dissenting:
I respectfully dissent on two grounds. First, North Slope Borough and the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (“NSB”) and Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands (“REDOIL”) filed their petitions for review after the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and neither Congress nor this court provide NSB or REDOIL with an exception to the requirement of timely filing.
Second, because the Minerals Management Service’s (“MMS”) approval of Shell’s exploration plan was neither arbitrary nor capricious, we have no power to overturn the agency action, and the majority’s efforts to do so contravene our recent en banc decision in The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.2008).
Jurisdiction
We do not have jurisdiction over NSB and REDOIL’s petitions for review because the petitions were filed in this court more than 60 days after the agency action here on review: MMS’s approval of Shell Offshore, Inc.’s (“Shell”) exploration plan. In their petitions for review, NSB and REDOIL contend MMS failed to consider how Shell’s exploration plan would harm some Inupiat subsistence activities: to wit, the Inupiat practice of bowhead whale *836hunting. We lack jurisdiction over these petitions because it took NSB and RE-DOIL 96 days to file the petitions they were required by statute to file within 60 days.
At all times relevant here, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., provided:
Any action of the Secretary specified in paragraph (1) or (2) shall only be subject to review pursuant to the provisions of this subsection....
43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(4) (emphases added). “This subsection” by which “[a]ny action of the Secretary” may only be reviewed is 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c).
43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(2) makes clear the statute applies to “[a]ny action of the Secretary 1 to approve ... any exploration plan .... ” and that such actions “shall be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of appeals for a circuit in which an affected State is located.” Id. (emphases added). Thus, review under 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) must be “judicial” in nature, because “any action” by the Secretary to approve an exploration plan “shall only ” be subject to review pursuant to the mechanisms described in the provisions of 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) — and those mechanisms are only judicial.2
Subsection 1349(c)(3) provides that “judicial review ... shall be available only to a person who ... files a petition for review of the Secretary’s action within sixty days after the date of such action.... ” Accordingly, an MMS order approving an exploration plan, as here, is reviewable “only” in a court of appeals and “only” when the petition for review is filed within 60 days. MMS approved Shell’s exploration plan on February 15, 2007. The last day to petition for review of the MMS decision was April 16, 2007, 60 days later. NSB and REDOIL filed their petitions for review in this court on May 22, 2007, and May 25, 2007, respectively.
The majority ignores the plain text of the statute, and instead relies on the fact that on April 13, 2007, before filing their petitions for review in this court, NSB and REDOIL chose to file a purported administrative appeal with the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) of MMS’s approval order — a filing that is not authorized by the relevant statute, 43 U.S.C. § 1349. They purported to do so pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 290.2.3 On May 4, 2007, IBLA *837“suspended” proceedings on the administrative appeal pending the outcome of the instant petition for review.
The majority holds the statutory 60-day filing period was “tolled” during NSB and REDOIL’s unauthorized administrative appeal. Accordingly, the majority holds NSB and REDOIL’s May 15 and May 22 petitions in this court were timely. The majority holds IBLA’s suspension of the administrative appeal pending the outcome of the instant action is a reviewable final agency order and, thus, the 60-day period for NSB and REDOIL to file their petitions for review of MMS’s order approving the exploration plan began when IBLA suspended the unauthorized administrative appeal.
The majority’s use of the word “tolling” here is inventive. The “tolling” the majority applies is different from any known concept of tolling by appeal or equitable tolling, which is perhaps why, as discussed below, the majority cites only inapposite cases. Here, the question is not whether the time to file for review of MMS’s approval of Shell’s exploration plan was extended by the administrative appeal. Rather, the question is whether the filing of an administrative appeal with IBLA suddenly rendered MMS’s approval of the exploration plan, which constitutes a final appealable order, non-final — and, therefore, whether IBLA’s later suspension of the administrative appeal was itself a “final agency action” that restarted the 60-day filing clock. See United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (“[T]he issue is better described as whether the [60]-day period began to run on the date of the first order or on the date of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, rather than as a matter of tolling. Principles of equitable tolling usually dictate that when a time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.”).
