dissenting;
The majority frames the jurisdiction issue as whether Oklahoma has been “ousted” from its “concurrent jurisdiction.” It disregards United States Supreme Court case law as well as recent Oklahoma case law1 squarely in point, and instead relies predomi*517nately on two United States Supreme Court eases dealing with “ouster.” In so doing, the majority makes the assumption that the state has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal and tribal courts, and pays no heed to the abundance of United States Supreme Court law dealing with the extremely narrow jurisdiction held by a state over Indian affairs in Indian country.2
The majority’s explanation of Gulf Offshore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) and Yellow Freight System, Inc., v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) may be correct when applied in the proper context; however, these two cases have no relevance in this setting, and are not applicable when the state’s jurisdiction is questioned because of an assertion that the event took place in Indian country. The United States Supreme Court has held, in similar instances, that application of principles derived in other areas of law are generally not helpful when attempting to resolve an issue which arose in Indian country. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980). Because of the special relationship between a tribe and the federal and state governments, such questions must be resolved in light of historical concepts regarding Indians. Id,.; see also Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 259-280 (1984).
No party to this lawsuit raised or addressed the issue of “ouster” or “concurrent jurisdiction.” Rather, they correctly framed the issue as one which focuses on whether the state courts have jurisdiction over a contract dispute involving an Indian housing authority.3 The housing authority urges that the state lacks jurisdiction because the land dispute arose in a dependent Indian eommu-nity which is included within the statutory definition of “Indian country.” The Lewises disagree, urging that state courts have jurisdiction because the housing authority was created and incorporated under state law.
“With the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law.” Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1251, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984) reh. denied, 471 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 2173, 85 L.Ed.2d 491 (1984) (Emphasis added); U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. The basic issue is simply whether the transaction occurred in Indian country. If it did not, the state may clearly assume jurisdiction and resolve the matter. However, if it did occur in Indian country, further analysis of Supreme Court law is necessary to determine where jurisdiction rests. “Numerous cases confirm the principle that the Indian country classification is the benchmark for approaching the allocation of federal, tribal, and state authority with respect to Indians and Indian lands.” Indian Country, U.S.A v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir.1987). cert. denied 487 U.S. 1218, 108 S.Ct. 2870, 101 L.Ed.2d 906 (1988).4 Thus, the question of whether this event took place in Indian country is the cornerstone and beginning point of analysis. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1991, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993).
This framing of the issue does not preclude all state jurisdiction over Indian concerns. It requires that the analysis begin by recognizing that OHahoma, in its Enabling Act, declined general civil regulatory jurisdiction. Oklahoma Enabling Act, Ch. 3335, § 3, 34 *518Stat. 267, 270 (1906); see also Senate Report 699, 1953 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2409, 2412. Thus, any civil jurisdiction held by this state is a direct result of federal congressional action or federal case law. We, as a court, may not like the idea that we are without jurisdiction to adjudicate certain civil actions dealing with Indian matters. Nevertheless, our guidance comes from the Federal Constitution and its interpretation in judicial opinions. We are bound by the interpretation given in this area by the United States Supreme Court. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. State ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.1989).
