dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s adoption of the interpretation of OCGA § 20-2-188 (d) advanced by the Superintendent of Education (Superintendent). In my opinion, the trial court correctly upheld the construction of the statute urged by the DeKalb County School District (School District) and, based on that construction, properly awarded the transportation costs attributable to prior years.
Subsection (d) of OCGA § 20-2-188 provides, in relevant part, that
[s]tudents who live beyond one and one-half miles from the school to which they are assigned, according to the nearest practical route by school bus, shall be eligible to be counted as transported students for the purpose of calculating that portion of the expense of student transportation associated with transporting students from home to school and from school to home as authorized under subsection (a) of this Code section, provided such students are actually transported to such school by school bus or other vehicle made available for this purpose by the local unit of administration. (Emphasis supplied.)
The question presented for resolution is the meaning of the emphasized language. According to the Superintendent, “the school to which they are assigned” means that school which is designated to serve the neighborhood in which the students live. The School District, on the other hand, maintains that the statute refers to the school at which the students actually are enrolled. The distinction is significant. Under the Superintendent’s interpretation, all students are deemed to attend their neighborhood schools for purposes of determining eligibility for calculation of transportation costs. Pursuant to the School District’s construction, each individual student’s eli*797gibility is based upon his or her proximity to the school of actual attendance.
In matters of statutory construction, the intent of the General Assembly is controlling, and the courts must “ ‘look first to the words of the statute to determine what that intent was and if those words be plain and unambiguous and the intent may be clearly gathered therefrom, we need look no further in determining what that intent was.’ [Cit.]” Early v. Early, 269 Ga. 415, 416 (499 SE2d 329) (1998). “In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. . . .” OCGA § 1-3-1 (b). OCGA § 20-2-188 (d) specifies a calculation of transportation costs based upon travel to and from home and the schools to which the students are “assigned.” “Assign” means “[t]o appoint, allot, or designate for a particular purpose, or duty. To point at, or point out; to set forth, or specify; to mark out or designate; to particularize . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Thus, the word connotes a sense of definiteness and affiliation. In my opinion, students are not “assigned” to a particular school simply because it may have been designated to serve the neighborhood. The mere designation of an attendance zone for a school in a particular locality is not the equivalent of assigning all students in that area to that school. For any number of reasons, a student can be sent to a school other than that serving his or her immediate neighborhood. Because the language of the provision focuses on travel to and from the schools to which the students are themselves “assigned,” rather than on their proximity to a designated local facility, I believe that it clearly and unambiguously expresses the legislative intent that eligibility is to be based upon the transportation of students between home and the school in which they are actually enrolled.
Since the enactment is unambiguous, the Superintendent’s contrary interpretation of the statute is not persuasive. “As long as the language is clear and does not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, ‘it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.’ [Cit.]” Ray v. Barber, 273 Ga. 856 (1) (548 SE2d 283) (2001). The courts are required “to give unambiguous statutes the interpretation which their language clearly implies, irrespective of contrary administrative interpretations . . . .” Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216, 225 (39 SE2d 225) (1946). The General Assembly’s failure to nullify the Superintendent’s construction of the enactment is immaterial. Only the judiciary has the constitutional authority to interpret statutes, and we do not delegate that responsibility to either the legislative or executive branch. Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 353 (1) (519 SE2d 210) (1999); Elder v. Home Building & Loan Assn., 188 Ga. 113, 115 (2) (3 SE2d 75) (1939). Thus,
*798“[l]ong-contimied practice and the approval of administrative authorities may be persuasive in the interpretation of doubtful provisions of a statute, but can not alter provisions that are clear and explicit when related to the facts disclosed.”
Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. State Revenue Commission, 179 Ga. 371, 376 (176 SE 1) (1934). Compare Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 89 (495 SE2d 13) (1998) (holding that a court’s interpretation becomes an “integral part of the statute” which the General Assembly may then accept or amend).
