dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision in the appeal of defendant and concur in the result only in the appeal of plaintiff.
I. Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
Our appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 *48S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007).
Summary judgment may not be used to resolve factual disputes which are material to the disposition of the action. Nor may summary judgment be used where conflicting evidence is involved. Where there is any question regarding the credibility of plaintiffs’ evidence ... or if there is a question which can be resolved only by the weight of the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.
Federal Paper Board Co. v. Kamyr, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 329, 333, 399 S.E.2d 411, 414 (internal citations omitted), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 570, 403 S.E.2d 510 (1991). “The factual truth must be clear and undisputed for summary judgment to be granted.” Camby v. Railway Co., 39 N.C. App. 455, 459, 250 S.E.2d 684, 687, disc. review denied, 297 N.C. 298, 254 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
B. Analysis
1. Defendant’s Appeal
The issue in defendant’s appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment holding that the insurance policy for the Toyota Sequoia (Toyota) provided underinsured motorist coverage for the Mitsubishi Montero (Mitsubishi) that plaintiff was operating at the time of the accident. Only if the Mitsubishi was a “temporary substitute” for the Toyota is this coverage applicable.
At the summary judgment hearing, sharply conflicting evidence was presented by the parties. The trial court and the majority accept at face value the testimony of the Martinis that there was a brake problem with the Toyota, and that is the reason that plaintiff operated the Mitsubishi on the morning of 10 January 2005. The majority further engages in the rank speculation that it is “reasonable to assume that Mrs. Martini did not immediately have the [Toyota] serviced because her husband had broken his neck in a car accident that morning.” The evidence was that the Toyota was not taken in for servicing until over two months after the accident. This is not the appropriate standard to be applied on a summary judgment motion. Rule 56 requires that there be “no genuine issue as to any material *49fact” before summary judgment can be entered. Whether the Mitsubishi was a temporary substitute vehicle as defined by the insurance policy and our case law was the material issue of fact in this case.
Brooks Allen (Allen), an adjuster for defendant, testified by way of deposition that he spoke to plaintiff’s wife on 1 March 2005 concerning the accident. Allen’s contemporaneous claims log note states:
Ms. Martini called. Husband was on his way to the airport to go to a business meeting when the accident occurred. He was driving the personally owned Mitsubishi, rather than a business owned Toyota, as the Toyota is much newer and nicer. So he did not want to leave it in the parking lot at the airport. Toyota is garaged at home and was available for use that day.
(Emphasis added). Based upon this conversation, defendant denied plaintiff’s claim.
On 21 March 2005, George Williams, plaintiff’s insurance agent, left Allen a voice message stating that he had spoken with plaintiff and he had asserted that he was driving the Mitsubishi “because the brake light had come on in the Toyota the night before the accident” and he wanted to “have it checked out[.]” Williams further stated that plaintiff’s wife knew this to be true during their first conversation, but did not think it was important. On 7 April 2005, Allen interviewed plaintiff by telephone, and recorded the conversation. After discussing the accident, plaintiff’s injuries, and the amount of medical bills, Allen asked plaintiff “Okay, why were you driving the Mitsubishi at the time of the accident?” Plaintiff responded:
I, there was, it was a Sunday afternoon, I believe,... my wife took one of my sons either to soccer or baseball practice, and I had noticed that the brake light was on, and in discussion that evening she just mentioned that that was on, and I was heading to the airport, so I said I would, because of that, I’ll just take that, the other vehicle.
Plaintiff went on to state that he and his wife continued to use the Toyota for “several weeks” and that “the brake light did go off.”
The deposition of plaintiff’s wife tended to show that they owned three vehicles, a Mitsubishi, a Toyota, and an Audi. Plaintiff’s wife primarily drove the Mitsubishi and plaintiff drove the Audi for personal use and the Toyota for business purposes. On the morning of the acci*50dent, both the Toyota and the Audi were parked at their residence. Plaintiffs wife drove the Toyota to the hospital that morning because the Audi was “a stickshift” and she “[didn’t] like to drive it.” Later that day she drove the Toyota back home without any problems. Plaintiff’s wife testified that there were no mechanical malfunctions or difficulties associated with the Toyota aside from the brake light being activated. Plaintiff’s wife further testified that she did not take the Toyota to be serviced until 24 March 2005, more than two months after the accident. The invoice from the National Tire & Battery Store on that date listed the following under Item Description: “Wheel Balance,” “Tire Rotation,” “Brakes Check & Advise” and “Patch & Balance Tire Repair[.]” Plaintiff’s wife was only charged for the tire repair at a rate $19.99. When asked if she recalled telling Allen that the Mitsubishi was nicer than the other cars she owned, she responded:
Well, the nicest car at our house would have been the Audi TT. And if I would have said — I wouldn’t have said that the Toyota is newer or nicer than the Mitsubishi, because the Mitsubishi was actually newer. That just wasn’t true. And I am thinking that there’s confusion there with the Audi, that — that he thinks that I was talk — that—I had been talking about the Audi, not the Mitsubishi.