In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1958), the United States Supreme Court explained the state’s role with regard to jurisdiction over Indian concerns. There, a non-Indian owned and operated a store on the Navajo Reservation. He brought suit against two on-reservation Indians who had purchased goods from his store on credit and had failed to make payment. The Arizona state court refused to dismiss the action.for lack of jurisdiction, and entered judgment on behalf of the store owner. The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the state had no jurisdiction over the matter. Quoting Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), the Court explained that the laws of the state have no application because the state does not have jurisdiction:
The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia' have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Id. 358 U.S. at 219, 79 S.Ct. at 270 (Emphasis added). The Court held that while there had been slight modifications in the law of Worcester, “the basic policy of Worcester had remained.” Id.5 Williams makes it clear that, unlike the majority’s assertion, Oklahoma does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government if the event took place within Indian country. See also Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883). Instead, there is a presumption against state jurisdiction in Indian country. Indian Country, U.S.A, 829 F.2d at 976, citing Cabazon, supra, and Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, supra.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly denied jurisdiction to state courts. In Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971). There, Indians bought food on credit from a grocery store on the reservation. The store brought suit against the indians in a Montana state court. The United States Supreme Court held that Montana was without jurisdiction over the matter because it had not complied with the terms of Pub.L. 83-280. Again, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) reh. denied 425 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 1524, 47 L.Ed.2d 772 (1976), Montana’s jurisdiction was questioned. There, an adoption proceeding had been brought in state court. The Supreme Court held that the tribe had jurisdiction over the adoption and that the state was without jurisdiction.
Later, in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983), the Court stated that the rule is not so inflexible as to preclude all *519jurisdiction absent Congress’ consent. Instead, the Williams rule was refined: “[U]n-der certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may asset jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.”6
Congress has consistently acted to show that the states have only limited power to regulate Indian affairs. Id. 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.Ct. at 270. The Federal Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, specifically states that “Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... with Indian Tribes.” Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, as well as federal courts of appeal, have consistently held that this provision of the “Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2402, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376, 96 5.Ct. 2102, 2105, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 714 n. 2 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 555, 95 S.Ct. 710, 716, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); Indian Country, U.S.A v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 974 (10th Cir.1987). The state’s lack of jurisdiction has also been affirmed when dealing with the related concept of sovereignty. “[Tjribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557, 95 S.Ct. at 717; see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980); Indian Country, U.S.A., supra.7
Congress provided a method by which Oklahoma could have assumed jurisdiction over some civil matters arising in Indian country. United States v. Burnett, 777 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.1985) cert. denied 476 U.S. 1106, 106 S.Ct. 1952, 90 L.Ed.2d 361 (1985). Under Public Law 83-280, as later amended in 25 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq., Congress agreed to cede jurisdiction over civil Indian matters to the states:
§ 1322. Assumption by State of civil jurisdiction
(a) Consent of United States; force and effect of civil laws
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.
Under this statute as originally enacted, the state was required to take some affirmative action to extend its jurisdiction to Indian country. Oklahoma did not take any such action. Id. see also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1992. The intent as expressed by congressional reports shows that Congress investigated the various needs of states and tribes. Tribes were for the most part “agreeable to the transfer of jurisdiction” proposed under Pub.L. 83-280. Senate Report, at 2412. However, several states — INCLUDING OKLAHOMA — had in their constitutions expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian land within state borders. The *520Senate Report states that the effect of such disclaimers was “to retain exclusive Federal jurisdiction ...” (Emphasis added). If the view enunciated in the majority opinion were correct, there would have been no need for federal legislation like Pub.L. 83-280.
Thus, the question is not one of “ouster of concurrent jurisdiction” but is one of state power and authority to adjudicate an matter occurring in Indian country. While Oklahoma is not completely precluded from regulating affairs on Indian country, it does not have general civil regulatory power or authority to apply all of its general laws. See Cabazon, infra. “If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.” Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) and Williams v. Lee, supra.8
This Court has once before attempted to exercise jurisdiction where it had not been expressly permitted by the federal government. In State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77 (Okla.1985), we stated that Oklahoma has “residual” civil jurisdiction over Indian country. Relying on a novel interpretation of Pub.L. 83-280, we held that assertion of jurisdiction under Pub.L. 83-280 was not the only way in which a state could exercise general civil jurisdiction. We stated that our state could exercise authority over Indian country under its “residual jurisdiction” powers:
The concept of ‘residuary’ jurisdiction is used to invest state courts with jurisdiction interstitially when the subject-matter of cognizance does not infringe upon tribal self-government and has not been preempted by congressional legislation.