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, IBLA’s suspension of proceedings cannot constitute a “final agency action” because a suspension of proceedings pending the outcome of collateral proceedings is, by definition, not final.4 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 *838U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (“As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First, the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process — it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’ ”). Nothing is more interlocutory than a suspension of proceedings — whether in review of an agency action or a divorce decree. Thus, the only “final” agency action here was MMS’s approval of the exploration plan.5
Further, the majority’s “tolling” theory is inapplicable as a matter of law because, although the Department of the Interior provides a general scheme for administrative appeals of MMS decisions pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 290.2 (the regulation on which NSB and REDOIL erroneously relied when filing their unauthorized administrative appeal), Congress expressly restricted the availability of review for MMS’s approval of an exploration plan to the court of appeals. See 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (“Any action of the Secretary to approve ... any exploration plan ... under this subchap-ter shall be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of appeals....”) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no statutory administrative review process during which a court may stay the running of OCSLA’s limitations period. NSB and REDOIL simply filed administrative appeals under general agency regulations, and those appeals clashed with a specific statutory prohibition of an appeal other than to a United States Court of Appeals. It should be that simple: the specific congressional statute trumps the general agency regulation. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
Even if “tolling” somehow were to apply, under any recognized tolling theory the statute of limitations would have begun to toll on April 13, 2007, when NSB and REDOIL filed their administrative appeals. On April 13, 2007, only three days remained in the 60-day statutory filing period. Thus, when IBLA suspended NSB and REDOIL’s unauthorized administrative appeal on May 4, 2007, NSB and REDOIL would have had three days in which to file timely petitions for review in this court (by May 7, 2007). Their petitions were not filed until May 22, 2007 (REDOIL) and May 25, 2007(NSB). Thus, the petitions were filed late, even if one accepts the majority’s creative “tolling” theory.
To support its tolling theory, the majority opinion relies on cases interpreting the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51, to hold the tolling rule applicable under that statutory scheme also applies here. Cases based on the Hobbs Act, however — including the primary case cited by the majority, ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) — are inapposite because: (1) the Hobbs Act simply does not apply to decisions of the Secretary of the Interior, whose authority is delegated to MMS, and (2) the rationale behind Hobbs *839Act tolling does not apply to a situation like this one.6
1. The Hobbs Act does not apply to actions by MMS or the Secretary of the Interior.
Any tolling rule derived from an interpretation of the Hobbs Act is off base because the Hobbs Act does not apply to MMS. The Hobbs Act states “[t]he court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of’ final orders from certain specific agencies — but not those within Department of the Interior, including MMS. On its face, the Hobbs Act applies only to final orders of: (1) the Federal Communications Commission; (2) the Secretary of Agriculture; (3) the Secretary of Transportation; (4) the Federal Maritime Commission; (5) the Atomic Energy Commission; and (6) the Surface Transportation Board, and also (7) orders under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2342. In some instances, an agency’s organic statutes may refer to the Hobbs Act as the appropriate statute for obtaining judicial review. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (providing for judicial review of final orders of removal of aliens under the Hobbs Act). OCSLA, however, is not such a statute. Instead, OCSLA contains its own provisions for exclusive judicial review by the courts of appeals. Thus, a judicially-created tolling rule under the Hobbs Act does not apply to agency action taken by the Secretary of the Interior or MMS under OCSLA.
Here, NSB and REDOIL simply may not have read OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., and filed an administrative appeal under a law that provides for review only by this court. Now they want a free pass. We should not give it to them: “As the saying goes, ‘rules is rules.’ ” Nat’l Sci. and Tech. Network, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.3d 1013, 1014-15 (D.C.Cir.2005).
2. The justifications for Hobbs Act “tolling’’ do not apply here.
Even were the Hobbs Act applicable to MMS’s final order, the underlying rationale for staying the running of the limitations period under the Hobbs Act does not apply to MMS approval of exploration plans under OCSLA. In the Hobbs Act cases, the agencies the court reviewed possessed statutory authority to conduct administrative reviews of their orders after the filing of a petition for rehearing or reconsideration with the agency. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 722(c) (granting administrative powers to review orders of the Department of Transportation); 46 U.S.C. § 304(b) (Federal Maritime Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (Atomic Energy Commission). Hence, in those cases, including those cited by the majority, it was consistent with Congress’s stated intent to stay the limitations period for judicial review of actions by those agencies because Congress gave those agencies statutory power *840and authority to review their own actions before another court did.
