Lawrence v. Lawrence

WlLLLAMS, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

I fully concur with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hunstein, and write separately to express my view that trial courts benefit most from appellate opinions which establish ascertainable standards and, if appropriate, impose an obligation to make specific findings on relevant issues. This is especially important when, as here, the abuse of discretion standard is applied on appeal.

As noted in Sumpter v. Kosinski, 419 NW2d 463, 471 (Mich. App. 1988), “[i]t should be observed that, when affairs of the heart are involved, legal guidance no matter how appropriate is often not heeded.” I believe this Court should hold that in considering the validity of antenuptial agreements, trial courts should disregard boilerplate language to the effect that the parties have made a full disclosure of their respective financial conditions, and that a party’s failure to retain an attorney or accountant to review a proffered agreement should be given no weight in determining whether an adequate disclosure was made. The majority opinion repeats the admonition of Bilge v. Bilge, 283 Ga. 65 (656 SE2d 822) (2008) that the best means of establishing that the mandated disclosure of financial condition was made is to attach a statement of assets and income to the agreement. Bilge, 283 Ga. at 69, n. 12. I would go further, and hold that if such documentation is not incorporated into an antenuptial agreement, the trial court is obligated to make *317findings on when the financial disclosure was made, the manner in which it was made (which could encompass a series of disclosures rather than a single, formal disclosure made in connection with the antenuptial agreement), and its accuracy in light of the evidence presented at the agreement enforcement hearing. Assumptions and presumptions based upon the parties’ dealings with each other prior to the marriage are an insufficient basis for reaching a conclusion on that critical issue, because persons involved in intimate relationships may deliberately behave in a manner calculated to overstate or understate their financial circumstances.

Decided November 9, 2009 Reconsideration denied December 15, 2009. Martin L. Fierman, for appellant. Stone & Driggers, Kice H. Stone, for appellee.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, which upheld the parties’ antenuptial agreement without rendering objective findings on what financial disclosure was made and whether it comported with the parties’ true financial condition at the time the agreement was made.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.