Id. at 88. We continued by balancing the interests of the state in regulating tribal bingo against that of the federal and tribal governments, holding that the state is not necessarily precluded from exercising jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with our May analysis in Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. State ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.1989). The same issue was presented in a connected case in the federal courts. The Tenth Circuit held that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in May was inconsistent with federal law, and because it was a matter of interpretation of federal principles, this Court’s analysis was not binding. Id. at 714. The federal court first looked to whether it should abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Answering that question in the negative, the court pointed out the primacy of the federal interest:
The Constitution grants to Congress the power ‘To regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.’ U.S. Const, art I, § 8, cl. 3. The treaties and other agreements that govern the relationship between the Indians and other Americans are part of ‘the supreme Law of the Land.” Id. art VI, cl.2. It is Congress that has set the terms under which modem American Indians live, the United States Supreme Court that has shaped the interpretation of those terms and the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs that has managed the day-to-day-interactions with the Tribes. Indeed, Oklahoma, like many other states, was required to disclaim jurisdiction over Indians at statehood.
Id. at 712. (Emphasis Added). The Tenth Circuit continued by noting that the “presumption and the reality, however, are that federal law, federal policy, and federal authority are paramount in the conduct of Indian affairs in Indian Country.” Id. at 713. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the federal *521court — not the Oklahoma state courts — had jurisdiction to regulate the civil matter of tribal bingo.
As for the majority’s claim that Harjo and Ahboah failed to consider “ouster” principles, these two cases have been approved by a federal court. In Richardson v. Malone, 762 F.Supp. 1463 (N.D.Okla.1991), the federal district court held that it had jurisdiction over a foreclosure action against Indian defendants involving property located in Indian country. The court again pointed out that Oklahoma had not accepted civil jurisdiction as authorized by Pub.L. 83-280. Citing Harjo and Ahboah, the federal court agreed that the state did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 1466. Because of the absence of tribal courts and the lack of jurisdiction in the state court, the contract dispute was properly lodged in the federal courts.
Here, if the transaction or land involved was not Indian country9 within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, then Oklahoma courts have jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is with this inquiry that Ahboah v. Housing Authority of the Kiowa Tribe of Indians, 660 P.2d 625 (Okla.1983) and Housing Authority of Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d 1098 (Okla.1990) come into play. These two cases dealt with Section 1151’s definition of “Indian country.” The relevant portion of Section 1151 states that “Indian country” includes “all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state.”
In Harjo, an Indian homeowner fell behind in her payments to the Indian housing authority. The authority brought suit in state court for forcible entry and detainer. The homeowner urged that the state did not have jurisdiction over the matter because her home was located in a dependant Indian community. The evidence showed that she inherited restricted Seminole land from her husband. She deeded the land to the housing authority to build her a house. Under a Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreement, the authority built the house. The woman agreed to make payments for seventeen years. After all payments were made, the house and land were to be deeded back to her.
Relying on federal case law10, we held that the factors to be considered when determining whether land is located in a dependant Indian community were:
(1) [Wjhether the United States had retained title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy and authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory, (2) the nature of the area in questions, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government and the established practice of government agencies toward the area, (3) whether there is an element of cohesiveness manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality, and (4) whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.
The federal government has jurisdiction over “those communities which, while neither part of a federal reservation nor Indian ‘allotments,’ are both ‘Indian’ in character and federally dependent.” Harjo, 790 P.2d at 1100-1101, quoting United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089, 103 S.Ct. 574, 74 L.Ed.2d 936 (1982). In general terms, the decisive question is whether the land was “validly set apart for the use of the Indians, *522as such, under the superintendence of the government.” United States v. Pelican, 282 U.S. 442, 34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676 (1914). The ultimate decision as to whether land is situated within a dependent Indian community is factually specific. Pelican, supra; Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir.1988).
