concurring in part, dissenting in.part.
The majority’s opinion correctly affirms the trial court’s order of summary judgment on Schenkel & Shultz, Inc., formerly known as Schenkel & Shultz Architects, P.A.’s (“plaintiff’) claims for negligence and professional malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of warranty and reverses the trial court’s order granting summary judgment regarding Hermon F. Fox & Associates, RC.’s (“defendant”) counterclaim.
The majority opinion’s conclusion that, “because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to the intention of the. parties to provide for a right to indemnity by incorporation by reference and the ‘flow-through’ contractual provision” and reversal of the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s claim for express contractual indemnity is error.
*270Plaintiff’s failure to preserve or argue the lack of an expert witness as a ground to grant summary judgment warrants dismissal of this assignment of error. Alternatively, since the majority’s opinion addresses the merits of plaintiff’s assignment of error, plaintiff cannot establish indemnity negligence liability as a matter of law without an expert witness and testimony. Plaintiff’s express contract indemnity claim also fails because indemnity agreements imposing liability must be unequivocally clear. See Candid Camera Video v. Mathews, 76 N.C. App. 634, 636, 334 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1985) (“Indemnity against negligence must be made unequivocally clear in the contract.”), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 390, 338 S.E.2d 879 (1986). The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s indemnity claim.
I. Failure to Assign Error
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on its indemnity claim. Defendant argued four separate grounds in support of dismissing plaintiff’s indemnity claim in its motion for summary judgment:
3) [Defendant] now seeks the dismissal of the Derivative Claim pursuant to Rule 56 on the grounds that there are no material issues of fact and that [defendant] is otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically:
a) There is no express right to contractual indemnification between [defendant] and the Plaintiff;
b) There is no justification for an implied-in-fact indemnification between [defendant] and Plaintiff;
c) [Defendant] and Plaintiff, as engineer and supervising architect, do not satisfy the active-passive framework required for common law indemnification; and
d) Without an expert witness to establish [defendant’s] professional standard of care and breach thereof, Plaintiff cannot establish liability as a matter of law.
A. Lack of Expert Witness
On appeal, defendant argues plaintiff failed to designate an expert witness prior to expiration of the deadline and cannot satisfy its *271burden to establish defendant negligently performed its duties under the contract without expert testimony. I agree.
The trial court’s summary judgment order does not specify upon which ground summary judgment was granted, and states, “There are no genuine issues of fact material to Plaintiffs claim for indemnification against Defendant and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Plaintiff failed to assign error or argue reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment order due to its failure to provide an expert witness to prove defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of care. This failure on plaintiff’s indemnity claim alone supports affirming the trial court’s order.
I. Standard of Care Required
“The standard of care provides a template against which the finder of fact may measure the actual conduct of the professional. The purpose of introducing evidence as to the standard of care in a professional negligence lawsuit ‘is to see if this defendant’s actions “lived up” to that standard[,]’ ” and this is generally established by expert testimony. Associated Indus. Contr’rs, Inc. v. Fleming Eng’g, Inc., 162 N.C. App. 405, 410, 590 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2004) (quoting Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C. App. 562, 567, 442 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1994), aff’d per curiam 340 N.C. 102, 455 S.E.2d 160 (1995)), aff’d on other grounds, 359 N.C. 296, 608 S.E.2d 757 (2005).
The scope of appellate review is limited to consideration of the assignments of error set forth in the record on appeal and argued in appellant’s brief. N.C. R. App. 10(a) (2006); N.C. R. App. 28(a) (2006). Plaintiff failed to set forth any argument in its appellate brief to excuse its failure to designate an expert witness.
Plaintiff’s brief only addresses three of the four grounds defendant argued to grant summary judgment. Plaintiff’s failure to designate an expert witness supports the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff’s assignment of error is not preserved or is abandoned and should be dismissed.
II. Lack of an Expert Witness
The majority’s opinion holds a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the contract between plaintiff and the school board provided for the indemnification of plaintiff by defendant by incorporation-by-reference and the flow-through contractual provision. Presuming an “indemnity” provision exists in these contracts, sum*272mary judgment is still proper and the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. No indemnity provision exists in the contract between plaintiff and defendant.
The “indemnity” provision plaintiff relies upon states:
In the event a claim, suit, or cause of action is made against [the school board] and/or [the school boards’] representatives for any personal injury, including death, or property damage (other than to the work itself), or other loss or damage resulting solely from any negligent act or omission of the [plaintiff] or out of [plaintiffs] breach of this Agreement, [plaintiff] agrees to defend and hold [the school board] . . . harmless and indemnified from any loss, costs, damages, expenses, attorneys fees and liability with respect to such claim, suit, or cause of action.
(Emphasis' supplied). Even if this “indemnity” provision requires defendant to indemnify plaintiff, plaintiff cannot establish negligence liability as a matter of law without expert testimony to establish defendant’s professional standard of care and breach thereof. See Handex of the Carolinas, Inc. v. County of Haywood, 168 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 607 S.E.2d 25, 31 (2005) (“The standard of care provides a template against which the finder of fact may measure the actual conduct of the professional. The purpose of introducing evidence as to the .standard of care in a professional negligence lawsuit ‘is to see if this defendant’s actions ‘lived up’ to that standard[,]’ and generally this is established by way of expert testimony.” (quoting Associated Indus. Contr’rs, Inc. v. Fleming Eng’g, Inc., 162 N.C. App. 405, 410, 590 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2004) (quoting Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C. App. 562, 567, 442 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 340 N.C. 102, 455 S.E.2d 160 (1995))).
