dissenting.
Because I conclude that the agency properly extended the time for entry of its final agency decision, I respectfully dissent.
This appeal requires us to determine the proper interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 150B-44, “Right to judicial intervention when decision unreasonably delayed” (2001). (emphasis added). The statute as it existed at the time of this action provided in relevant part that:
Unreasonable delay on the part of any agency ... in taking any required action shall be justification for ... a court order compelling action by the agency[.] ... An agency that is subject to Article 3 of this Chapter . . . has 90 days from the day it receives the official record in a contested case from the Office of Administrative Hearings to make a final decision in the case.
This time limit may be extended by the parties or, for good cause shown, by the agency for an additional period of up to 90 days. ... If an agency subject to Article 3 of this Chapter has not *72made a final decision within these time limits, the agency is considered to have adopted the administrative law judge’s decision as the agency’s final decision. . . .
(emphasis added).2 The specific issue before this Court is the significance of the phrase “for good cause shown” within the statute. Upon consideration of longstanding principles of statutory construction, I conclude that the phrase “good cause shown” articulates the standard that the agency employs to determine whether an extension of time is appropriate in a given case.
“A cardinal principle governing statutory interpretation is that courts should always give effect to the intent of the legislature. The will of the legislature ‘must be found from the language of the act, its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its adoption which throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied.’ ” State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 212, 470 S.E.2d 16, 22 (1996) (quoting Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967)) (citation omitted). To determine the legislative intent, “[w]e first look to the words chosen by the legislature and ‘if they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the statute, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings.’ ” Union Carbide Corp. v. Offerman, 351 N.C. 310, 315, 526 S.E.2d 167, 170 (2000) (quoting Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998)). However, “where a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990) (citing Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797 (1948)).
G.S. § 150B-44 is found within the N.C. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whose “primary purpose” is “to provide procedural protection for persons aggrieved by an agency decisionf.]” Holland Group v. N.C. Dep’t of Administration, 130 N.C. App. 721, 725, 504 S.E.2d 300, 304 (1998). I conclude that the title of G.S. § 150B-44 unambiguously articulates its general purpose: the protection of a litigant’s rights where a final agency decision is “unreasonably delayed.” However, within N.C.G.S. § 150B-44, the phrase “for good cause shown” is ambiguous, as it fails to indicate how, or to whom, the “good cause” should be shown. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the possible interpretations of the provision allowing an agency for good cause shown to extend by up to 60 days the period within which it must render its final agency decision.
*73I would reject an interpretation that the agency must appear before a superior court judge and submit evidence of “good cause” in order to obtain an extension of time. First, the statute does not state such a requirement. Where our legislature intends for the trial court to determine whether good cause has been shown, the statute invariably states so very plainly. For example, N.C.G.S. § 150B-45 (2001), the statute immediately following G.S. § 150B-44, states that “[f]or good cause shown, however, the superior court may accept an untimely petition.” (emphasis added). “It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that where a statute is intelligible without any additional words, no additional words may be supplied . . . and the courts . . . are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.” State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 151-52, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974) (citation omitted).
Moreover, in all probability, the factors evaluated by an agency head in determining whether to take an extension of time generally involve in-house allocation of agency resources and personnel, setting of internal agency priorities, and assessment of the best response to unexpected employee absences. Thus, as a practical matter, the determination of whether there is “good cause” for an extension would not lend itself to judicial review. Nor would such a review serve the statutory purpose of preventing “unreasonable delay.” Judicial review, with its attendant right to appeal, would likely lead to delay of the final agency decision. I would conclude that this Court is without authority to superimpose upon G.S. § 150B-44 the requirement that an agency must show its good cause to a judge before it may obtain an extension of time, and would further conclude that such a requirement would not further the purpose of the statute.
I would also reject the possibility that an agency must show to the petitioner, or must recite in the document taking an extension, the circumstances that the agency has determined constitute “good cause” for an extension. Again, the statute does not state such a requirement, and we are without authority to superimpose it upon the statutory language. Nor would such a requirement appear to serve much purpose, inasmuch as the petitioner lacks a forum to obtain review of the factual circumstances surrounding the agency’s need for an extension.
