The state of Idaho (the State) appeals from the district court’s order suppressing items seized during an inventory search of Brian Julian (Julian). The district court invalidated the underlying arrest because it concluded that Julian was arrested for misdemeanor domestic battery at a scene other than that of the alleged domestic disturbance. We reverse and remand.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior to May 20, 1994, Julian and his wife had been separated for approximately six weeks. While visiting her at their residence, Julian discovered a flower arrangement sent to Mrs. Julian by a high school friend of the Julians. Julian called the friend and the two got into a heated argument over the phone. What occurred next is disputed by the parties, but the district court found that there was some type of struggle between the Julians and, during the course of the struggle, Mrs. Julian’s arm was broken.
Afterwards, Mrs. Julian attempted to use the pre-programmed 911 number on her phone. Instead, she mistakenly hit the redial button and rang the acquaintance’s residence in .the state of Washington. When the friend answered the phone, Mrs. Julian asked if she had reached 911, realized her mistake and hung up. The Julians then left for St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center. In the meantime, the friend realized that it was Mrs. Julian who had just called him. He called the Ada County Sheriffs dispatch and reported that he believed Mrs. Julian was being battered by Julian. Ada County dispatched two deputies to the Julian residence.
Deputies Wright and Monson arrived at the Julian residence at approximately 1:30 a.m. The deputies’ repeated knocks on the front door went unanswered as did a telephone call placed by the Ada County dispatcher. Receiving no response from inside, the deputies entered the Julian home through the unlocked front door. Once inside, the deputies allegedly discovered a blood stained rag sitting on the kitchen counter and items lying on the floor which evidenced a struggle. None of these items were seized or photographed. While the deputies were searching the home, Ada County dispatch informed the deputies that the Julians were at St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center. The deputies exited the home and proceeded to the hospital.
The sequence of events at the hospital are also disputed, but it appears that a third deputy, Deputy Buzzini, arrived at the hospital prior to Deputies Monson and Wright’s arrival at 2:15 a.m. A hospital security guard alerted the three deputies that Julian was sitting in his car in the emergency room parking lot. Deputy Monson asked Julian to step out of the car and conducted a pat search. Deputy Buzzini then went inside to talk to Julian’s wife while the other deputies continued to speak with Julian. Following his interview with Mrs. Julian, Deputy Buzzini signaled the other deputies to arrest Julian. The deputies cited Julian for misdemeanor domestic battery, Section 18-918 of the Idaho Code. He was transported to the Ada County jail, where, during a standard inventory search, a small glass vial of cocaine fell out of his shoe.
Although the arrest citation was issued for misdemeanor domestic battery, the State *135charged Julian with aggravated battery, Sections 18-903 and 18-907(a) of the Idaho Code, and possession of a controlled substance under Section 37-2732(c) of the Idaho Code. The State subsequently dismissed the aggravated battery charge. Following the preliminary hearing, Julian moved the district court for an order suppressing the items seized during the inventory search. In ruling on the motion, the district court noted that Section 19-603(6) of the Idaho Code only allows an arrest for domestic battery to be made “at the scene of a domestic disturbance.” Since no acts of domestic battery had occurred at St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center, the court concluded that the deputies had no authority to arrest Julian and suppressed the items subsequently seized from him. Alternatively, the court held that if it were to find that Julian was arrested for an offense other than that of domestic battery, Julian was not properly informed of the “cause of arrest” as required by Section 19-608 of the Idaho Code.
The State appealed.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in ruling that Julian was not lawfully arrested and placed into police custody?
A. Did probable cause exist for Julian’s arrest?
B. Is the fact that Julian was issued a citation for domestic battery relevant to the validity of his arrest?
2. Did the district court err in ruling that the cocaine was not lawfully seized from Julian’s person?
A. Was there a valid seizure incident to Julian’s arrest?
B. Was there a valid seizure pursuant to an inventory of Julian’s possessions at the time of his being booked into the Ada County Jail?
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court’s treatment of a motion to suppress, this Court will overturn factual findings made by the trial court only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 452, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989). However, the Court “may undertake a free review of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found.” Id. quoting State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 949 (Ct.App.1988). The measuring of the facts as found by the district court against the constitutional standard of reasonableness is the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court. Heinen, 114 Idaho at 658, 759 P.2d at 949.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A. The Fact That The Officers Cited Julian For Misdemeanor Domestic Battery Does Not Preclude An Inquiry Into Whether An Objective Assessment Of The Facts Supports A Finding of Probable Cause To Arrest For A Related Felony.
A vial of cocaine was discovered in Julian’s shoe during a custodial inventory search of Julian’s person and property. Custodial inventory searches, so long as performed according to standardized police procedures, have been held to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80, 813 P.2d 888, 891 (1991). However, a valid arrest of the person searched is a condition precedent to a valid inventory search. Id. Whether or not an arrest was legal is governed by state law. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420-21 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 820, 826-27 n. 8, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974).
The Idaho Legislature prescribed the circumstances under which a peace officer may arrest. I.C. § 19-603. Idaho’s arrest statute provides:
When peace officer may arrest. — A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
*1361. For a public offense committed or attempted in Ms presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in Ms presence.
