dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the applicable standard of review in this case. But before this Court may properly grant the writ of actual innocence that petitioner seeks, petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that based on all of the evidence in the record, “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii) (emphasis added); accord Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 335, 344, 641 S.E.2d 486, 491 (2007). It is this Court’s statutory duty to examine the entire record, including Brown’s credible confession to murder, to determine whether Turner has met his burden. See Code §§ 19.2-327.11 to 19.2-327.14. This analysis is not as simple as merely accepting the circuit court’s determination that Brown testified credibly that he acted alone when he physically committed the murder and that Turner played no role in the restraint of Evans as clear and convincing evidence that Turner did not abduct Evans with the intent to defile her or that he is not guilty of felony murder.10 Unlike, the majority, I do not find that Turner has met his statutory burden. Therefore, I would dismiss petitioner’s request for a writ of actual innocence, and I respectfully dissent.
I. ABDUCTION WITH INTENT TO DEFILE
At the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that “Brown is credible in his assertion that he acted independently *493in murdering the victim and that ... Turner played no role in the murder or in the restraining of the victim.” The relevant question is not whether Brown acted alone in killing Evans, but whether Turner abducted her with the intent to defile her. If he did, the fact that Brown may have acted alone in committing the murder does not absolve Turner of his guilt. I find that the facts and the law indicate that Turner is guilty of abduction with the intent to defile and therefore is also guilty of the felony murder.
Turner was convicted of abduction with intent to defile pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-48. Code § 18.2-47 provides in relevant part
[a]ny person who, by force, intimidation or deception and without legal justification or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes the person of another, with the intent to deprive such person of his personal liberty ... shall be guilty of abduction.
The majority opines that because the circuit court found that Brown was “credible in his assertion that he acted independently in murdering the victim and that ... Turner played no role in the murder or in the restraining of the victim,” the circuit court addressed the question as to whether Turner abducted Evans with the intent to defile in the negative. The majority further opines that because the circuit court so found, Turner is entitled to have his petition granted. I find that a clear reading of Code §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-48 indicates that the circuit court did not address the issue of whether Turner abducted Evans with the intent to defile. Because the circuit court did not address that issue, this Court must. Moreover, because Turner is unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no rational finder of fact could have found him guilty, his petition should be dismissed.
I agree with the majority that kidnapping, which our legislature has declared is synonymous with abduction, is not defined in the Virginia Code. The majority relies on State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1973) for its position that at common law, kidnapping required proof of both “an unlawful *494restraint” and “an asportation.” Dix recognized that kidnapping was defined generally as the unlawful taking and carrying away of a human being against his will by force, threats or fraud. Id. A related offense, false imprisonment was defined as the illegal restraint of a person against his will. Id. The court in Dix went on to recognize that their jurisprudence held that the unlawful detention of a human being against his will was false imprisonment, not kidnapping. Id. (citing State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E.2d 577, 582 (1971)). “The element of carrying away was the differentiating factor between the two offenses.” Id. at 899. Thus, the court recognized that there was some degree of tension in the definition of kidnapping, specifically with regard to the degree of asportation required to turn a false imprisonment into a kidnapping. The court reconciled the tension by holding that in addition to unlawful restraint, the taking, carrying away, transportation or asportation of the victim from the place where seized to some other place is an essential element of common law kidnapping. Id. at 904. I agree with the majority that at common law every kidnapping involved some degree of restraint.
However, in both Virginia and North Carolina, abduction has since been modified by statute. Our Supreme Court has recognized that Code § 18.2-47 supersedes the common law. Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526, 323 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1984).
To the extent that the majority would limit Code § 18.2-47 such that the only difference from the common law is that Code § 18.2-47 now allows a conviction for abduction upon proof of a detention without any asportation, stating that the statutory language provides no indication that the legislature has removed the “restraint” requirement, the majority construes the statute too narrowly. Indeed, our Supreme Court has specifically stated “we shall construe [Code § 18.2-47] according to its plain meaning and evident intent. Because [Code § 18.2-47] casts its several prohibited acts in the disjunctive, each is independently sufficient to support a conviction.” Scott, 228 Va. at 526, 323 S.E.2d at 576; see also John *495L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 7.1 (2009) (“This codal section supercedes [sic] the common law, but includes its several offenses [false imprisonment, kidnapping and abduction] by virtue of the disjunctive presentation of the parts of each of the elements”).