We held that under the circumstances presented in Harjo, the land was located within a dependant Indian community. The land remained subject to the control of the federal government; there were comprehensive governmental regulations regarding the MHO agreement. The tribe maintained the sewage and health services to the area. The schools received federal funding, through programs designed to help Indian children. An anthropologist testified that the living arrangement was consistent with a distinct traditional pattern of dwelling within Indian families. The house was located near Indian churches where traditional Indian languages were spoken.
The evidence is not nearly so strong in the present case. The land in question was not owned by Indians nor held in trust for their benefit prior to the purchase by the housing authority. The home is located on unrestricted fee land. There is not intensive control by the federal government through HUD, because the MHO agreement has been completed and the house and land has been deeded to the Lewises. There do not seem to be close tribal ties to the housing addition. There is no evidence that the residents of the house are dependent on the Sac and Fox Tribe for police or fire protection.11 Importantly, the Lewis’s assert that they are not part of an Indian community. Unlike Harjo, where four tracts of lands were deeded to build houses for members of the same family, the only connection between the Lewises and the other homeowners is location. The land was not ‘set apart for the use of Indians, as such under the superintendence of the government.” Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, 34 S.Ct. at 399.
I would determine that the facts are not sufficient to show a “dependent Indian community” under Harjo. Thus, the land is not Indian country as defined by Section 1151. The state court has jurisdiction to decide the controversy. This rationale is consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeal, and our own jurisprudence.
I am authorized to state that KAUGER, J., joins in these views.
. Housing Authority of Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d 1098 (Okla.1990), is effectively overruled by today’s majority opinion. Other cases which are overruled, although not expressly, are Ahboah v. Housing Authority of Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625 (Okla.1983), Barnett v. Newcomer, 307 P.2d 148 (Okla.1957), and Swain v. Hildebrand, 36 P.2d 924 (Okla.1934).
. A conflict between this Court’s resolution and those resolutions of the federal appeals court is reason for the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1086, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1974).
. At least one federal court has held that Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over general contract disputes which arise in Indian country. See Richardson v. Malone, 762 F.Supp. 1463 (N.D.Okla.1991).
.Cited as authority for this statement are Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 1163, 79 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir.1980); Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 27-46 (R. Strickland ed. 1982); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 5-8 (1942).
. Williams and Worcester have been consistently followed in jurisprudence concerned with state jurisdiction over Indian affairs. See, e.g. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) reh. denied 425 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 1524, 47 L.Ed.2d 772 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367 (1945). The concepts have now been further refined to permit a “a more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes.” Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148, 93 S.Ct. at 1270; see also Organized. Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 66 S.Ct. 307, 90 L.Ed. 261 (1946). Because I do not believe that this property was located within Indian country, I do not fully discuss the different arenas in which the state may have jurisdiction over Indian country.
. See also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) reh. denied 448 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 25, 65 L.Ed.2d 1172 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973).
. See generally Clinton, American Indian Law (3d ed. 1991), pp. 181-183.
. One example of insufficient state interests to justify the extent of state jurisdiction was addressed in Cabazon. There california sought to regulate tribal bingo, asserting that the State had an interest in preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime. The Supreme Court held this to be insufficient to permit the state to have jurisdiction. This decision is important especially in light of the fact that California had expressly been granted certain jurisdictional rights under Pub.L. 280, yet the Court still declined to extend the state's jurisdiction to cover this situation. Oklahoma, by failing to take action under Pub.L. 280, has even less regulatory authority than does California.
. It is not “reservation” status that blocks the state from asserting jurisdiction. In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993), the United States Supreme Court stated that “reservation" status was irrelevant; the proper inquiry was whether the event took place in "Indian country” or involved a tribal member who lived in “Indian country.” Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1991. The Court went on to note that “Congress has defined Indian country broadly to include formal and informal reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
. United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823, 103 S.Ct. 52, 74 L.Ed.2d 58 (1982); United States v. Marline, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.1971).
. The Authority states that such protection is available.