Based on the above-recited testimony before the trial court, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to why plaintiff operated the Mitsubishi on the morning of the accident. The resolution of this issue requires the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weighing of the testimony. This is a task for the trier of fact and not for the court upon a motion for summary judgment. Since neither party requested a jury trial, the trial court should have heard the evidence, and entered a judgment containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52 (2007); Federal Paper Board Co., 101 N.C. App. at 333, 399 S.E.2d at 414; see also Craddock v. Craddock, 188 N.C. App. 806, 813, 656 S.E.2d 716, 721 (2008) (“The Capps reminder still holds true, as the trial judge may not assume the role of trier of fact too soon.”) (citation omitted)); Capps v. City of Raleigh, 35 N.C. App. 290, 292, 241 S.E.2d 527, 528-29 (1978) (“[T]he Supreme Court and this Court have emphasized in numerous opinions that upon a motion for summary judgment it is [not] part of the court’s function to decide issues of fact but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. Despite our frequent reminders, we find that some of the trial judges continue to treat the motion for summary judgment as a hearing upon the merits before *51the court without a jury where the judge becomes the trier of the facts.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)).
The insurance policy states “[t]he covered ‘auto’ must be out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, ‘loss’ or destruction.” North Carolina appellate courts have interpreted similar provisions with varying results based upon the specific facts of each case as is correctly articulated in the majority opinion. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co., 279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571 (1971); Ransom v. Casualty Co., 250 N.C. 60, 108 S.E.2d 22 (1959); Maryland Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 83 N.C. App. 140, 349 S.E.2d 307 (1986). The general rules that can be gleaned from this prior case law are that the vehicle covered under the insurance policy need not be withdrawn from use because of some mechanical defect, it may also be unavailable due to body work in order for another vehicle to qualify as a substitute. Insurance Co., 279 N.C. at 251, 182 S.E.2d at 578; Maryland Casualty Co., 83 N.C. App. at 142, 349 S.E.2d at 308-09. “[H]owever, the initially covered vehicle must nonetheless be actually withdrawn from use.” Maryland Casualty Co., 83 N.C. App. at 142, 349 S.E.2d at 309.
No reasonable interpretation of the policy provision in the instant case would conclude that the Toyota was “out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, ‘loss’ or destruction” because plaintiff did not want to leave it in the parking lot at the airport because it was “newer and nicer” than the Mitsubishi. If the trial court believed Allen’s testimony as to why plaintiff drove the Mitsubishi to the airport, plaintiff would be excluded from coverage pursuant to the underinsured motorist insurance policy. On the other hand, the trial court could determine that plaintiff drove the Mitsubishi on the morning of the accident because the Toyota’s brake light had activated. If the trial court made such a finding, the next question the trial court must resolve is whether the Toyota’s activated brake light caused the vehicle to be “out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, ‘loss’ or destruction.” This ruling will depend upon the evidence plaintiff presents at trial. In making this determination, the trial court should consider the purpose of the typical substitution provision:
the purpose of the provision is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicles the insured intends normally to use, while at the same time permitting operations to go on should the particular vehicles named be temporarily out of commission, thus enabling the insurer to issue a policy upon a rate fair to both insured *52and insurer, rather than one at a prohibitive premium for blanket coverage of any and all vehicles which the insured might own or operate.
Ransom, 250 N.C. at 63, 108 S.E.2d at 24. If plaintiff presents evidence at trial establishing by the greater weight of the evidence that the Toyota was “out of service” on the day the accident occurred, the Mitsubishi would be a temporary substitute vehicle and there would be underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for the Toyota. If plaintiff fails to present such evidence, coverage would be precluded.
Because the resolution of this factual dispute is outcome determinative, it may not be resolved at summary judgment. Federal Paper Board Co., 101 N.C. App. at 333, 399 S.E.2d at 414. The trial court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff was improper.
2. Plaintiff’s Cross-Anneal
The issue in plaintiff’s cross-appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment holding plaintiff failed to show defendant committed unfair settlement practices and unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-63-15(11) and 75-1.1.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the allegations in plaintiff’s unverified complaint are sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact. See Tew v. Brown, 135 N.C. App. 763, 767, 522 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1999) (“[T]he trial court may not consider an unverified pleading when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)), disc. review improvidently allowed, 352 N.C. 145, 531 S.E.2d 213 (2000); Venture Properties I v. Anderson, 120 N.C. App. 852, 855, 463 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1995) (holding that “[sjince [the] defendant’s pleadings were unverified, the trial court acted properly in refusing to consider them” when granting the plaintiff summary judgment (citations omitted)), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 898, 467 S.E.2d 908 (1996). In the instant case, a genuine issue of material fact was raised by conflicting evidence in the parties’ depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits as to why plaintiff operated the Mitsubishi on the morning of the accident. Whether defendant violated N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-63-15(11) and 75-1.1 is largely contingent upon the resolution of this factual dispute, which would dictate whether the Mitsubishi was a temporary substitute vehicle. Once the trial court has properly determined whether or not plaintiff is provided coverage under the underinsured motorist insur*53anee policy, it can then determine whether defendant conducted a reasonable and complete investigation before denying plaintiffs claim and whether defendant was justified in continuing to deny plaintiffs claim after the 7 April 2005 conversation. Because plaintiffs cross-appeal also depends upon a factual dispute which is material to the disposition of the action, partial summary judgment in favor of defendant was improper. Therefore, I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion.
I would hold the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff as to the coverage issue and granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant as to plaintiffs claim for unfair settlement practices and unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-63-15(11) and 75-1.1. This case should be remanded for a trial on the merits.