Our Supreme Court arrived at the holding in Scott in reliance on another North Carolina case: State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). In Fulcher, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether one could be convicted of kidnapping where there was no asportation. 243 S.E.2d at 351. In doing so, the court interpreted a statute very similar to Virginia’s. As our Supreme Court stated in Scott, the North Carolina statute provided, in pertinent part, “[A]ny person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain or remove from one place to another, any other person ... without the consent of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping....” 228 Va. at 525-26, 323 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-39(a)). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that their legislature rejected their previous decisions holding that there must be both detention and asportation of the victim, because the statute plainly stated confinement, restraint or removal. Fulcher, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
That court went on to define the terms used in its statute as follows:
[T]he term “confine” connotes some form of imprisonment within a given area, such as a room, a house or a vehicle. The term “restrain” while broad enough to include restriction upon freedom of movement by confinement, connotes also such a restriction by force, threat or fraud, without a confinement. Thus, one who is physically seized and held, or whose hands or feet are boimd, or who, by the threatened use of a deadly weapon, is restricted in his freedom of motion is restrained ....
Id. (emphasis added). Throughout the opinion, asportation was defined as the carrying away of the victim. See id. at 350.
The reasoning of the North Carolina Court in Fulcher, which was found persuasive by our Supreme Court in Scott, is *496equally applicable to the interpretation of our statute. Because our statute is plainly written in the disjunctive, it is clear that restraint is no longer a requirement of abduction as the legislature has declared one who seizes, takes, transports, detains,11 or secretes for any one of the prohibited purposes commits an abduction, as each action is independently sufficient to support a conviction.
Therefore, because restraint need not be an element of an abduction, the majority incorrectly concludes that because we presume that the circuit court knows and correctly applied the law, we can presume that the circuit court’s conclusion that Turner did not restrain Evans means that Turner did not abduct her with the intent to defile. However, the circuit court was not asked to determine whether Turner abducted Evans with intent to defile. Thus, the majority’s presumption is based on their assumption that the circuit court knew and correctly applied the law to a question that was not asked.
Our case law is clear that, under Code § 18.2-47, an abduction occurs where the perpetrator detains or moves his victim “by force, intimidation, or deception.” Scott, 228 Va. at 526, 323 S.E.2d at 576. In Jerman v. Dir. of the Dep’t. of Corr., 267 Va. 432, 439, 593 S.E.2d 255, 259 (2004), the Supreme Court of Virginia found that an abduction occurred where the evidence proved that one of the petitioner’s confederates convinced the victim to come with her under the ruse of selling illegal narcotics to her and petitioner when their true intent was to harm the victim. See also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 683, 688, 537 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2000) (holding that the appellant accomplished the abduction through the use of both deception and intimidation). Our Supreme Court made no *497mention of any “restraint” upon the victim in the first abduction in Jerman; rather, the fact that the victim was tricked into getting into the vehicle and traveling with the co-conspirator was enough to prove abduction. Thus, if based on all of the evidence before this Court, any rational fact finder could have concluded that Turner deceived Evans into leaving the club while at the same time intending to defile her, then a writ of actual innocence should not issue.
The majority refers to Kent v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 840, 841^12, 183 S.E. 177, 177-78 (1936), and Jerman as cases where the appellants told “specific lies” to accomplish the abductions. Supra § II.B. However, Code §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-48 do not require that the deception be verbalized and, certainly, it is well settled that one’s intention, such as the intent to deceive, may and often must be proven through the use of circumstantial evidence. Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 194, 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (reiterating that “[ajbsent a direct admission by the defendant, intent ... must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence”). To prove that Turner abducted Evans with the intent to defile, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he had the specific intent to sexually molest her. Simms v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 614, 617, 346 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1986). “Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind which may, and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979). Petitioner’s acts, conduct, and statements may be considered to discern his state of mind. Id.; accord Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). “The [trier of fact] may consider the conduct of the person involved and all the circumstances revealed by the evidence.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 510, 519, 446 S.E.2d 451, 457 (1994) (quoting Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987)).
