I concur in part, and respectfully dissent in part. While I agree with the majority’s analysis of the search issue, I disagree -with the analysis of the voluntary nature of Rollison’s plea. Accordingly, I would affirm the PCR court’s ruling.
Rollison argues he was not informed by his counsel or the guilty plea judge that he was pleading guilty to a second offense which carried an enhanced sentence. Therefore, he claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary. I agree.
Entering a guilty plea results in a waiver of several constitutional rights, therefore, the Due Process Clause requires that guilty pleas are entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently by defendants. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In order for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must be aware of the nature and crucial elements of the offense, the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalty, and the nature of *513the constitutional rights being waived. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 405 S.E.2d 391 (1991); State v. Hazel, 275 S.C. 392, 271 S.E.2d 602 (1980). When determining issues relating to guilty pleas, the court can consider the entire record, including the transcript of the guilty plea, and the evidence presented at the PCR hearing. Harres v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 318 S.E.2d 360 (1984). Any defects in the information conveyed by defense counsel can be cured by information provided at the guilty plea proceeding.Moorehead v. State, 329 S.C. 329, 496 S.E.2d 415 (1998). The knowing and voluntary nature of the plea “may be accomplished by colloquy between the Court and the defendant, between the Court and defendant’s counsel, or both.” State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437, 427 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1993).
Based on the entire record, I would hold Rollison did not enter a voluntary plea. There is little evidence as to what defense counsel communicated with Rollison. Rollison’s testimony at the PCR hearing indicates he was not informed by his counsel before his plea that he was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute which would be enhanced to a second offense if he pled guilty to the simple possession charge. Furthermore, any defect in the information given to Rollison by his counsel was not cured by the information he received at the plea hearing because the guilty plea judge was not fully informed Rollison was pleading to a second offense.5
There are two clear indications, evidenced in the record, that the plea judge was not clearly informed Rollison’s charge of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute was enhanced to a second offense based on a first offense of simple possession which Rollison was pleading to at the same time. First, the following colloquy occurred during the plea:
*514The Court: There are three indictments, sir. 96-4898 does allege, sir, that you did on or about June 23,1995, possess a quantity of crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of the laws of South Carolina. Do you understand that charge?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you plead guilty or not guilty to that charge?
The Defendant: Guilty, sir.
Therefore, when asking for Rollison’s plea of guilty or not guilty, the court made no mention that he was pleading to a second offense.
Secondly, the sequence of the plea indicates the plea judge was not aware Rollison was pleading to a second offense which was based upon a first offense which was pled to at the same time. Rollison pled guilty to the second offense before he pled guilty to the first offense. Furthermore, the plea judge sentenced him for the second offense, before the first offense. Therefore, there was no conviction for a first offense upon which to base an enhanced sentence for the second offense.
The definition of a second offense is contained in S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-470 (Supp.2000). It provides, “[a]n offense is considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to his conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted under this article.” Id. (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the statute requires a prior conviction before an enhanced sentence can be imposed.
As this Court stated in DeWitt v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 274 S.C. 184, 262 S.E.2d 28 (1980),
When the State is prosecuting a person for an offense that carries an enhanced penalty on a conviction of a second or subsequent offense, the State is not required to prove the legality of the prior conviction, nor does it have to show the facts surrounding that conviction. It is only necessary for the State to prove that a previous conviction exists, that the conviction was for an offense which occurred prior to the commission of the offense for which the defendant is being tried, and the defendant was the subject of that prior-conviction.
*515Id. at 187, 262 S.E.2d at 29-30 (emphasis added). The first offense (for which a defendant was convicted) must have occurred prior to the commission of the second offense. In Rollison’s case, this is true. However, the transcript of the guilty plea shows Rollison first pled guilty to and was convicted and sentenced under the June 1995 offense, not the January 1995 offense. Therefore, Rollison pled guilty and was convicted of a second offense before he pled guilty and was convicted of a first offense.
A defendant can enter a valid plea to a first and second offense at the same plea hearing. However, the court and/or counsel must clearly explain to a defendant the consequences of such a plea. Here, Rollison was not informed his plea to a second offense would result in an increase in his jail sentence by ten years. Furthermore, he was not told he could go to trial on the simple possession charge first before he pled guilty to the possession with intent to distribute second, and that this strategy could have helped him avoid the enhancement of his possession with intent to distribute charge.
There is ample probative evidence in the record to support the PCR court’s findings. See Anderson v. State, 342 S.C. 54, 535 S.E.2d 649 (2000) (PCR court’s findings should be upheld if supported by any probative evidence in the record).
Accordingly, I would AFFIRM the lower court’s order granting PCR.
. I disagree with the majority’s contention in footnote 1 that the plea judge’s misunderstanding concerning the fact that Rollison had no previous drug convictions does not, standing alone, entitle Rollison to relief. The plea judge’s knowledge is very much at issue. If the judge is misinformed, it is up to the defendant’s counsel to correct his information. If counsel fails to correct the judge’s perception, his representation has fallen below the objective standard of reasonableness.