dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is a case of statutory construction. I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute.” State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446, 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361, 259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979); State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974).
In other statutes within chapter 14, article 7A, the legislature included consent language: (1) section 14-27.2, the first-degree rape statute, refers to vaginal intercourse with a child under the age of thirteen years or with another person by force and against the will of that person, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2 (1999); (2) section 14-27.3, the *619second-degree rape statute, refers to vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of that person or with someone who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3 (1999); (3) section 14-27.4, the first-degree sexual offense statute, refers to engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of thirteen years or with another person by force and against the will of that person, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.4 (1999); (4) section 14-27.5, the second-degree sexual offense statute, refers to engaging in a sexual act with a person by force and against the will of that person or with someone who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5 (1999); and (5) section 14-27.7, titled “Intercourse and sexual offenses with certain victims; consent no defense,” explicitly states “[c]onsent is not a defense to a charge under this section,” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7 (1999).
In contrast, the statute at issue, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7A, refers to vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a person who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old. N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7A (1999). In the other statutes in this article, the legislature included the phrase “by force and against the will of the other person” or “[cjonsent is not a defense” to specify its intention. Therefore, it is clear the legislature knew how to indicate consent was not a defense if that was its intention.
N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7A is neither unclear nor ambiguous as to whether consent is a defense. It is silent. We have previously stated that this Court, “even if persuaded by the State’s concerns, may not substitute its judgment for that of the General Assembly.” State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 37, 497 S.E.2d 276, 280 (1998). While the majority focuses on the specific inclusion of a marriage defense and the “spirit” of the Act to protect children, I cannot overlook the legislature’s clear distinction between the use of the phrase “by force and against the will of the other person” or the inclusion of the specific language that “[c]onsent is not a defense” in the other statutes of the same article. Without a clear mandate that consent is not a defense, the majority is substituting its judgment for the legislature’s and creating a limitation which is not in the statute.
Justice Orr joins in the dissenting opinion.