When weighing the evidence, the fact finder is not required to accept entirely either party’s account of the facts. The fact finder may reject that which it finds implausible, yet accept other parts which it finds to be believable.
*498Barnes v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 619, 630, 535 S.E.2d 706, 711-12 (2000) (citing Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 107, 341 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986)).
Because it is Turner’s intent that is relevant, Brown’s credible confession to killing Evans cannot be found to be dispositive of what Turner was thinking when he left the club with Evans. Indeed, Brown’s confession only establishes what occurred after he got into the car with Turner and Evans.12 Thus, it does not change the evidence of Turner’s intent to defile that was before the jury in Turner’s trial. That jury was instructed that abduction with the intent to defile could be accomplished by, inter alia, deception and could have found that Turner deceived Evans into leaving the bar, his nefarious intent unbeknownst to her.13 Thus, it cannot be said that no *499rational trier of fact could have found Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the jury did.
Moreover, a review of the entire record before this Court reveals that it is replete with evidence from which a rational finder of fact could reach a conclusion that Turner deceived Evans into leaving the club with him for stated innocent purposes while his true intent was to defile her. Turner avowed that he only wanted to talk -with Evans and that he had no sexual interest in her. Turner’s actions and, more tellingly, his own words on the night Evans was murdered belie his claim that he did not intend to have sex with Evans. Turner went out of his way to arrange for Karen Bishop, Brown’s ex-girlfriend, to give Brown a ride home if Turner did not return to the club by closing time. During that conversation, Bishop asked Turner if she needed to give Brown a ride home because Turner “was going home with [Evans], and [Turner] said yes.” Bishop warned Turner that “if that’s what [he’s] going to do, use a condom.” Turner just smirked and laughed in response.
The most telling piece of evidence is a conversation that occurred after Turner arranged for Bishop to give Brown a ride home and after he professed his intent to have sex with Evans to Bishop. Julio Fitzgibbons, a Navy SEAL, met Turner and Brown the night Evans was murdered and they talked about the SEAL training program for some time before parting ways. Toward the end of the night and after Turner had arranged a ride for Brown, Fitzgibbons approached Turner and Brown to see whether they had any plans for that night. While Evans was standing approximately fifteen yards away, Turner told Fitzgibbons that he and Brown were going to have a “threesome” with Evans.14 Within a few seconds of *500this, Evans approached and Turner introduced her to Fitzgibbons as she stood next to Brown. Before leaving, Fitzgibbons gave them the thumbs up sign, which Turner returned. Turner had a smile on his face.15
While Turner denies having made this statement, his petition for a writ of actual innocence supports this sequence of events and the fact that there was an exchange with him, Brown, and Fitzgibbons regarding a “threesome.” In paragraph forty-seven of his petition, Turner states under oath
Petitioner was happy with Bishop’s response and he went to tell Brown about the arrangements. Petitioner remarked that the plan was if he wasn’t back by 2:00 a.m., Bishop should take Brown home. Brown asked Petitioner where he was going with “that chick,” and Petitioner explained. Brown was slurring his words and asked Petitioner what the chances were for him to “get it on with her too.” At that moment, [Fitzgibbons] walked up to them and asked what their plans were for the night. Brown said something to the effect, “I’m going to get a threesome going.”
(Emphasis added).
Turner confirms that he talked with Brown after the arrangements were made with Bishop to take Brown home. Based on his version of Brown’s response to Turner’s description of his plans with Evans, it is clear that Turner planned to have a sexual encounter with Evans as Brown’s response was to inquire about the chances of him “getting it on with her too.” (Emphasis added). The evidence is also clear that the plan was formulated for both Turner and Brown to have sex with Evans as Fitzgibbons was told that they were going to have a “threesome.” While Turner tries to attribute the “threesome” comment to Brown, Fitzgibbons was clear that it was a declaration made by Turner. Clearly, Brown and *501Turner made a plan before either left the club to have sex with Evans.16
Finally, Turner’s intent to have sex with Evans, even though not even he believed Evans would agree, is clear from what was not said. Evans’ friend, Burdette, described Evans as a woman who would not speak to anyone using sexual overtures. Burdette also testified that she believed that Evans would not have been speaking to Turner had he made any sexual invitations to Evans. Evans’ other friend, McCammon, similarly believed that Evans had no intent to have a “romantic interlude” that night. As further proof of his intent to defile Evans, Turner confirms these descriptions of Evans. He testified that during the course of the evening, he never discussed sex with her. He also echoed Evans’ friends with regard to her character. Specifically, he stated that in the short time he spent with her, Evans was not the kind of woman who would have engaged in a “threesome.” Yet, he spoke to two different people about having sex with her, although she and he had not discussed it. Moreover, he unreservedly declared that he was going to have a “threesome” with Evans and Brown, even though he did not believe she would have willingly engaged in a “threesome.” From this, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Evans was unaware of Turner’s sexual plans for her, and would not have willingly engaged in a “threesome,” but that that was his intention.
