who were Judges Haymond, Given, Browning and Ducker. In those seven cases, which are now disapproved, fifteen of the forty nine judges of this Court since the formation of this State in 1863, have held or entertained the view that classifications for the valuation of taxable property of different types or classes were valid and constitutional under the provisions of Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution of 1863 and of Article X, Section 1, of the present Constitution that *412“taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value,” provided the valuation within each particular class was uniform and equal. Now the views and the conclusions of all these former and present judges of this Court are summarily disapproved and rejected by the decision of a majority consisting of three judges, two of whom participated and concurred in the decision in the case of In re: Tax Assessments Against The Southern Land Company, 143 W. Va. 152, 100 S. E. 2d 555, in which the opinion states that “Subj ect to the (limitations, governing (the j urisdiction of this Court,the question before us is raised by Article X, Section 1, of the West Virginia Constitution, which reads: ‘Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value * * This requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation, as set forth in Article X, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, means that as to all classes of property, business or incomes there shall be uniformity of taxation.” I can not concur in or approve the decision of the majority which accomplishes that surprising and to me wholly unwarranted result.
The history of the incorporation in the Constitution of 1863 of the “no one species” provision and the reason for its adoption militate against and do not support the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. Prior to and at the time of the formation of this State the Constitution of Virginia of 1851, in Article IV, Sections 22 and 23, contained these provisions: “Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the commonwealth, and *413all property other than slaves shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” And “Every slave who has attained the age of twelve years shall be assessed with a tax equal to and not exceeding that assessed on land of the value of three hundred dollars. Slaves under that age shall not be subject to taxation; and other taxable property may be exempted from taxation by the vote of a majority of the whole number of members elected to each house of the general assembly.” This constitutional limitation on the valuation of slaves and the provision for exemption from taxation of other taxable property by the vote of a majority of the whole number of members elected to each house of the general assembly and the inadequate and unequal representation in each house of the inhabitants of the western counties of Virginia which subjected them to the policies supported by the eastern counties caused violent and bitter dissatisfaction to the people of the western counties where there were fewer slaves than in the eastern counties and required them to pay higher taxes upon other types of personal property than the taxes paid upon slaves by their owners. These inequalities were among the main causes that led to the separation of the western and the eastern sections of the commonwealth and resulted in the formation of this State in 1863. See Vol. 1, Debates and Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, pages 5 and 6, and Vol. Ill, page 55. The main purpose of the proponents of the “no one species” clause in causing its incorporation in the Constitution of 1863, as disclosed by the debates of that convention, was to prevent any constitutional limitation of the value for the assessment of taxes of a particular type or species of property to the exclusion of all other types or species of property such as the limitation of the valuation of slaves in the Virginia Constitution which had provoked their bitter and undying opposition. Some members of the Convention were of the opinion that the “no one species” clause did not affect the meaning and effect of the “equal and uniform” clause but *414amounted to mere repetition of that provision. See Vol. Ill, Debates and Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, remarks of Mr. Brown, page 56, remarks of Mr. Stuart, page 67, remarks of Mr. Paxton, pages 56 and 68, remarks of Mr. Smith, page 68, remarks of Mr. Sinsel, page 72, and remarks of Mr. Irvine, pages 64 and 74. It is clear that it was not the intention of those who voted for the adoption of the “no one species” clause that it would ever be the instrument or afford the means of reducing the value of all taxable property of every naturally different class or type to the lowest valuation brought about by “a systematic plan” to assess property at forty per cent or any other specified percentage of its true and actual value, and of prohibiting the assessment of other classes of property at different valuations provided the valuation in each class is equal and uniform. Precisely that result, however, has been accomplished by the decision of the majority in this case.
If the “no one species” clause is now to be used to reduce the valuation of all property to the level recognized by “a systematic plan” to assess property at a specified percentage of its true and actual value to the exclusion of different valuations of different classes of property which are equal and uniform within each class, which, as I understand the majority decision, is the result which it requires, the value of the stock of the plaintiff should be reduced, not to forty per cent of its true and actual value, but instead to twenty per cent of its true and actual value to conform to the “systematic plan” followed by the assessor of Kanawha County who has actually assessed machinery and equipment at a valuation based upon twenty per cent of their original cost. And this principle must necessarily apply under the “equal and uniform” clause to the valuation of property in every county of this State.
In my opinion the present decision will inevitably result in confusion and uncertainty in the valuation of the property of utilities which own property and operate in *415more than one county in this State. If a public service corporation operates in Kanawha County and in several other counties in this State the valuation of its property in that county must be reduced to conform to the “systematic plan” to assess property at forty per cent of its true and actual value or it will be subjected to an unconstitutional discrimination if its property is assessed above that percentage of its true and actual value. If its property in some other county where “a systematic plan” to assess property at sixty per cent of its true and actual value exists its property must be assessed at that percentage and it will be subjected to an unconstitutional discrimination in that county if it is assessed at any greater percentage of its true and actual value. But if its property in Kanawha County is and must be asessed at forty per cent of its true and actual value and its property in another county to conform to the “systematic plan” is and must be assessed at sixty per cent of its true and actual value, the taxation of its property which by the “equal and uniform” clause must be equal and uniform throughout the State will not be equal and uniform and under that provision will be invalid because in violation of that clear and express provision, for manifestly an assessment can not be constitutional and valid under the “no one species” clause if it is violative of the “equal and uniform” clause of the same Article and Section of the Constitution. In fact, under the decision of the majority, the property of any utility in several counties of this State, to comply with the “equal and uniform” clause which requires taxation to be equal and uniform, not in any one county but “throughout the State,” must be reduced in valuation to the lowest valuation of property in Kanawha County which as to machinery and equipment is twenty per cent of their true and actual value based on that percentage of their original cost.