In contrast, OCSLA and the organic statutes for the Department of the Interior do not provide for Interior or other agency administrative review of MMS decisions. The statutory scheme provides the Secretary of the Interior only with the general authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out” OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1334, but not to review an MMS order approving an exploration plan. Indeed, as discussed above, the OCSLA provision governing the approval of exploration plans expressly limits review to a petition to the courts of appeal.
Thus, we lack a statutory basis on which to allow tolling for an administrative appeal in the OCSLA context. Further, tolling here violates the clear intent of Congress that the Secretary “shall approve” exploration plans within 30 days. The majority’s holding that action on exploration plans may be administratively appealed to the IBLA and, thus — probably, almost always — decided over a period of time longer than 30 days, defeats Congress’s express desire for rapid approval or denial of exploration plans.7 The justifications for Hobbs Act tolling simply do not apply to review of an exploration plan approval under OCSLA.
Finally, the Supreme Court has made clear that statutorily imposed times to file a notice of appeal (and, by extension, a petition for review) are jurisdictional and are not subject to equitable exceptions. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).8 The majority does not claim there are grounds for equitable exceptions to the 60-day rule. Here, as discussed, we lack any statutory basis for “tolling.” Therefore, because OCSLA provides exclusive jurisdiction for review of MMS approval of exploration plans to the courts of appeals, because the Hobbs Act does not apply to petitions for review under OCSLA, and because the justifications for Hobbs Act tolling are not present in the context of this case, we do not have jurisdiction over NSB and RE-DOIL’s untimely petitions.
Our lack of jurisdiction over NSB and REDOIL’s untimely petitions narrows the scope of our review because it eliminates from our consideration those issues that were not raised in the timely filed petition of the Alaska Wilderness League, the National Resources Defense Council, and the Pacific Environment (collectively “AWL”). Specifically, we lack jurisdiction over claims that MMS failed to take a “hard look” at the potential impact of Shell’s exploration plan on Inupiat subsistence hunting, as AWL did not raise this contention.
We still must determine whether, as AWL did contend, MMS failed to take a “hard look” at the impact of Shell’s exploration plan on bowhead whales.
Merits
Under OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior and, by delegation, MMS, are *841charged with ensuring the “vital national resource reserve” of the Outer Continental Shelf “be made available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards.” 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3). Under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the agency must utilize a staged decision-making process that conducts environmental review at each stage of a proposed action’s OCSLA review. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20.
This case comes to us at stage three of NEPA analysis.9 At this stage, OCSLA requires — prior to lessee Shell commencing exploration of potential oil or natural gas deposits — that such lessee must “submit an exploration plan to the Secretary for approval.” 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1). If the Secretary finds the plan is consistent with OCSLA, OCSLA regulations, and the provisions of the lease, the exploration plan “shall be approved” within 30 days of submission. Id.
As the majority correctly observes, MMS prepared an initial, 1500-page Environmental Impact Statement that discussed potential environmental effects from development of each of Shell’s lease-sale sites (“multi-sale EIS”). MMS then prepared a supplemental, near-100-page Environmental Assessment (“EA”) that supplemented the multi-sale EIS for two of Shell’s lease plots about which MMS decided additional information was needed. In agency parlance, this supplementing process is called “tiering.” “Tiering” means the agency bases its later analyses on its initial comprehensive analysis, instead of preparing another 1500 page EIS. Petitioners and the majority do not want MMS to use its extensive prior work to inform its decisions on individual leases, but to prepare a new, self-contained EIS10 for each lease Shell proposes to explore. This is worse than re-inventing the wheel: this is re-inventing the wheel for each wheel of the car.
