concurring.
In State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524 (1) (322 SE2d 711) (1984), this Court ordered the Court of Appeals “ ‘to transfer to the Supreme Court all cases in which either a sentence of death or of life imprisonment has been imposed upon conviction of murder, and all pre-conviction appeals in murder cases . . . .’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Justice Nahmias views that order as an exercise of our constitutional certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, the language of Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (8), placing appellate *260jurisdiction in this Court over “[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed[,]” may be broad enough to include appeals in all murder cases.
Regardless of the precise basis for the order in Thornton, it has provided a practical, bright-line rule which continues to serve both Georgia appellate courts well. As the controlling precedent cited in the majority opinion makes clear, Thornton includes all collateral orders which are entered in the context of a pending murder prosecution. Exclusion of certain contempt orders on the ground that they do not sufficiently affect the underlying murder trial would destroy the benefits of Thornton’’s bright-line rule. Because there exists absolutely no basis under our precedent to transfer this appeal from a contempt order in the context of a pending murder prosecution, I fully concur in the majority opinion.