concurring in the result only.
I do not agree that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a1) (2007) applies in the circumstances of this case. Defendant is arguing that he should have been sentenced only for robbery with a dangerous weapon and not also for habitual misdemeanor assault. If he were to prevail on this argument, the judgment for habitual misdemeanor assault would be arrested, and he would not be subjected to the suspended consecutive seven to nine month sentence. This argument does not seem to me to fall within the intended scope of § 15A-1444(a1).
In any event, I believe that defendant’s argument is precluded by State v. Richardson, 279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E.2d 102 (1971), and State v. Hines, 166 N.C. App. 202, 600 S.E.2d 891 (2004). In Richardson, our Supreme Court held that “when separate indictments for armed robbery and felonious assault based on separate features of one continuous course of conduct are tried together, and verdicts of guilty as charged are returned, these verdicts provide support for separate judgments.” 279 N.C. at 633, 185 S.E.2d at 111. Here, defendant’s conviction of armed robbery is supported by the evidence that he took the victim’s purse by confronting her with a knife. Defendant also, in the course of the robbery, struck the victim in her stomach and in her side — separate features of the course of conduct that supported the conviction of assault on a female that was the basis for the habitual misdemeanor assault conviction.
Defendant, however, argues that Richardson did not involve a statute, such as the statute governing assault on a female, that provides for punishment for assault “[u]nless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) (2007). Hines, however, involved precisely such a statute, and this Court rejected the argument made by defendant in this case.
Relying upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(e) (2003), which allowed for punishment for assault on a handicapped person “[u]nless [defendant’s] conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishmentf,]” the defendant in Hines argued that *687she could not be sentenced for both robbery with a dangerous weapon and aggravated assault on a handicapped person. 166 N.C. App. at 208, 600 S.E.2d at 896. This Court rejected that argument, holding that “the statutory language cited by defendant bars punishment under both this provision and another provision of an assault statute.” Id. at 209, 600 S.E.2d at 897. Because the defendant had been convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon (not a violation of an assault statute), she could also be convicted of assault on a handicapped person. Id. I believe Hines is indistinguishable from this case.
Under both Richardson and Hines, defendant could properly be sentenced for both robbery with a dangerous weapon and habitual misdemeanor assault. Since there was no error, defendant cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel by defense counsel in failing to raise this issue.