dissenting.
As the Court correctly asserts, the question here is not really whether Cline had *98the authority to offer Qualman the school counselor position but rather whether the claimant demonstrated a good faith effort to cultivate a suitable job opportunity. The Commission concluded that the school counselor position was suitable for the claimant, even though the salary was lower than her expectations, and that her refusal to take the position rendered her ineligible for benefits. The Court holds, however, that Qualman’s “request” for a higher salary was a good faith effort to cultivate the proffered position and that she was merely trying to negotiate with Cline when he terminated the conversation. This is simply the Court’s own interpretation of the record. On the contrary, an equally reasonable interpretation of the record is that Qualman made her salary demands known and when Cline advised her the district could not meet those demands, she refused employment at the lower salary.
On the Idaho Continued Claim Report Qualman completed in October she checked the box stating that she had refused work. Qualman gave, as her reason for that refusal, that the School District would not pay her at least $30,000 a year. In her testimony before the hearing officer, Qualman made the following statement:
Q. [by the hearing officer] Okay. So, then on the October 11th, when he told you that the salary was twenty-five one one zero,
A. [Qualman] Uh huh.
Q ____did you tell him that you could not
take it if it didn’t pay 30,000?
A. I told him I needed at least 30,000 ...
I therefore fail to see, under the facts presented, how Qualman’s situation can be distinguished in any meaningful sense from that of the claimant in Czarlinsky. If anything, Qualman’s actions were less ambiguous than those of the claimant in Czarlinsky who only told the employer she “preferred” not working nights when the breakdown in the application process occurred. Qualman specifically refused to work for less than the $30,000 per year to which she felt she was entitled.
Thus whether Qualman refused an actual offer of employment or simply rejected Cline’s overtures, there is substantial competent evidence that some type of offer was made which Qualman refused; and there would be no purpose served at that point in seeking school board approval. Likewise, the Commission’s finding that “the salary restriction imposed by [Qualman] was not reasonable” is also supported by substantial and competent evidence. Contrary to the Court’s conclusion, once Qualman was advised that her salary requirements could not be met, her refusal to thenceforth be considered for the school counselor position does not evidence good faith.
As the Court notes, determining whether a claimant has satisfied the eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits is a question of fact. Clay, 127 Idaho at 503, 903 P.2d at 92. This Court should always defer to the Commission in its factual interpretations when there is substantial and competent evidence to support those findings. Pomerinke v. Excel Trucking Transp., 124 Idaho 301, 305, 859 P.2d 337, 341 (1993) (citing Idaho Const. art. 5, § 9; I.C. § 72-732). Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Commission’s order finding Qualman ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
SCHROEDER, J., joins in Justice TROUT’S dissent.