The process will be expensive, time-consuming, and largely duplicative, which is precisely why NEPA’s implementing regulations encourage “tiering” of NEPA documents — to “eliminate repetitive discussion of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (“Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has been prepared ... the subsequent statement or environmental assessment need only summarize the issues discussed in the broader statement .... ”). The agency’s use of tiering allows it to fulfill its NEPA obligations while complying with the strict 30-day turnaround time OCSLA requires. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1). Here, following its tiered analysis, MMS issued a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (“FONSI”), which is the agency’s determination that the existing analyses are sufficient and a new, start-from-seratch EIS *842(or “revised” EA) is unnecessary. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1).
The majority concludes MMS failed to include a sufficiently detailed analysis of the biological effects of Shell’s exploration plan on bowhead whales, and that its order approving the plan was therefore arbitrary and capricious. The majority holds the agency should have prepared a new, self-contained EIS (or “revised” EA) in response to Shell’s exploration plan, rather than the two-lease EA it prepared, which tiered to the multi-sale EIS.
MMS conducted a thorough review to determine whether its two-lease EA was sufficient fully to analyze Shell’s exploration plan. Pursuant to regulations, MMS considered the “significance” of Shell’s proposal in terms of “context” and “intensity.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. This means the agency considered, in relevant part: (1) whether, after a “hard look,” Shell’s exploration plan was likely to impact bowhead whales in a significant manner; (2) whether the likely consequences of the drilling plan were “highly controversial”; (3) whether the agency’s identification of “cumulatively significant impacts” on bowhead whales required a separate EIS or different EA; and (4) whether Shell needed to identify the precise locations of each well it planned to drill. The majority holds each of these considerations requires the agency to produce a supplemental EIS or “revised” EA, and reverses the agency’s order. For the reasons discussed below, with respect, the majority is in error. We should deny the petition.
1. MMS gave the potential effects of Shell’s exploration plan on bowhead whales a “hard look.”
The majority concludes MMS’s analysis of the effect on bowhead whales of the proposed exploration plan was insufficient for the agency to approve the exploration plan without requiring a new, separate EIS (or “revised” EA) for each lease site because the agency did not give the plan a “hard look.” We will find an agency gave an environmental issue a “hard look” under NEPA if the agency puts forth a “ ‘convincing statement of reasons’ that explain why the project will impact the environment no more than insignificantly.” Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir.2005). This “statement” may not be a mere conclusory assertion. Id.
The majority concludes the 1500-page multi-sale EIS and 100-page “tiered” EA it prepared were insufficient to constitute a “hard look” because — says the majority, not the expert agency — the EA and multi-sale EIS were too generalized to consider adequately the impact of Shell’s planned activities on bowhead whales. According to the majority, it was not enough for the agency to analyze studies regarding the impact of the type of noise Shell’s equipment would produce on bowhead whales as they swim by; in the majority’s “expertise,” the agency failed to analyze such vital additional noise-related consequences of drilling as the noise of two drillships with two icebreakers (versus the noise of two drillships with one icebreaker), and the noise of cracking ice.
Sitting en banc, we recently held in a similar case that, contrary to the majority’s position, “it is not our proper role” to “make fine-grained judgments” about the weight of specific studies on which an environmental agency relies. The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir.2008). Rather, “we are to be ‘most deferential’ when the agency is ‘making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science.’ ” Id.
In Lands Council, we affirmed a Forest Service plan to regrow an old-growth forest area against a challenge that contended *843the Forest Service failed to confirm its statistical modeling with long term, on-the-ground observation. We recognized that, “as non-scientists,” we need only ensure the Forest Service analyzes the issue based on “studies that the agency, in its expertise, deems reliable.” Id. at 994. In other words, we do not “assessf ] the quality and detail” of the studies on which the agency relies. Id. at 993. Rather, “we ... conduct a ‘particularly deferential review’ of an ‘agency’s predictive judgments about the areas that are within the agency’s field of discretion and expertise as long as they are reasonable.’ ” Id. Our role is merely to ensure the agency has not: (1) “relied on factors which Congress has, not intended it to consider,” (2) “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” or (3) “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or an explanation that is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id.