Plaintiff failed to disclose his expert witnesses within the time required. If defendant’s duty to indemnify arises “out of [plaintiff’s] breach of the Agreement,” with the school board, expert testimony is required to establish the breach. The trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s indemnification claim should be affirmed on the merits.
III. Contractual Indemnity
The majority’s opinion holds the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s indemnification claim should be reversed because a genuine issue of *273material fact remains as to whether the contract between plaintiff and defendant expressly provided for indemnification. I disagree.
Plaintiff argues that defendant is contractually bound to indemnify it because plaintiff had contractually agreed to indemnify the school board. As noted earlier, the contract between plaintiff and the school board provides, in part, that:
In the event a claim, suit, or cause of action is made against [the school board] and/or [the school boards’] representatives for any personal injury, including death, or property damage (other than to the work itself), or other loss or damage resulting solely from any negligent act or omission of the [plaintiff] or out of [plaintiff’s] breach of this Agreement, [plaintiff] agrees to defend and hold [the school board] . . . harmless and indemnified from any loss, costs, damages, expenses, attorneys fees and liability with respect to such claim, suit, or cause of action.
The contract between plaintiff and defendant does not include this covenant or any express contractual provision for defendant to indemnify plaintiff. Plaintiff relies on Section 1.1.2 of its contract with defendant to argue the above language was “incorporated by reference” or implied into its contract with defendant. Section 1.1.2 of the contract between plaintiff and defendant provides:
[Defendant’s] services shall be performed according to this Agreement with [plaintiff] in the samé manner and to the same extent that [plaintiff] is bound by the attached Prime Agreement to perform such services for [the school board]. Except as set forth herein, [defendant] shall not have any duties or responsibilities for any other part of the project.
Plaintiff drafted the contract with defendant and failed to reference, include, or bargain for any indemnification by defendant. See Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 295, 378 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989) (contracts are construed against the drafter).
“Courts strictly construe an indemnity clause against the party asserting it.” Hoisington v. ZT-Winston-Salem Assocs., 133 N.C. App. 485, 494, 516 S.E.2d 176, 183 (1999), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 351 N.C. 342, 525 S.E.2d 173 (2000). This Court has stated:
In interpreting a contract of indemnity, the court should give effect to the intention of the parties. But where the contractual language is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret *274the contract as written. Indemnity against negligence must be made unequivocally clear in the contract, particularly in a situation where the parties have presumably dealt at arm’s length.
Candid Camera Video, 76 N.C. App. at 636, 334 S.E.2d at 96 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
A court is not free to incorporate, imply, or write into a “clear and unambiguous” contract covenants and conditions the parties themselves did not include. Id.; see Klein v. Insurance Co., 289 N.C. 63, 66, 220 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1975) (A court cannot rewrite a contract and make a new contract for the parties.).
“Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court is obligated to interpret the contract as written, and the court cannot look beyond the terms to see what the intentions of the parties might have been in making the agreement.” Renfro v. Meacham, 50 N.C. App. 491, 496, 274 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1981) (citing Root v. Allstate Insurance Co., 272 N.C. 580, 158 S.E.2d 829 (1968)).
The majority’s opinion correctly states, “a right to indemnity may rest on the express contractual provisions between two parties.” Here, the contract between plaintiff and defendant clearly and unambiguously does not contain an express contractual provision requiring defendant to indemnify plaintiff. No provision contained in the contract between the parties requires defendant to indemnify or hold plaintiff harmless for its negligence.
The trial court properly interpreted the contract and correctly determined it did not “unequivocally” provide for defendant to indemnify plaintiff. Candid Camera Video, 76 N.C. App. at 636, 334 S.E.2d at 96. The trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s indemnification claim. That portion of the trial court’s order should also be affirmed.
IV. Conclusion
The majority’s opinion correctly affirms the trial court’s order of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for negligence and professional malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of warranty, and reverses summary judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim.
Plaintiff’s failure to preserve or argue its lack of an expert witness as a ground to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment *275supports dismissal of plaintiffs indemnity claim. Plaintiffs assignment of error should be dismissed.
Alternatively, because the majority’s opinion addresses the merits of plaintiffs assignment of error, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff cannot establish negligence liability as a matter of, law without an expert witness. Handex of the Carolinas, Inc., 168 N.C. App. at 10-11, 607 S.E.2d at 31.
Summary judgment on plaintiff’s indemnity claim should also be affirmed because the contract plaintiff drafted and relies on does not “unequivocally” provide for indemnification by defendant. See Candid Camera Video, 76 N.C. App. at 636, 334 S.E.2d at 96 (“Indemnity against negligence must be made unequivocally clear in the contract.”). The contract between plaintiff and defendant does not contain an indemnity provision. Courts should not incorporate, imply, or write into the parties’ contract a provision the parties themselves failed to include.
I vote to affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff’s indemnification claim. I respectfully dissent.