I believe the statutory language is intended to draw a distinction between an extension sought by the plaintiff (which requires “agreement of the parties”), and an extension sought by the agency (to which it is entitled, without the plaintiffs agreement, provided the *74agency believes that good cause necessitates the extension). I would conclude, therefore, that the phrase “for good cause shown” refers to the standard the agency is to apply in determining whether to take an extension.
Because the agency’s discretion is quite restricted, this interpretation does not undermine the statutory purpose of protecting litigants from unreasonable delay. The agency may obtain only one extension of time. Holland Group v. N.C. Dep’t. of Administration, 130 N.C. App. 721, 728, 504 S.E.2d 300, 305 (1998) (“[p]ointedly, the statute does not allow for additional periods, thus limiting the agency to a single extension”) (emphasis in original). Further, G.S. § 150B-44 is “self executing”: that is, a decision by the ALJ automatically becomes the final agency decision if the agency fails to file its final decision within the statutory period. Occaneechi Band of the Saponi Nation v. N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs, 145 N.C. App. 649, 651, 551 S.E.2d 535, 537 (2001) (“the pertinent portion of G.S. § 150B-44 is self-executing ... when Respondent failed to issue a final decision on or before [the deadline], the Recommended Decision of the AU became the Final Agency Decision.”).
The substitution of a recommended decision of an ALJ for a state agency’s final decision is a severe sanction. It is analogous to entry of a default judgment, which is not favored in North Carolina. See Peebles v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 497, 504, 269 S.E.2d 694, 698 (1980), modified and aff’d, 302 N.C. 351, 275 S.E.2d 833 (1981) (“the law generally disfavors default judgments”). Therefore, imposition of this extreme penalty upon a state agency properly should be reserved for situations in which the agency has unreasonably delayed issuance of a decision. Accordingly, I find it significant that, in several recent cases affirming the judicial imposition of the ALJ opinion as the final agency decision, the evidence showed that the agency had unreasonably delayed its final opinion. See, e.g., County of Wake v. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 155 N.C. App. 225, 232, 573 S.E.2d 572, 579 (2002) (agency in violation of G.S. § 150B-44 “by taking multiple extensions of time in which to render its final agency decision” over a period of almost a year); Occaneechi, 145 N.C. App. 649, 551 S.E.2d 535 (agency failed to render final decision within extension period); Holland Group v. N.C. Dep’t of Administration, 130 N.C. App. 721, 728, 504 S.E.2d 300, 305 (1998). In Holland, the agency attempted to take several extensions, ultimately “extending” the deadline retroactively at the time it issued its decision. This Court held:
*75We cannot countenance the [agency’s] attempt at retroactive extension of either the statutory or its self-imposed time limitations. First, such action appears contrary to the [purpose] of G.S. § 150B-44, i.e., protection from unreasonable delays. In addition, in view of the previous advance written notice of extension of the deadline for good cause, it would be neither unfair [nor] unjust, to hold the [agency] to similar notification of any subsequent extension for good cause.
(citation omitted). Thus, in prior appellate decisions upholding substitution of the ALJ recommendation for the final agency decision, the agency had, as a factual matter, been unreasonably dilatory in issuance of a decision.
However, in the instant case, there is no evidence that the agency improperly delayed issuance of its decision. Within the initial 90 day period, the agency notified the petitioner that it was extending the time for up to 90 days. The agency took only one extension, and issued its decision well within the extension period. The record contains no evidence that the agency was guilty of “unreasonable delay” in issuing a final agency decision. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the better practice might have been to inform the petitioner of the factual basis for the extension, I conclude that on these facts it would be unfair and contrary to the statute to impose upon the agency the extreme sanction of adoption of the recommendation of the ALJ. I would hold that the agency was entitled to take an extension, and that its letter to petitioner sufficiently informed petitioner that it was doing so. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court and reinstate the decision of the HHR.
. Effective 1 January 2001, both the initial time period and the allowable extension period were shortened to 60 days.