dissenting.
On March 18, 1980, Robert Nigherbon injured his neck and back in an accident while driving a truck for Feller Trucking. Mr. Nigherbon also became severely depressed, and an issue the Commission had before it was whether Mr. Nigherbon’s depression was work-caused, thereby making it a compensable disability under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act. Conflicting evidence was presented to the Commission: Mr. Nigherbon introduced testimony in deposition form from his two treating therapists, Dp. Hurst and Dr. Adams, that his depression was work-related. Defendants introduced testimony from two experts, Dr. Holt and Dr. Kruzich, also in deposition form, that Mr. Nigherbon’s depression was not work-related.
The Commission1 concluded that Mr. Nigherbon’s depression was not work-related, and, therefore, denied any benefits relating to his depression. In choosing to accept the opinion testimony of defendants’ experts, the Commission stated that it was “inclined to the view that psychiatrists can more accurately diagnose mental problems and the cause thereof [than psychologists].”
The Commission made this statement in reference to the fact that Mr. Nigherbon’s primary treating therapist, Dr. Hurst, is a psychologist with a Ph.D. in psychology, *236whereas defendants’ experts are psychiatrists.2
Although the weight to be given medical evidence rests with the Commission, Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618, 621, 671 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1983), and its determination as to weight has been said to be conclusive on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous, Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 445, 649 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1982),3 here, the placing of greater weight on the testimony of the defendants’ experts rather than the claimant’s experts, premised on the basis that defendants’ experts are psychiatrists while Mr. Nigherbon’s expert was a psychologist, is not supported as a matter of law.
For purposes of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act, a “physician” is defined in the following way:
“Physician” means medical physicians and surgeons, ophthalmologists, otorhinolaryngologists, dentists, osteopaths, osteopathic physicians and surgeons, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractic physicians and members of any other healing profession licensed or authorized by the statutes of this state to practice such profession within the scope of their practice as defined by the statutes of this state and as authorized by their licenses. I.C. § 72-102(20) (emphasis added).
It is readily apparent that psychologists fall within this definition. I.C. § 54-2301 et seq. regulates the licensing of psychologists. Subsequent sections in that chapter state that the practice of psychology affects “the public health,” I.C. § 54-2301, and that psychology includes working with and treating mental problems. I.C. § 54-2302(f). It cannot be denied that psychologists licensed in Idaho to treat mental health problems are “physicians” for purposes of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act.4
Thus, where a mental problem is psychologically and not biologically based, as is true in this case,5 there is nothing in the law, for worker’s compensation purposes, that lends credence to the Commission’s broad, all-encompassing statement, which improperly permitted the discounting of Dr. Hurst’s testimony. There is no law and there is no record to support the Commission’s view that “psychiatrists can more accurately diagnose mental problems and the cause thereof [than psychologists].”, Thus, there being no basis in this record for the Commission’s statement, this Court should not affirm the Commission’s ruling that the mental depression was not work-related.
In so stating I do not wish to be understood as saying that the Commission in some instances may not find sound reasons for giving greater weight to a psychiatrist’s rather than a psychologist’s testimony. Clearly, it can. Conversely, in some instances, it may give greater weight to a psychologist’s rather than a psychiatrist’s testimony. But some basis for doing so must be stated, and that basis must bear some reasonable relationship to the special circumstances and facts of the particular case.
*237The record does not tell us how much reliance the Commission placed on the stance it here took when evaluating the evidence concerning the cause of Mr. Nigherbon’s depression. Noting the rule long established in Idaho that the testimony of a claimant’s treating physician ought to be given at least as great if not greater weight than that of the physician or physicians who examined him only for purposes of trial, Graves v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 87 Idaho 451, 456, 394 P.2d 290, 293 (1964); Stralovich v. Sunshine Mining Co., 68 Idaho 524, 533, 201 P.2d 106, 112 (1948), and that here the dispute is between Mr. Nigherbon’s treating physicians and defendants’ experts,6 it is manifestly clear that this Court, at the least, should reverse and remand to the Commission for reconsideration of the cause of Mr. Nigherbon’s depression.
HUNTLEY, J„ concurs.. The Commission adopted the proposed findings and conclusions of the referee who conducted the hearing; therefore, we speak in terms of the Commission's decision. We have before us the same cold record which the Commission reviewed and then adopted. Where the sole issue presented is the interpretation and application of medical testimony we should defer to the expertise of the Commission. See Small v. Jacklin, 109 Idaho 541, 709 P.2d 114 (Sup.Ct. No. 14994, issued May 29, 1985) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
. Dr. Adams, who also testified that Mr. Nigherbon’s depression is work-related, is a medical doctor who concentrates 70 percent of his practice to the field of psychiatry.
. See footnote 1, supra. As a condition to giving deference to the Commission, this Court should at the least require that the Commission’s determination was not influenced by improper considerations.
. There is no problem here with the fact that Mr. Nigherbon's claim involves a mental problem. Idaho’s Worker's Compensation Act covers both mental and physical problems caused in the work place. In Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984), this Court stated: “[Psychological disorders should be compensated [under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act] if they are proximately caused by the job environment and if they result in loss of earning capacity." Id. at 690, 692 P.2d at 334.
.The surety-defendant’s own psychiatrist. Dr. Kruzich, testified that the probable cause of Mr. Nigherbon’s depression “is the various stresses and strains which he is experiencing as opposed to his depression being due to a bipolar or a biochemical type of depression____” (Emphasis added.)
. It is notable that Dr. Hurst alone saw Mr. Nigherbon 60 times while the defendants' experts saw him only a total of five times between them.