concurring specially.
There are times when we must exalt form over substance and this may be one of those times. Although the trial court did not, as the majority observes, “address the issue of ‘significant change of circumstances,’ ” the failure to do so may very well have been a result of the record before it in which the significant changes were so self-evident as to obviate the necessity to set them forth. The majority opinion does not discuss all those facts and it does not serve my purpose to do so here. It is sufficient for me to note that if that were the only issue the record is such that I would be sorely tempted to affirm the trial court’s order, notwithstanding the need in almost every instance for the trial court to make findings concerning that significant change in circumstances as that is the touchstone to a change in custody. E.g., Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666 (N.D.1981).
But the record is, to me, the problem. I recognize Lila’s trial counsel failed to object to the limitations placed on the scope of the evidence and the time for the hearing. However, in an instance such as this wherein the custody is to be changed from the parent who has been the custodial parent since 1982, I believe that parent should have an adequate opportunity to offer any evidence the parent may have to justify the continuation of that relationship. That was not done here and, notwithstanding Local Rule No. 2 of the East Central Judicial District, and the lack of any objection to the procedure by Lila’s counsel, I concur in the result set forth in the majority opinion, i.e., that we remand for a new hearing on the merits.