None of these factors are present here. The documents MMS utilized in its analysis were comprehensive. The 1500-page multi-sale EIS contains a detailed analysis of icebreakers’ potential effects on bow-heads, and finds the effect of icebreaker noise on bowheads is likely to be “short-term” and not disruptive of migration patterns. The multi-sale EIS also contains a comprehensive 37-page analysis of all possible impacts from drilling and other oil and gas related activities on bowhead whales, reviewing studies on the biological significance of noise as it related to bow-heads. The EIS notes “there has been no documented evidence that noise ... would serve as a barrier to migration.”
The EA, which was tiered to the multi-sale EIS, analyzed the biological significance of exploratory drilling on whales, with the advantage of knowledge of Shell’s specific plans. It provided detailed information regarding the specific types of drilling and ice-management vessels Shell plans to use and how it intends to use them. All the studies to which they referred considered responses of bowhead whales to the noise from drillships along with noise from ice management vessels. The EA discussed icebreaker noise, the effect on bowheads of noise from drilling and ice management, and the National Marine Fisheries Service’s conclusion that exploratory drilling and associated activities would not jeopardize bowhead whales, which it based in turn on an analysis of icebreaker and ice-management noise in addition to drilling noise. In fact, the EA conducted a noise analysis specific to the particular drilling vessels (the Kulluk and Frontier Discoverer) and the particular ice-breakers (the Kapitcm Dranitzyn and Vladimir Ignatyuk) Shell plans to use.
The EA also requires Shell to measure and mitigate sound levels in specific operating environments. Specifically, the effects on bowhead whales will be carefully monitored through methods including aerial surveys; if there is any indication bow-heads are being displaced from important habitats, the agency retains the authority to require Shell to modify its operations to prevent the threat of serious, irreparable harm to the whales.
If one substitutes the Forest Service’s sufficient statistical modeling simulation in Lands Council for MMS’s purportedly insufficient simulation of noise effects here, and the unnecessary on-the-ground observation by the Forest Service in Lands Council for the purportedly necessary on-site noise measurement here, one cannot help but conclude the panel majority here is overruling Lands Council sub silentio.
The majority holds simulations of noise effects on bowhead whales are not enough; the agency must actually go and measure *844the effect of noise on-site in an “uncontrolled setting.” The EIS and EA studies that do exist, according to the majority, are insufficient because they involve two drillships with one icebreaker ship, and the situation here involves two icebreaker ships (nevermind the fact the agency analyzed the statistics for each of the two icebreaker ships Shell plans to use). And the agency’s proposal to monitor the environmental effects of Shell’s plan is not good enough; according to the majority’s environmental “expertise,” the agency should have mandated “alternative migration measures” or prepared a full EIS (or “revised” EA). This is precisely the analysis Lands Council rejected. See 537 F.3d at 1001 (“[T]o require [an environmental agency] to affirmatively present every uncertainty in an EIS would be an onerous requirement, given that experts in every scientific field routinely disagree; such a requirement might inadvertently prevent the [agency] from acting due to the burden it would impose.”).
MMS gave a “hard look,” by any stretch of the term, to whether Shell’s plans would disrupt the bowhead whale’s migratory habits. The expert agency to which Congress delegated its authority concluded Shell’s plan would not disrupt the bowhead whales to an extent necessary to require an additional costly EIS (or “revised” EA). The majority would replace the “hard look” standard with one that requires the agency to address every possible post-hoc consideration or eventuality. This not what the statute demands — “[N]one of NEPA’s statutory provisions or regulations requires[an environmental agency] to affirmatively present every uncertainty in its EIS,” id. at 1001 — and such a rule would render impossible Congress’s express requirement in OCSLA that the analysis be completed in 30 days. Thus, with respect, the majority’s analysis is incorrect on this ground.
2. The potential effects identified in the multi-sale EIS and EA are not “highly controversial.”
If a proposed exploration plan is “highly controversial,” a new, site-specific EIS (or “revised” EA) may be required. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. The majority contends MMS erred by failing to prepare a site-specific EIS (or “revised” EA) due to “[t]he contentious nature of the agency’s internal communication during the review process.” This is based on a handful of complaints from a few agency scientists who opposed the agency’s final determination.
