with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the holding that Breck’s action is barred by laches.
The trial court found that Breck gave ample notice of her opposition to the project and the reasons for it, and did not, under the circumstances, unreasonably delay in bringing suit. The court found also that the alleged injury to petitioners was not caused by Breck’s delay, but rather by their own haste in proceeding with the project despite the serious questions raised concerning the legality of the bidding procedures. In reaching its decision, the trial court gave careful consideration to the evidence before it, and I am unable to say that the court’s findings were clearly erroneous. In light of these findings, I do not see how we can now say; “Breck was guilty of inexcusable delay in bringing this litigation ... and ... her inexcusable delay resulted in undue prejudice to petitioners.” We are not entitled to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
I would affirm the judgment. Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976).