dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion which affirms the trial court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add two individual defendants, Lauten and Clark.
Before expounding upon the reasons for my disagreement with the majority, I believe it is important to review the procedural history of this case, paying particular attention to the proximity of relevant dates. Lauten and Clark reported plaintiff’s alleged improper conduct on 20 November 2000. Plaintiff commenced his action against the Board, Sechrist, and Johnson Controls on 6 June 2001. On 21 September 2001, plaintiff received interrogatories from those defendants that identified Lauten and Clark as his accusers. Not having known the identity of his accusers prior to receiving the interrogatories, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add these individuals as defendants on 19 November 2001. The trial court filed an order on *69228 December 2001 that (1) scheduled any pending motions for hearing on 21 January 2002, (2) required discovery to be completed by 22 March 2002, and (3) set the trial date for 15 April 2002, with an alternate trial date of 8 July 2002. All pending motions were actually heard on 22 January 2002, and the trial court denied plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint to add Lauten and Clark as defendants entered on 7 February 2002.
As recognized by the majority, “ ‘[a] motion to amend is addressed to the [sound] discretion of the trial court. Its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.’ ” Isenhour v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 345 N.C. 151, 154, 478 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1996) (quoting Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 82, 310 S.E.2d 326, 331 (1984)). “However, amendments should be freely allowed unless some material prejudice to the other party is demonstrated. The burden is upon the opposing party to establish that that party would be prejudiced by the amendment.” Mauney v. Morris, 316 N.C. 67, 72, 340 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1986) (citations omitted).
Here, defendants have failed to establish how allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint to add Lauten and Clark as defendants would have prejudiced them in any way. During the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, defendants argued the motion should be denied solely on the basis that discovery was essentially completed and it would be “a tremendous amount of waste of time and money[]” to engage in additional discovery or redo discovery. However, this Court has held that “[t]he fact that additional discovery may be required . . . does not amount to prejudice or make the delay ‘undue.’ ” Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 723, 381 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1989). This holding is especially relevant in the instant case considering the parties had until 22 March 2002 to complete discovery, and the only discovery that had been officially completed at the time of the hearing was the deposition of plaintiff. Three additional depositions (two of which were Lauten and Clark) were scheduled for 22 January 2002, the day plaintiff’s motion to amend was heard, and a few interrogatory responses from the Board were still outstanding.
Moreover, plaintiff’s motion to amend was filed within the applicable statute of limitations period for each claim raised in the action; therefore, plaintiff could have filed a new complaint initiating a separate action against these defendants instead of filing a motion to amend. By granting the motion to amend, the court would have “promoted judicial economy by avoiding the necessity for separate trials or for plaintiff to file first a separate complaint and then a motion to *693join the two actions.” Mauney, 316 N.C. at 72, 340 S.E.2d at 400. Instead, by the court denying the motion, plaintiff lost his opportunity to bring a defamation action against Lauten and Clark because his motion to amend was filed one day before the statute of limitations on that claim expired. Defendants failed to show they were prejudiced by plaintiffs choice.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s decision denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint because defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing how they would be prejudiced by the addition of Lauten and Clark.