A plan is “highly controversial,” and thus in need of a new EIS (or “revised” EA), only if there is a “substantial dispute ” about the “size, nature, or effect” of the proposed act — and not the mere “existence of opposition.” Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). Internal disagreement alone is not enough to render an agency-approved plan “highly controversial,” because “[w]hen specialists express conflicting views, we defer to the informed discretion of the agency.” Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1017 (9th Cir.2006). As this court has explained, “[s]imply because a challenger can cherry pick information and data out of the administrative record to support its position does not mean that a project is highly controversial.... “Native Ecosystems Council, 428 F.3d at 1240.” Not only would such a standard deter candid disclosure of negative information, it does not follow that the presence of some negative effects necessarily rises to the level of demonstrating a significant effect on the environment.” Id.
Thus, that qualified experts may disagree about the importance of certain data *845does not necessarily create a substantial enough controversy to undermine the EIS or EA the agency prepared. Otherwise, “any information included in an EA and its supporting NEPA documents that admits impacts oh wildlife species and their habitat would trigger the preparation of an EIS.”11 Id. Thus, this court has “decline[d] to interpret NEPA as requiring the preparation of an EIS any time that a federal agency discloses adverse impacts on wildlife species or their habitat or acknowledges information favorable to a party that would prefer a different outcome.” Id.
Accordingly, the majority is incorrect that the agency’s action was so “highly controversial” that preparation of an EIS was required. Indeed, the fact that the agency considered such dissenting views underscores what a “hard look” the proposal was given. See id. at 1241 (“A ‘hard look’ should, of course, involve the discussion of adverse impacts. A ‘hard look’ does not dictate a soft touch or brush-off of negative effects.”). However, “such information does not automatically make the project ‘highly controversial’ ... for the purposes of determining whether” a new EIS (or “revised” EA) is necessary. Id.
On the contrary, neither the majority nor the parties identify systemic failures in the agency’s analysis, or any potential effects it might avoid by the collection of more data. The agency did not err.
3. There is no need for an EIS to analyze “cumulatively significant impacts. ”
The majority asserts a supplemental EIS (or “revised” EA) was necessary because “there is the potential for cumulatively significant impacts.” “Cumulatively significant impacts” are environmental effects from multiple activities, each too small to create a disturbance, but that together create a measurable environmental effect.
Here, the multi-sale EIS, along with the EA, show the agency gave substantial consideration to the cumulative impacts from the proposed activities. Section V of the multisale EIS contains an 85-page discussion of cumulative impacts. Using a 5-step analysis, the multi-sale EIS: (1) identified “the potential effects of the Beaufort Sea multiple sale on the natural resources and human environment that may occur in the Beaufort Sea, on the North Slope, and along the oil-transportation route”; (2) “analyze[d] other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future oil-development activity on the North Slope/Beaufort Sea ...”; (3) “considered] effects from other actions (sport harvest, commercial fishing, subsistence hunting, and loss of overwintering range, etc.)”; (4) “attempted] to quantify effects by estimating the extent of the effects ... and how long effects would last”; and (5) “weigh[ed] more heavily other activities that are more certain and geographically in the [zone nearest to shore] and ... analyzed] more intensively those effects that are of greatest concern.” (emphasis added). The EA updated the above-described analysis and included information on the potential effects from claimed global warming. The cumulative effects analysis considered the projected effects of oil development and production under all of the leases covered by the multisale EIS, past development and production, reasonably foreseeable development and production, and even speculative development and production prospects.
*846Relying on its previous cumulative impact analyses, the EA reasonably determined “the incremental contribution of the proposed activities to cumulative impacts is expected to be quite small, and thus not significant.” The EA further observed that “[t]he activities proposed in[Shell’s exploration plan] represent a small portion of the projected activities originally analyzed for a Beaufort Sea lease sale.” As one agency scientist stated in an e-mail, because there is no new information to be discovered in an additional EIS, “[w]e do not need to reanalyze all cumulative impacts.”