The record also contains evidence of Turner’s aggressive nature, especially when things were not going his way. Burdette testified that Turner was “exceptionally rude” to her and McCammon, that he spoke to them in a “horribly belligerent tone[,]” and that he “pulled the [car] door open with surprising *502force” when he and Evans finally prevailed and the plan was devised for Evans to stay with Turner for one additional hour.
Turner’s callous disregard for Evans, displayed after her murder, is consistent with a finding that he intended to defile her before she was murdered. Within minutes of Brown killing Evans, Turner took the lead in finding an isolated spot to dispose of her body. Both men testified that Brown passed out within seconds of killing Evans. However, rather than making known what occurred, Turner drove from Virginia Beach to a secluded area in a Newport News park where it was unlikely that Evans’ body would be found. After finding the appropriate spot, he then woke Brown up to assist him in moving and covering Evans’ body. The day after Turner claimed to have witnessed Brown end a young woman’s life without any provocation, Turner still desired to rent an apartment with Brown. When lying to police and Federal Bureau of Investigation officials about leaving the club separately from Evans, an FBI officer interviewing Turner found him to be “very calm, very collected.” Another police officer present for the interview said that Turner “seemed calm, cool. Had his thoughts about him and talked very straightforward.” A few days after the police and FBI officers visited Turner and Brown at the naval base to interview them, the men went to Pizza Hut with Matt Novello, a Navy boatswain mate. Brown had brought the current, local newspapers with him. One of the newspapers contained a composite sketch purportedly of Turner. Throughout the meal, Turner and Brown repeatedly laughed and joked that the sketch looked nothing like Turner.
Thus, the record provides ample evidence of Turner’s determination to spend time with Evans, his aggressive demeanor toward her friends, and his unremorseful reaction after witnessing Brown end Evans’ life. There is also significant, contradictory evidence of Turner’s claim that he had no interest in having sexual relations with Evans and his attempts to facilitate such relations. The evidence further proves that Turner walked Evans to his car on the pretext of waiting for her friends. He did not disclose to her his stated intention to Fitzgibbons to have a “threesome” with her and Brown. *503Certainly, the act of engaging in a “threesome” does not, in and of itself, provide evidence of Turner’s intent to defile Evans. However, the evidence in the record when considered as a whole—including Turner’s belief that Evans would not be receptive to sexual advances, Turner’s claim to police and at trial that he had no interest in having sexual relations with Evans, and his declaration to Fitzgibbons that he intended to have a “threesome” with Evans-enables a rational trier of fact to infer that Turner intended to have sexual relations with Evans against her will.
II. FELONYMURDER
“[Mjurder for purposes of the felony-murder statute is common-law murder coupled with the contemporaneous commission or attempted commission of one of the listed felonies^]” including abduction with intent to defile. Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 761, 284 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981). “[T]he felony-murder statute applies where the killing is so closely related to the felony in time, place, and causal connection as to make it a part of the same criminal enterprise.” Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 1044, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (1978).
In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the 'act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine .... “Death must be a consequence of the felony ... and not merely coincidence.”
King v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 351, 356, 368 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958)). Abduction is a continuing offense and “ ‘it [is] for the fact finder to determine in each case ... whether the [abduction] had been terminated within the purview of [Code § 18.2-32].’ ” Barnes, 33 Va.App. at 629, 535 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting Haskell, 218 Va. at 1043, 243 S.E.2d at 483).
