(dissenting). The issue presented for this Court’s decision is whether § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act (dramshop provision) applies to the operation of Alcamo’s Holiday House and Alcamo’s Halls Incorporated.
*169The majority disagrees with the Court of Appeals liberal construction of the dramshop provision and, more specifically, those "persons” held subject to liability under that provision.
I concur for three reasons with the analysis of the majority that the concluding paragraph of §22(2) restricts the application of the dramshop provision to those "persons” who are retailers of beer, wine or spirits for consumption on the premises and to Specially Designated Merchants.
First, this conclusion is dictated by a literal construction of the term "person”, as found in a prior paragraph in the same section, to define those subject to liability.
Second, such a construction is fortified by the fact the dramshop provision, when reenacted, was not republished as a separate and distinct provision of the Liquor Control Act. The dramshop provision thus became interwoven with the bonding provisions vis-á-vis those "persons” included:
"and the principal and sureties of any bond given under this law shall be liable, severally and jointly, with the person or persons selling, giving * * * intoxicating * * * liquors as aforesaid”. (Emphasis added.)
This provision pinpoints potential liability to those specific persons selling or furnishing intoxicating beverages, together with their principals and sureties.
Finally, if this Court were to adopt the Court of Appeals construction of the term "persons”, it is reasonable to assume that attempts would be made to extend liability to persons other than retailers. Conceivably, private parties would be held subject to liability for selling, giving, or furnishing alcohol to minors or to visibly intoxicated persons. While I agree that remedial legislation *170requires liberal interpretation, this extension of potential liability would go far beyond the legislative intent of the existing dramshop provision.
However, I dissent from the conclusion of my colleagues that Alcamo’s was not a retailer. The operation conducted by Alcamo’s clearly constituted a retailing of beer for consumption on the premises as a matter of law.
According to the Liquor Control Act a "retailer” is defined as follows:
" 'Retailer’ means any person who customarily sells to the consumer, under such rules as the commission may establish.” MCLA 436.2m; MSA 18.972(13).
Alcamo’s, in its answer to the amended complaint, claimed that it was a "catering hall engaged in the catering business and not engaged in selling alcoholic beverages”. The depositions reveal three critical facts:
(1) Alcamo’s furnished the beer that was consumed on the night in question;
(2) Alcamo’s charged the lessees of the hall for the beer and handling expenses; and,
(3) Alcamo’s furnished the person (bartender) who dispensed the beer at the hall.
Under the majority’s own artful and narrow construction of the dramshop provision, it is clear that Alcamo’s was a retailer. As one aspect of its catering business, Alcamo’s directly dispensed to consumers an alcoholic beverage through its bartender for commercial remuneration and thus its operation took on all the attributes of a retailing establishment. It makes no difference that all the remuneration may not be directly related to the volume of intoxicants consumed. The statutory duty remains.
Alcamo’s was not a properly licensed or bonded *171vendor-retailer of alcoholic beverages. However, it would be patently unjust to permit so-called "catering” establishments which directly dispense alcohol to escape potential dramshop liability because they fail to procure proper licenses and bonding. This Court would then be encouraging de facto retailing establishments to eschew proper licensing and bonding in order to avoid incurring dramshop liability.
The majority apparently agrees with this policy proposition:
"It is implicit of course that 'persons* maintaining operations tantamount to those embraced within the foregoing class but who have failed to obtain or maintain the required licensing are equally chargeable under the 'dramshop’ provision of the act.”
Thus, I would hold a catering hall subject to liability which (1) permits the consumption of intoxicating beverages on its premises, (2) supplies any of those intoxicating beverages for a specific fee or as an accommodation for other rental considerations, and (3) provides a person to dispense such beverages. When combined, such activities are tantamount to those of a retailer and are subject to the dramshop provision of the Liquor Control Act.
Accordingly, while I concur in the majority’s analysis, I dissent from my colleagues’ conclusion. I would affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated herein, I would reverse the summary judgment granted the defendants and remand the cause for trial on the facts.
Williams, J., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr., J.