Accordingly, the EA and the documents to which it tiered articulated a careful and extensive cumulative effects analysis. The MMS reasonably concluded potential additional cumulative effects were not significant enough to require a costly and time-consuming new EIS (or “revised” EA), which would have made compliance with Congress’s 30-day OCSLA approval mandate impossible.
A Shell did not need to specify the location of each drilling well prior to approval of its exploration plan.
Shell’s exploration plan included the locations of the four wells it planned to drill during the first of three years of drilling. The plan explained Shell intended to drill wells on additional prospects during the final two years of the plan. The precise location and extent of drilling in the final two years, however, depended in part on the resources found during the first year of drilling.12 The majority incorrectly concludes OCSLA and its implementing regulations require Shell’s exploration plan to include the specific locations of every well that will be drilled.
OCSLA requires that an exploration plan include, “in the degree of detail which the Secretary may by regulation require,” among other things, “the general location of each well to be drilled.” 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(3)(C) (emphasis added). The agency’s regulations require an exploration plan that includes “[a] map showing the surface location and water depth of each proposed well and the locations of all associated drilling unit anchors.” 30 C.F.R. § 250.211. Here, Shell knew of and proposed four wells “to be drilled,” and provided a map with the required information for those four wells. This is sufficient under the regulation. The majority’s demand Shell provide exact locations of wells before approval of its exploration plan, when those exact locations depend on what happens with the earlier wells which must be explored pursuant to the exploration plan, is a Catch-22.
Under the exploration plan approved by MMS, should Shell seek to drill at sites other than the four specified in its original exploration plan, it will need to obtain a permit to drill before doing so. 30 C.F.R. § 250.281(b). Likewise, all- supplemental exploration plans the Regional Supervisor determines are likely to result in a significant change in the impacts previously identified and evaluated in the original exploration plan will be subject to the same procedures for approval as the original exploration plan. 30 C.F.R. § 250.285(c). Thus, Shell will be required to supplement its exploration plan with information regarding those additional drilling sites.13
*847The agency’s interpretation of its own regulations to permit an entity to determine the exact location of future wells based on what it discovers in the first year of exploitation is consistent with the statute and its regulations and is entitled to substantial deference. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer-”). Any drilling beyond the specific sites approved in Shell’s exploration plan would have to undergo separate MMS review pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 250.413(h), which requires the applicant for a permit to drill to submit a report of conditions as the proposed site. Thus, the agency’s decision not to require this information now, but instead to require it later when the information is available, was not arbitrary and capricious.
Conclusion
In the statutorily required 30-day period MMS had to approve or deny Shell’s request for an exploration permit, the agency parsed nearly 1,600 pages of in-depth scientific analysis. This voluminous study — a “hard look” by any rule — revealed that, while the drilling project might have some small impact on the environment, that impact was not significant enough for MMS to require a costly, time-consuming, duplicative EIS or “revised” EA. This analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and is entitled to deference.
I’m afraid the majority has substituted its “expertise” in environmental science for that of the expert agency to which Congress entrusted primary analytic responsibility, and in the process has overruled an en banc decision and nullified Congress’s express 30-day OCSLA approval requirement. We should not do any of this. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, I would hold we lack jurisdiction over NSB and REDOIL’s untimely petitions for review, and that MMS’s approval of Shell’s exploration permit without an additional EIS or “revised” EA was not arbitrary and capricious.
. MMS has the authority to approve exploration plans on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. See 30 C.F.R. § 256.
. Contrary to the majority's assertion, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) does not mention or even raise the possibility of administrative review. We should not read such review into the statute, particularly when, as here, the statute includes opposing provisions. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (“The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ‘as applied to statutory interpretation creates a pre-sumption that when a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as exclusions.’ ”). Thus, mention of "judicial review” must be interpreted as the only review allowed by statute. To allow administrative review is plainly to amend the statute by judicial writ.