Eligibility based upon the school of actual attendance, rather than that located in the student’s neighborhood, is an objective standard which applies uniformly in all school districts in this state, rural or urban and wealthy or poor alike. Moreover, basing eligibility on the proximity to neighborhood schools which students do not attend would result in a distorted reflection of the actual cost of transporting them. OCGA § 20-2-188 (a) provides that “the amount of funds to be actually distributed to any local unit of administration under this Code section during any school year shall not exceed the actual costs incurred by the local unit in transporting students to and from public schools. . . .” If the provision contemplates that a local school district may receive funds up to its “actual costs” of transporting students, then basing the determination of student eligibility on a criterion which is completely unconnected with those costs would be inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Therefore, the Superintendent’s construction not only conflicts with the unambiguous language of the statute, it also violates the principle that “[t]he courts will not ascribe to the General Assembly an intention to adopt a statute containing inconsistent or contradictory provisions. [Cit.]” Vollrath v. Collins, 272 Ga. 601, 604 (2) (533 SE2d 57) (2000). Accordingly, I believe that the trial court correctly rejected that interpretation.
With regard to the award of transportation costs for previous years, mandamus relief may be sought only “to compel a due performance, if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights.” OCGA § 9-6-20. It “applies prospectively only. It will not lie to compel the undoing of acts already done and this is so even though the action taken was clearly illegal. [Cit.]” Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 660 (6) (469 SE2d 22) (1996). Here, the trial court did not exceed the permissible scope of mandamus by awarding damages or by ordering the Superintendent to reverse any previous administrative act or decision. It only compelled the payment of such accumulated additional sums as the School District was entitled to receive under the provisions of OCGA § 20-2-188 (d). See Griffies v. *799Coweta County, 272 Ga. 506 (530 SE2d 718) (2000). Compare Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, supra at 660 (6) (trial court erroneously ordered the repayment of previously disbursed tax funds). Because the Superintendent had no discretion in the performance of the duty to pay that greater amount of transportation costs under the unambiguous provisions of the statute, the trial court was authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to compel payment to the School District. Lomax v. McBrayer, 248 Ga. 753, 755-756 (1), (2) (286 SE2d 35) (1982).
The majority does not attempt to distinguish or overrule Lomax v. McBrayer, supra, which is controlling precedent for holding that mandamus is an available remedy for compelling the Superintendent to pay the additional sums. Thus, the trial court’s order was proper in all respects and should be affirmed in its entirety.
In addition to the claim under OCGA § 20-2-188 (d), the School District asserted an alternative theory of recovery based upon administrative regulations adopted in 1996. The trial court held that the School District was also entitled to recover transportation costs pursuant to those regulations, but it concluded that that alternative claim was rendered moot by its holding that the costs were recoverable under the statute. Reversal of the trial court’s ruling on the statutory claim now removes any question of mootness as to the School District’s regulatory claim. However, the majority does not expressly address the viability of the alternative theory of recovery. Presumably, the majority perceives that its holding that retrospective monetary relief is not available in a mandamus action would also bar a recovery for past transportation costs under the regulations. As previously noted, however, I strongly believe that mandamus is available when, as here, the petitioner seeks to recover such additional accumulated sums to which it is entitled. Lomax v. McBrayer, supra. Moreover, even if the School District cannot recover for past transportation costs, it certainly would not be precluded from seeking prospective mandamus relief. Compare Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, supra at 660 (6). I do not believe that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the regulations are a viable alternative basis for awarding transportation costs. Therefore, even accepting as correct the majority’s statutory analysis, the appropriate resolution of this case would be to reverse as to the statutory claim and remand with direction that the trial court award the School District prospective relief on the regulatory claim.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.
*800Decided June 9, 2003 Reconsideration denied July 11,2003. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Alfred A. Lindseth, Rocco E. Testani, Melanie W. Crowe, Weekes & Candler, Gary H. Sams, for appellees.