*504As discussed above, the record in toto provides sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that Turner deceived Evans into going to his car with the true intent of both he and Brown having a “threesome” with Evans against her will. The evidence further shows that when Brown joined Evans and Turner in Turner’s car, Brown asked Evans whether she was a virgin and whether she had ever had sex with a “frogman” immediately before “snapping” and killing her. Moreover, Brown was present when Turner told Fitzgibbons that he and Brown intended to have a “threesome” with Evans. From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Brown and Turner intended to forcibly have sexual relations with Evans and that Brown killed Evans when she rebuffed his advances. The trier of fact could have found that because of this shared sexual desire, the abduction had not ended.17 Thus, I do not believe that this Court can find that Brown’s credible recantation provides this Court with clear and convincing evidence that no rational fact finder could have found that Turner used deception to abduct Evans with the intent to have sexual intercourse with her against her will and, therefore, I dissent.
Because the issues addressed herein are of first impression and potential litigants and members of the bar may benefit from the directives herein, we direct the Clerk to publish this order.
. The majority, in footnote 3, states that ‘‘[t]o disregard the circuit court’s credibility determination would render the entire evidentiary hearing meaningless.” To accept the circuit court’s factual determinations divorced from their place in the entire record would render meaningless the role of this Court and the statutory scheme providing for a writ of actual innocence.
. Clearly the word “detains” is synonymous with "restrains.” The majority defines "restrain” as "to 'control' or 'to take away freedom or liberty of.' ” Webster's defines "detain” as "to hold or keep in ... as if in custody, to keep back, to restrain.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 616 (1993). The use of the word "detain” further indicates that "restraint” is no longer an element of kidnapping in addition to each of the enumerated acts. To so hold would mean that the Commonwealth would have to prove not only that the victim was "detained” but also that the victim was "restrained.”
. In his confession, Brown reiterates his prior statements that he did not intend to have sex that night. His recent confession, however, has no bearing on what a reasonable fact finder could find about Turner’s and Brown’s sexual intent prior to Brown joining Evans and Turner in Turner’s car because Brown's confession focused on the details of how he killed Evans and what followed after he met them in the car. Specifically, this was not part of what the trial court was asked to decide, nor is this issue of Brown’s sexual intent part of the circuit court's findings. Indeed, Brown’s protestations that he was not sexually interested in Evans are belied by his interview with Turner's attorney and by his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing where he recounts his sexual overtures toward Evans immediately upon getting into Turner's car and admits to trying to have intercourse with Evans' corpse twice, once before they even left the parking lot and again in the woods where they disposed of Evans’ body.
. Though the record, unfortunately, is devoid of the closing arguments made to the jury in Turner's trial, it is clear from the trial court's ruling on Turner’s motion to strike and from the jury instructions that the abduction by deception theory was advanced in the trial court. In ruling on Turner's motion to strike, the trial court held that there was sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that Evans did not
knowingly and willingly [go] with ... Turner to the parking lot or to his car for the purposes of engaging in a threesome or what has been discussed as group sex with [Turner] and ... Brown; but we certainly know from the evidence in this case that that was the defendant's intent____ It’s clear from all the circumstances in evidence in this case that the defendant had a sexual mode; and, of course, his specific intent to defile or sexually molest ... can be derived not only from his conduct but from his statements as well.
*499(Emphasis added).
. Fitzgibbons testified that he understood "threesome” to mean a sexual encounter involving Turner, Brown, and a woman, in this instance, Evans. Though the majority suggests that this may have been an allusion to a prior incident in which Turner and Brown engaged in a "threesome,” the argument makes no sense given that Fitzgibbons did *500not know Brown and Turner or their sexual histories. Such an allusion would certainly have been lost on Fitzgibbons.
. Several other witnesses also testified that Turner and Brown had a history of engaging in "threesomes."
. While the majority contends that Turner's statements regarding a threesome were implicitly rejected by the circuit court and negate the inculpating evidence against Turner, this simply is not the case. For all of the previously stated reasons, the circuit court was never asked to reach, nor did it reach the issue of whether Turner abducted Evans by deception with the intent to defile.
. The majority’s determination that ”[t]he circuit court, by referring to the murder and the restraint in the disjunctive, contemplated Brown's recantation in light of both the actual killing and the underlying crime of abduction” is unsupported and requires an inferential leap.