.30 C.F.R. § 290.2 provides: "If you are adversely affected by a[n][MMS] official’s final decision or order issued under” the relevant MMS regulations, "you may appeal that decision or order to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.” MMS sought dismissal of NSB’s and REDOIL’s IBLA administrative appeals because federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review the approval of an exploration plan under OCSLA. The majority states that "the IBLA declined to exercise its jurisdiction and stayed the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of” the instant petition for review. Op. at 819. Actually, the IBLA's order is unclear: the IBLA stated it would have no jurisdiction to hear this matter once the administrative rec*837ord was filed in this court, but also stated the IBLA would immediately “suspend proceedings ... pending the outcome of" the instant petition for review. Importantly, the IBLA did not decide it had jurisdiction, but prudentially or otherwise decide not to exercise any such jurisdiction. Rather than determine it had jurisdiction, it observed it would have no jurisdiction upon filing of the record. Note: the IBLA did not say it would lose any jurisdiction it might have had. Indeed, it declined to rule one way or the other on the motion challenging its jurisdiction. This is a far cry from "the IBLA declined to exercise its jurisdiction”: the only action the IBLA took was to take the motions to dismiss and to stay "under advisement.”
The only way to interpret the IBLA order, based on its actions as well as its words regarding the motions to dismiss and to stay, is that the IBLA understood it would lose any jurisdiction it had once the appeal was perfected by the filing of the administrative record in this court, and anticipating such filing, stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the instant petition for review. The IBLA was in error. The IBLA never had jurisdiction over this matter in the first place, and thus had no valid administrative appeal to stay, because § 1349 provides the courts of appeals with "exclusive” jurisdiction to hear petitions for review of MMS’s approval of an exploration plan.
. Indeed, how can the suspension of an appeal at the agency level be a reviewable final agency action? If we determine the suspension was within the agency's discretion, it can be indefinite and there will never be an decision! Here, for instance, if no administrative record were filed, the suspension of the appeal would be indefinite. Even a decision by the circuit court would not fulfill the regula*838tion's requirement of filing an administrative record to oust agency jurisdiction.
. The petitioners are not misled. Their opening briefs are clear they petition for review of MMS’s approval of the exploration plan, and not IBLA's suspension of their administrative appeal. See Opening Br. of AWL and RE-DOIL at 1; Opening Br. of NSB at 4-5.*
. I note Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is inapposite for the additional reason that, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, there was no question the administrative review board had authority to take the administrative appeal. See 482 U.S. at 276, 107 S.Ct. 2360. The situation here, as discussed, is quite the contrary: the IBLA had no authority whatsoever to take an administrative appeal of an MMS exploration plan.
The majority also cites Acura of Bellevue v. Reich, 90 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir.1996) in support of its "tolling” theory. Unlike Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Acura is not a Hobbs Act case. However, Acura is inapposite because it did not involve a specific statutory provision, as here, that provides the courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to hear petitions for review.
. Congress stated its intent for OCSLA included ‘‘expedited exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf” and to "insure that the extent of oil and natural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf is assessed at the earliest practicable time." 43 U.S.C. § 1802(1), (9) (emphases added).
. "Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.... Bowles' failure to file his notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction.... Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. ... [T]his Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements_" Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2365-66.
. Stage one is preparation of a lease schedule, stage two is drafting the lease itself, and stage four is development of the lease property. See Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining the four stages of NEPA analysis before deferring to the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior as to the adequacy of the environmental studies at issue). The instant petitions for review address stage three alone.
. The majority alternatively permits the agency to prepare a “revised” EA instead of a wholly new EIS. However, the majority does not explain how or whether its demand for a "revised” EA is analytically distinguishable from its demand for a new EIS. Further, whether the majority requires MMS to prepare a new EIS or a "revised” EA does not change the fact the agency gave the exploration plan a sufficiently "hard look” and so did not abuse its discretion by approving the exploration plan.
. As discussed above, the majority has not analytically distinguished between its demand MMS prepare a new EIS or a "revised” EA.
. This seems to make sense. Should the oil company commit to drill next to what turns out to be a dry well?
. Shell would also be required to submit a revised exploration plan if it proposes to "[c]hange the surface location of a well.'' 30 C.F.R. § 250.283(a)(2).