concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s opinion and affirmance in Case No. A01A0757, but I respectfully dissent as to the opinion and affirmance in Case No. A01A0461, in which I would reverse the judgment. I would hold that the language of the restrictive covenant is not ambiguous, and that under its plain meaning the covenant against amusement centers protects more than Chicagoland’s business interests as an arcade center and thus is unenforceably overbroad.
Parkside and King argue that the court erred in instructing and allowing the jury to construe the restrictive covenant and in failing to declare the covenant unenforceable as a matter of law. I agree that the court should have construed the covenant, and I would hold that this error was harmful in that a proper construction of the contract would have resulted in the conclusion that the covenant was unenforceable.
*616“The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court.”2 Contract construction follows three steps: “The trial court must first decide whether the contract language is ambiguous; if it is ambiguous, the trial court must then apply the applicable rules of construction; if after doing so the trial court determines that an ambiguity still remains, the jury must then resolve the ambiguity.”3 Thus, the jury does not become involved in the process, even if the contract is difficult to construe, until there appears an ambiguity in the contract which cannot be resolved by the court’s application of the rules of construction set forth in part in OCGA § 13-2-2.4
I would hold that the contract provision here was not ambiguous but was plain on its face. Thus, the rules of construction need not be applied, and the matter should not have gone to the jury. The lease’s restrictive covenant prohibits Parkside from entering a lease with someone who would use the space as an amusement center or other usage substantially similar to Chicagoland’s use. “Amusement center” is a broad term that would include movie theaters, bowling alleys, billiards rooms, or other forms of amusement or entertainment. Nothing modifies “amusement center” so as to restrict its meaning to arcade or videogame centers.
The query would then become whether such a restriction is enforceable under Georgia law. The validity of covenants restricting the activities of lessors in commercial leases
is subject to the overriding requirements that, as to territoriality and/or duration, they be reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the covenantee, that they not impose greater restrictions upon the covenantor than are necessary for the covenantee’s protection, and that they not unduly prejudice the interests of the public.5
Chicagoland did not narrowly define “amusement center” to restrict competition for its protection. Since the term includes activities not in competition with Chicagoland, it is overbroad and unreasonable as to the scope of the activity prohibited, i.e., it imposes greater restrictions upon Parkside than necessary to protect Chicago-land’s interests. Thus, I would hold that the court erred in not striking the provision as unenforceable and in not entering judgment in *617favor of Parkside and King on the breach of contract claim and on the derivative claim for attorney fees.
Decided July 16, 2001 Browning & Tanksley, Thomas J. Browning, for appellants. Wimberly & Lawson, Paul Oliver, Rhonda L. Klein, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge and Judge Phipps join in this dissent.
OCGA § 13-2-1.
(Footnote omitted.) Garrett v. Women’s Health Care &c., 243 Ga. App. 53, 56-57 (3) (532 SE2d 164) (2000); accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blakey, 180 Ga. App. 520 (349 SE2d 474) (1986).
Kusuma v. Metametrix, 191 Ga. App. 255, 256 (2) (381 SE2d 322) (1989).
(Citations omitted.) Webster v. Star Distrib. Co., 241 Ga. 270, 272 (a) (244 SE2d 826) (1978).