3. When a felony has m fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
4. On a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
5. At rnght, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony.
6. When at the scene of a domestic disturbance there is reasonable cause to believe, based on physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of an officer upon immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person arrested has committed an assault or battery.1
Id.
We note that in mterpretmg the arrest statute the district court concluded:
The remaining provision m the arrest statute, I.C. § 19-603(6), permits arrest for a domestic battery oMy “[wjhen at the scene of a domestic disturbance____” The arrest took place at the hospital, and there is no allegation in the record that any domestic disturbance occurred at the hospital. The citation issued to Julian upon Ms arrest indicates that the offense for wMeh Julian was arrested took place at “2011 Ridge Point Wy., Boise.” The same citation states that the arrest took place at the “St. Luke’s E.R. parking lot.” There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Julian was arrested at the scene of a domestic disturbance. The pertinent facts conceded by the state establish that Julian’s arrest exceeded the scope of the arrest statute.
The district court also held that because Julian was arrested for domestic battery, the subsections in the arrest statute dealing with warrantless felony arrest were facially inapplicable. We disagree and hold that the fact that the officers cited Julian for domestic battery does not render the other subsections of the arrest statute facially inapplicable. Because we so hold we need not interpret the “when at the scene of a domestic disturbance” requirement of I.C. § 19-603(6).
In addition to allowing an officer to make an arrest for the commission of the crimes enumerated in subsection 6, the arrest statute allows for a warrantless felony arrest based upon reasonable cause. I.C. § 19-603(3). Reasonable or probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty. State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677, 603 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1979). Probable cause is not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. Id. Rather, it deals with “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on wMch reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal techmcians, act.” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).
When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective standard. That is, “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search “warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Because the facts making up a probable cause determmation are viewed from an ob*137jective standpoint, the officer’s subjective beliefs concerning that determination are not material. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 381, 757 P.2d 240, 244 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Cootz, 110 Idaho 807, 811, 718 P.2d 1245, 1249 (1986); see also, Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir. 1969). In Klingler, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Because probable cause for an arrest is determined by objective facts, it is immaterial that [the arresting officer], at the hearing on the motion to suppress, testified that he did not think he had “enough facts” upon which to arrest Klingler for armed robbery. His subjective opinion is not material. A constitutional safeguard predicated on an objective standard requires an even-handed application. From the standpoint of the individual, the figurative zone protecting his privacy and personal integrity may be encroached under the law only by facts and circumstances totaling probable cause for arrest. From the standpoint of the government, application of the principle of probable cause must allow room for some mistakes by the arresting officer. As Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949): “[t]hese long-prevailing standards [of probable cause] seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officer’s whim or caprice.”
Klingler, 409 F.2d at 304 (Citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the officer’s decision to cite Julian for domestic battery does not foreclose an inquiry into whether an objective assessment of the facts present at the moment of arrest would lead a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Julian for a felony arising from the same operative facts supporting the domestic battery arrest, i.e. aggravated battery.
Furthermore, we hold that an objective assessment of the facts as found by the district court gave the deputies probable cause to arrest Julian for aggravated battery. The district court found that in the late evening of May 20,1994, Julian, in an apparently jealous state, telephoned an acquaintance who had sent Mrs. Julian some flowers. Following the telephone conversation, there was a struggle between the Julians and, during the course of that struggle, Mrs. Julian’s arm was broken. After receiving Mrs. Julian’s mistakenly placed call, the acquaintance telephoned an Ada County dispatcher to report that Mrs. Julian was being battered by Julian. Upon entry in the Julian home, the deputies observed what appeared to be signs of a struggle, including a piece of cloth that appeared to have blood on it.2 The deputies were informed that Mrs. Julian was at the St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center emergency room being treated for a broken arm. After a short conversation with Mrs. Julian, the interviewing deputy gave the other deputies the sign to arrest Julian.
We believe that the possession of these facts, when viewed from an objective standpoint, would warrant a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Julian for a felony, i.e. aggravated battery. The arrest statute allows the warrantless arrest of a person when a felony has been committed and the arresting officer has reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has committed it. I.C. *138§ 19-603. It also allows for a warrantless arrest at night when there is reasonable cause to believe that the arrested person has committed a felony. I.C. § 19-603(5). Because we find that probable cause existed to arrest Julian for aggravated battery, the deputies were within the scope of either subsection of the arrest statute when they arrested Julian.
. The 1994 Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 19-603, effective one month after Julian’s arrest. The amended version added a subsection dealing with hijacking and amended subsection 6 to read:
[Wjhen at the scene of a domestic disturbance there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the officer upon immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person arrested has committed a violation of section 18-902 (assault), 18-903 (battery), 18-918 (domestic assault or battery), 18-7905 (stalking), or 39-6312 (violation of a protection order).
. In his motion to suppress, Julian also argued for suppression of any evidence allegedly observed by the deputies after they entered his residence without a warrant. The district court concluded that the deputies’ entry into the home was not unreasonable and refused to suppress evidence of the items observed by the deputies while inside the Julian home. Julian has not cross-appealed the district court’s ruling in this regard.