As heretofore pointed out, the present decision, instead of harmonizing the “equal and uniform” provision and the “no one species” provision in Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution, has rendered them apparently *416repugnant to each other and created an apparent irreconcilable conflict between them. In accomplishing that unnecessary and unfortunate result, the majority has disregarded an elementary canon of constitutional construction which requires that if there is an apparent repugnancy between different constitutional provisions it is the duty of the court to harmonize them if possible. In 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 53, the text contains these statements: “In construing a constitutional provision, it is the duty of the court to have recourse to the whole instrument, if necessary, to ascertain the true intent and meaning of any particular provision, and if there is an apparent repugnancy between different provisions, the court should harmonize them if possible. The rules of construction of constitutional law require that two sections be so construed, if possible, as not to create a repugnancy, but that both be allowed to stand, and that effect be given to each.” In 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Section 23, the rule is discussed in these terms: “In ascertaining both the intent and general purpose, as well as the meaning, of a constitution or a part thereof, it should be construed as a whole. As far as possible, each provision should be construed so as to harmonize with all the others, with a view to giving effect to each and every provision in so far as it shall be consistent with a construction of the instrument as a whole.” In State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715, this Court held in point 3 of the syllabus that “In ascertaining the intention of the people in adopting a constitution all parts of the constitution must be considered, every article, section, clause, phrase and word allowed some effect, and all parts, clauses, phrases and words harmonized, if possible. No part or word in it can be ignored, disregarded, treated as meaningless or denied purpose and effect, unless there be irreconcilable contradiction and repug-nancy.” In Berry v. Fox, 114 W. Va. 513, 172 S. E. 896, quoting from Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol. 1, page 129, this Court said that an amendment to the constitution and all its other provisions must, if possible, be harmonized. See also Flesher v. Board of *417Review, West Virginia Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 138 W. Va. 765, 77 S. E. 2d 890.
It should be emphasized that, until the present decision, the prior decisions of this Court have consistently been considered binding authority to be followed and adhered to unless such prior decisions are found to be plainly erroneous or utterly unsound. By expressly disapproving the seven prior decisions of this Court cited and referred to earlier in this dissenting opinion, the majority has departed from that salutary and well established principle. Instead of adopting the reasons set forth and the conclusions reached by this Court in those decisions, the majority seeks to sustain its present decision by citing and relying upon numerous decisions by courts in other jurisdictions in disregard of the rule that such decisions should be accorded only persuasive but not controlling force and effect. I am unwilling to ignore the decisions of this Court and instead to apply the decisions to the contrary of the courts of other jurisdictions in the consideration and disposition of any case by this Court.
In my judgment, the present decision requiring all types of property, regardless of the natural diversities between them, to be placed in a single, universal and all inclusive class and to be given the same percentage of value for the assessment of ad valorem taxes, accomplishes the amazing and heretofore unheard of result of completely and permanently abolishing any classification of the different kinds of property into separate and distinct categories for the purpose of assessing ad valorem taxes against inherently different types of property in this State; and this result is accomplished by a bare majority consisting of three judges of this Court in the face of a heretofore unbroken line of well considered cases in which this Court reached an opposite and entirely different conclusion. Under the present decision, money, bills and notes, evidence of indebtedness, oil wells, railroad systems and equipment, shares of stock, livestock, farm machinery, merchandise, coal mines, house*418hold furniture, jewelry, automobiles, steamboats, racehorses, real estate of all kinds, and even poodle dog pets must be given the same percentage of value and can not be placed in separate or distinct classes, despite the natural differences between them, or valued equally and uniformly within the class in which some or any of the foregoing items may directly and properly belong for the assessment of the ad valorem taxes to which they are subject under the law of this State. I do not and can not subscribe to any such previously unheard of, chaotic and utterly impractical innovation in the system of taxation in this State.
As previously indicated the present decision is logically inconsistent and legally unsound. The assessed valuations in the cases of Charleston and Southside Bridge Company v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002, error dismissed 168 U. S. 704, 18 S. Ct. 941, 42 L. Ed. 1212, In Re: Tax Assessments Against Hancock County Federal Savings and Loan Association, 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S. E. 2d 543, and In Re: Tax Assessments Against Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association, 126 W. Va. 506, 30 S. E. 2d 513, affirmed Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 65 S. Ct. 624, 89 L. Ed. 857, and In Re: National Bank of West Virginia, 137 W. Va. 673, 73 S. E. 2d 655, can not be valid and constitutional, as this Court held them to be in those cases, and at the same time be invalid and unconstitutional as violative of the “no one species” provision of Article X, Section 1, as they must be under that provision as applied to the valuation of the stock of the plaintiff in this case and, by the same norm, the valuation of that stock can not be valid and constitutional, as it is under the above cited cases, because of its uniformity within that class of property, and at the same time be invalid and unconstitutional under the “no one species” provision as applied by the majority in its decision of the instant case. In brief an assessed valuation of property for the collection of ad valorem taxes can not be valid and constitutional under the “equal *419and uniform” provision, as heretofore applied by this Court, and at the same time be invalid and unconstitutional under the “no one species” provision of Article X, Section 1, of the Constitution of this State as now applied by the majority in the decision of this case.
For the reasons stated and under the authorities cited and quoted from in this dissent I would adhere to the former decisions of this Court and affirm the action of the circuit court in assessing the stock of the plaintiff at one hundred per cent of its true and actual value of $6,000,000.00.
I am authorized to state that Judge BERRY concurs in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.